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Abstract 
This thesis re-examines a common assumption entering theoretical models of 
endogenous switching costs. Through a discrete choice experiment we test the 
hypothesis that consumers are heterogeneous in the way they respond when firms offer 
repeat purchase discounts through loyalty schemes. The assumption itself is important 
because in practice, heterogeneity in consumer switching costs holds implications for 
firms’ strategies and their resultant market shares. This thesis presents a flexible 
methodology for a discrete choice experiment inspired by the UK groceries sector using 
novel techniques in D-efficient experimental survey design. When fitting the data to the 
mixed logit model, we find that consumers’ taste varies significantly more for loyalty 
schemes than for any of the other variables entering the model. The results of our 
discrete choice experiment show that consumers differ significantly in how they 
respond to repeat purchase discount strategies. On this basis, it is likely that theoretical 
models of loyalty schemes overemphasise the effects of loyalty schemes on price 
competition.  We argue instead, that a repeat purchase discount strategy will not result 
in a unilateral increase in artificial switching costs for all consumers in the market.  We 
propose that forward looking firms are likely to recognise the limitations to scheme 
effectiveness due to heterogeneity in switching costs and will be more likely to invest 
in their customer base through future lower prices. Therefore from a competition policy 
perspective, we argue that in a fast paced retail market for non-durable goods, loyalty 
schemes are more likely to intensify competition for the benefit of consumers rather 
than act as an exclusionary device. 
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Thesis Introduction 
Traditionally, models of endogenous switching costs have assumed that 
consumers are homogeneous in the way they perceive artificial costs of switching when 
firms offer repeat purchase discounts.  This thesis re-examines this assumption and 
shows empirically that consumers’ responses to repeat purchase discount strategies are 
likely to vary significantly in real-world markets. This result is driven by the fact that 
consumers are heterogeneous in their costs of switching when retailers offer loyalty 
schemes.  It follows that some consumers do not perceive any switching costs when 
choosing between retailers when loyalty schemes are introduced in the market.  Instead, 
these consumers base their choice of retailer on their general preferences and this is 
independent of the availability of a repeat purchase discount. In fact, we find that a 
loyalty scheme may actually reduce utility for some individuals who may for example, 
prefer not to allow retailers to collect, store and analyse their personal data.  Therefore, 
on the basis of our empirical findings, we argue that the theory cannot simply assume 
that repeat purchase discounts unilaterally increase switching costs for all consumers. 
In turn, we note the limitations of scheme effectiveness will likely affect the strategies 
adopted by forward looking firms competing for consumers in a non-durable goods 
market. 
From a competition policy perspective, switching costs are generally viewed as 
welfare reducing because as consumers become “locked-in” through perceived and/ or 
actual costs of switching they are less willing to switch away in future periods of 
competition. This demand side effect has a tendency to soften price competition.  In 
this context, forward looking firms may choose to create switching costs by 
implementing loyalty schemes strategies. Considering the industrial organisation 
literature, it is well-documented that consumers incur costs of switching between 
brands and providers in many markets (Klemperer 1995, Farrell & Klemperer 2007). 
For example, individuals’ psychological attachments to brands are associated with 
switching costs and may reduce their willingness to try alternative products.  
Transaction costs incurred by customers when switching between providers also 
represent a type of switching cost.   
Both of the above examples represent exogenous switching costs and prevail in 
markets regardless of consumers’ behaviour or firms’ strategies. On the other hand, 
endogenous switching costs arise when firms make strategic decisions which create 
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artificial switching costs.  Namely by entering into contractual arrangements with 
customers, introducing product incompatibility or offering customers repeat purchase 
discounts in the form of loyalty schemes. Exogenous and endogenous switching costs 
are generally associated with less competitive markets and tend to soften price 
competition (Klemperer 1995, Farrell & Klemperer 2007).   However, they may also 
lead firms to compete more fiercely for market share through lower prices (Rhodes 
2014).  There are a number of drivers underlying these outcomes and we briefly 
consider these below.  
It has been shown that in markets with exogenous switching costs firms compete 
vigorously ex ante to gain and establish a large market share to achieve greater market 
power in future periods over locked-in consumers (Farrell & Klemperer 2007).   With 
the knowledge that consumers are partially locked-in in a market with exogenous 
switching costs, firms tend to face the trade-off between harvesting or investing in 
market share (Klemperer 1995, Anderson & Kumar 2007, Rhodes 2014).  In some cases 
this leads to a bargain-to-rip-off game where firms offer low prices to grow market 
share and then charge higher prices in future periods (Farrell & Klemperer 2007).  In 
other words, anticipating that consumers will not switch away, a firm with a degree of 
market power can harvest customers by charging higher prices.  Alternatively, a firm 
may instead invest in growing its market share and reduce prices leading to more 
intense price competition.  Therefore the assumptions entering a theoretical model, 
namely the number of stages of competition, will have a direct impact on the 
competitive effects of switching costs and market outcomes (Rhodes 2014). 
Equally, loyalty scheme strategies can lead to either more or less competitive 
markets depending on consumers’ responses, the market structure and firm symmetry. 
For instance, loyalty schemes are generally considered to be anticompetitive in 
duopoly, while under monopolistic competition, loyalty schemes are associated with 
largely procompetitive effects that enhance welfare for consumers (Caminal & Claici 
2007).  The assumptions on consumer preferences are also important in such models as 
loyalty scheme effectiveness drives consumer responses and the firm’s own strategy 
going forward.  However, theoretical models of repeat purchase discounts, by definition 
assume that firms themselves determine the size of artificial switching costs (Klemperer 
1995, Farrell & Klemperer).  Another important assumption found in theoretical models 
of switching costs, is that consumers incur switching costs homogenously say through 
a unilateral increase in transport costs in a Hotelling framework. As far as we are aware, 
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there exists only one recent publication which considers heterogeneous switching costs 
(Biglaiser et al. 2016).  The authors provide an important contribution in that “[…] 
heterogeneity of switching costs has complex strategic consequences which have 
largely been ignored in the literature. It will influence the strategies of firms, the 
equilibrium distribution of clients, and the value of incumbency.”1   
This thesis is structured as follows. Section 1.2 of the first chapter sets out the 
features of UK groceries sector which represents a mature market for loyalty scheme 
strategies.  We then set out in detail the main aspects of the theoretical literature on 
switching costs and loyalty schemes in nondurable goods markets in Section 1.3.  
Section 1.4 then presents empirical evidence on the effects of loyalty schemes.  In 
reviewing the literature, we find that few papers study the demand-side effects of the 
strategy in fast moving retail markets and attention has instead been typically placed on 
frequent flier programs.  The effects of the strategy are also influenced by the principal 
agent problem which is not common across markets.  In the context of the review, we 
identify a gap in the literature in the context of heterogeneity in endogenous switching 
costs when firms implement repeat purchase discounts in fast moving consumer 
markets.   
Section 1.5 sets out the relevant competition policy considerations for markets 
with endogenous and exogenous switching costs. In doing so we apply the lessons from 
the theory and also assess the relevant practical considerations for intervention.  This 
section looks at the recent market investigations into UK retail banking and the retail 
energy where low switching by consumers was deemed as being particularly 
problematic for rivalry between firms and outcomes for consumers.  Towards the end 
of the first chapter, we introduce the concept of discrete choice experiments. This 
approach enables the researcher to address very specific questions on drivers of 
consumer choice by mimicking real-world markets through some form of instrument.  
Either through a series of survey questions or controlled lab experiments.  The approach 
also overcomes some of the limitations of theoretical models which may not capture 
the wider aspects of a retail offer and instead assume a relatively unsophisticated 
consumer preferences.  We do acknowledge that theoretical modelling is essential in 
explaining broader dynamics of markets to help us understand the underlying rationale 
                                                 
1 Biglaiser, G., Crémer J., Dobos, G., ‘Heterogeneous switching costs’, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, Vol. 47, p. 63, 2016. 
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and incentives for the pricing and discounting strategies adopted by firms.  However, a 
typical model focuses on the firm and rivalry with competitors not the consumer.  This 
is the case even though consumers’ preferences and reactions to strategies can have 
significant effects on the competitiveness of a market.  We recognize that DCEs are 
useful however these are of course experiments.  As such, they will always be imperfect 
due to the complex nature of real world markets (Waterson 2014).  Nonetheless, we 
argue that when analysing the effectiveness of business strategies which rely heavily 
on reactions of consumers, a combination of theoretical and experimental evidence may 
be optimal.  In combining both approaches, we note that empirical evidence can help 
determine realistic assumptions to enter a theoretical model.  The model itself can then 
be applied for a broader assessment of welfare effects and consumer outcomes more 
accurately reflecting the demand and supply sides of the market.  
The experiment we design in this thesis relies on novel techniques in stated 
choice methods. The theoretical underpinnings and applications of stated choice 
methods are presented within the beginning of the second chapter of this thesis in 
Section 2.2.  Section 2.3 derives the functional form of the logistic regression models 
used to analyse micro-level choice data including the conditional logit model and the 
more advanced mixed logit.  The mixed logit model accommodates preference 
heterogeneity and allows us to later show that consumers differ in their taste for repeat 
purchase discounts. In the second chapter we note that there exists two main methods 
for the design of the unique survey: a traditional orthogonal design or an efficient 
design.  Section 2.4 sets out the trade-offs inherent to these methods noting that our 
chosen efficient experimental design approach requires a smaller sample size to achieve 
robust parameter estimates. This methodology incorporates the discrete choice model 
into the survey design itself and thus seeks to reduce the resulting standard errors of 
parameter estimates.  Furthermore, unlike orthogonal designs which are based on the 
statistical properties of linear models, the data obtained using an efficient survey design 
can be easily accommodated by non-linear discrete choice models. Section 2.5 sets out 
additional considerations for the design of a survey in terms of contextual realism, the 
sample size requirements, how to select the optimal number of questions to present to 
respondents and other relevant factors of survey design.  
Ahead of presenting our detailed methodology, Section 2.6 evaluates ways in 
which researchers perform surveys of human populations, noting the possible biases 
tied to online surveys and convenience sampling approaches.  Then, we outline a 
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methodology for the design of a discrete choice experiment to measure consumer 
preferences for loyalty schemes in the UK groceries market in Section 2.7.  We explain 
how we design the survey questions to maximise elicitation of truthful response, in 
particular on sensitive issues such as income.  We also perform a qualitative assessment 
of this market to ensure the experiment accurately reflects features of the sector. We 
undertake a small pilot study and evaluate the results in Section 2.8. We rely on the 
estimated coefficients to set the parameter priors to enter the final design of our survey.  
This is a requirement in D-efficient designs.  The final survey design is outlined in 
Section 2.9 where we explain how to control for uncertainty on parameter prior values 
through Bayesian estimation methods. 
Proceeding to the third chapter, we present the empirical results of the discrete 
choice experiment.  We begin in Section 3.2 by outlining how we cleaned the data by 
removing certain responses.  We also perform a number of data quality checks to ensure 
that the results we estimate are in fact reasonable. We then compare the 
sociodemographic characteristics of survey respondents to the general population 
figures in section 3.3. We find that the sampled respondents are wealthier, younger and 
on average more likely to be from Southern regions where household incomes are above 
the national average.  This source of bias is addressed within the empirical analysis 
section through the application of weights in Section 3.4.  Section 3.5 presents the 
results of further model specifications where we perform individual-level parameter 
estimation as well as presenting estimates of willingness-to-pay.  We then apply our 
empirical results to the literature we reviewed as part of the first chapter as part of the 
discussion in Section 3.6.  
The coefficient estimates we obtain suggest that consumers have heterogeneous 
preferences for most grocery retailer attributes.  However, we observe the most 
variation in taste for the repeat purchase discount attribute.  Our results suggest that 
around a third of consumers and/ or households prefer not to receive a repeat purchase 
discount. When looking at the distribution in tastes (i.e. unobservable variation in 
preferences) among grocery shoppers, the discount variable displays the most variation 
with 68% of grocery shoppers favouring a loyalty scheme when choosing between 
grocery retailers.  While the remaining 32% of shoppers prefer not to participate in any 
loyalty scheme at all.  On the basis of our empirical results, we argue that some 
consumer segments are more likely to incur artificial switching costs than others. For 
example, individuals who participate in few loyalty schemes tend to be more affected 
14 
 
by the presence of a loyalty scheme.  In terms of behaviour, they will be more likely to 
choose to participate in a loyalty scheme and make their future retailer choices on that 
basis. In addition, the results show that while the loyalty scheme coefficient is positive 
for most individuals, this is not the case for everyone. On the basis of our estimates, 
respondents who indicated that they do not participate in any loyalty schemes at all, 
may actually receive a disutility from this attribute.  This suggests that some consumers 
may even be deterred by the scheme perhaps due to data privacy concerns.  As such, 
these shoppers will instead choose the retailer corresponding to their current 
preferences, even if it is the retailer who offers the loyalty scheme.  In reality the 
availability of a loyalty scheme does not necessarily imply the consumer is forced to 
sign up to the scheme and redeem a coupon.  
Our results strongly suggest that it is unrealistic to assume that when a firm 
implements a loyalty rewarding scheme this will unilaterally increase artificial 
switching costs for all consumers active in the market.  As loyalty schemes do not create 
artificial switching costs for all consumers, the effects of the strategy are likely to be 
weaker and thus lead to a less significant impact on price competition than suggested 
in the literature. In applying these aspects of our results to the theoretical assumptions 
on consumer behaviour, we argue that variation in endogenous switching costs between 
consumers may have ambiguous welfare effects depending on the model design.  In 
particular, whether rival firms can actually observe this aspect of differentiation in 
behaviour and how they would react in response.  For example, by price discriminating 
between groups of consumers.   
As such, in a nondurable goods market, absent significant exogenous costs of 
switching, loyalty schemes will have weaker lock-in effects than suggested by theory 
and will be more likely to be procompetitive in nature. We argue that due to limitations 
to scheme effectiveness outlined above, firms likely face weaker incentives to engage 
in harvesting of consumers and instead, are more likely to choose a strategy which 
seeks to invest in market share.  Further, assuming rival firms cannot discriminate in 
their pricing between different groups of consumers who vary in their sensitivities to 
loyalty schemes, they will be incentivised to implement other strategies to compete for 
different types of consumers, namely through higher quality or lower average prices.  
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1.1 Introduction 
In some retail markets, firms have the profit incentive to implement loyalty 
scheme strategies that offer consumers repeat purchase discounts (Klemperer 1987, 
1995, Caminal & Claici 2007).  The strategy creates artificial switching costs and as a 
result, consumers are less willing to switch away to an alternative product or provider 
(Klemperer 1995).  It has been established in the literature, that switching costs allow 
firms to enjoy a degree of market power over the segment of “locked-in” consumers 
giving them a profit incentive to maintain this position.  It follows that the lock-in effect 
created by switching costs, explains to an extent, firms’ willingness to invest in 
increasing and/ or maintaining high current market shares as this will lead to greater 
profits in future. Following Klemperer (1995), from the perspective of the firm, it 
chooses to offer repeat purchase discounts if it anticipates that the current cost of 
implementing the scheme will be outweighed by the profits it can achieve as a result. 
Considering the above, firms prefer larger switching costs and not having to commit to 
future prices where they can recoup the discounts offered to customers.   
  It can be shown that rivalry between firms attempting to secure higher market 
share in the presence of switching costs can either soften or intensify competition 
(Klemperer 1987, Caminal & Matutes 1990, Caminal & Claici 2007).  The type of 
competitive effect depends on a number of factors including the number of firms, firm 
symmetry, number of periods entering a theoretical model, presence of different types 
of switching costs among other factors.  We note however, that the models used to 
assess the effects of switching costs typically ignore the fact that consumers are likely 
to be heterogeneous in their switching costs (Biglaiser et al. 2016).  This is the case 
even if switching costs have significant effects on firms’ strategic decisions and 
distribution of market shares (Biglaiser et al. 2016).  Further, theoretical models in 
industrial organisation typically focus on the behaviour of firms, ignoring important 
aspects of consumer behaviour (Waterson 2003).  This is the case even if in some 
markets consumers behaviour affects the functioning of markets and incentives of 
competing firms.  In such cases, the effects of consumer behaviour, namely costs of 
switching, should be reflected in competition policy (Waterson 2003).   
This thesis begins in Section 1.2 by looking at features of the UK groceries 
sector, where two of the largest retailers by market share, Tesco and Sainsbury, offer 
loyalty schemes that enable consumers to earn and spend accumulated points in a 
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variety of ways.2 The evidence, albeit limited, on the UK grocery retailer Tesco’s 
Clubcard, indicates that loyalty schemes can be a tool to gain and retain consumers 
(Rowley 2007, Turner & Wilson 2006).  For example, research by The Institute of 
Grocery Distribution published in May 2013, reports that 43% of shoppers stated that 
the ability to use a loyalty scheme in store determines their choice of grocery retailer.3 
More recently, high-end grocery retailer Waitrose, also introduced its own loyalty 
scheme offering a free coffee and newspaper to scheme members on a daily basis. The 
trend is set to continue with businesses showing an appetite for innovations in mobile 
payment systems and corresponding mobile apps that accommodate more sophisticated 
loyalty programs offering additional customer insights.4   
After outlining the main features of the groceries sector, we present the 
economic theory of switching cost which explains the rationale for the use loyalty 
schemes in retail markets.  In presenting the literature, we note that despite the growing 
popularity of loyalty rewarding schemes in a number of markets, there exist only a few 
publications which focus specifically on the competitive effects of the strategy, 
particularly from an empirical perspective. Thus the impact of loyalty programs on 
competition and outcomes is not completely established in neither marketing5 nor 
industrial organization research (Caminal & Claici 2007, Caminal 2012, Dorotic, 
Bijmolt & Verhoef 2012).  Most models used to analyse loyalty scheme strategies are 
derived from the theory of endogenous switching costs.6  In this setting, firms create 
switching costs through strategic decisions which may include the adoption of repeat 
purchase discounts.  The resultant market shares of firms depend on rivals’ actions, 
particularly their ability to respond with a lower price or similar discount.  Thus it can 
be shown that even when firms are largely identical ex ante, the repeat purchase 
discount can help the firm differentiate itself from rivals, act as a business stealing 
device and facilitate exclusion of rivals in future periods (Caminal & Claici 2007).   
On the other hand, loyalty schemes can also be shown to intensify competition 
between firms attempting to attract consumers through lower prices.  Thus loyalty 
schemes are largely pro-competitive when there are a number of competing firms in the 
                                                 
2 See Figure 1.1 below for the market shares of the main grocery retailers in the UK groceries sector. 
3IGD, ‘What impact do loyalty schemes have on store choice?’ 15th July 2013  
4 Mobile payments groups set sights on winning over UK wallets, The Financial Times, June 2, 2014 
5 We note that this thesis focuses on the insights offered by the economic models in industrial 
organisation and we place little weight on the marketing literature.   
6 We note that the Lal & Bell (2003) model of loyalty rewarding programs applies an alternative model 
framework to that observed in models of endogenous switching costs. 
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market (Caminal & Claici 2007). However, as noted above, the fact that consumers 
may not react in the same way to the availability of a repeat purchase discount has 
largely been ignored in the literature. In addition, the models of loyalty schemes we 
present further below in Section 1.3, do not account for the rich set of features of 
retailers in real world markets who compete not only on price but across a number of 
non-price factors.  Section 1.4 considers the existing empirical evidence on loyalty 
schemes and loyalty inducing discounts.  We note that the majority of literature is 
concerned with frequent flier programs which represents a distinctive market with its 
own idiosyncrasies, namely the principal agent problem in driving prices paid by 
customers. 
After reviewing the main sources of evidence on different types of switching 
costs which prevail in markets, we look at likely implications for competition policy in 
Section 1.5.  We look at the recent market investigations into the retail energy and retail 
banking markets in the UK where switching costs were found to be particularly 
problematic and leading to poorer outcomes for some customers.  In doing so we 
explain how policy should look at the wider features of a market when assessing the 
effects of switching costs, namely markets shares of firms over time and price trajectory 
over time. We also note that while there are inherent trade-offs in the approach, discrete 
choice methods can help test the assumptions entering theoretical models and 
accommodate modelling of consumers’ variation in taste. 
1.2 Case Study: UK Groceries Market  
In this section we discuss the role of loyalty schemes in the UK groceries sector 
and compare the features of Tesco’s and Sainsbury’s loyalty schemes. These two 
retailers were the first to implement loyalty schemes and have also enjoyed the highest 
market shares in the groceries sector.  Figure 1.1 below displays the market shares and 
loyalty scheme launch dates of the main players in the market.  A survey of 60 Clubcard 
holder respondents revealed that the majority were satisfied with the returns received 
and card ownership was correlated with consumer loyalty (Turner & Wilson 2006). 
Rowley (2007) argues that the success of this particular loyalty scheme has been in part 
a result of its multi-dimensional reward design and customer focused approach. Overall 
the Clubcard is highly integrated into the structure of the company and is a key driver 
of its brand strategy (Rowley 2007). Further, in a groceries market ‘even small shifts in 
buying habits, multiplied by very large numbers of customers, can provide a welcome 
19 
 
boost to profits’.7 Hence, a well implemented loyalty scheme can be an important 
mechanism for differentiation in a competitive market.  We note that the UK’s then 
Competition Commission (“CC”) investigated the groceries sector in 2008.  However, 
the investigation did not consider loyalty schemes as part of its competitive assessment 
of the market.8  
We note that in addition to loyalty schemes, over the years retailers in the market 
have adopted a number of competing business models to attract consumers to their 
stores. Over the years, retailers implemented price-match promises, repeat purchase 
coupons and notably Lidl and Aldi have emerged as strong competitors in the discount 
price segment. For example, at one stage, retailers offered customers a bundled petrol 
discount for exceeding a certain basket price, in the form of a 5p per litre petrol 
discount.9 Further, Sainsbury’s and Tesco also implemented a scheme that guaranteed 
customers a coupon at check out when their shopping basket was more expensive than 
a comparable rivals’ basket.10  
Figure 1.1 – UK Grocery Retailer Market Shares & Loyalty Schemes 
Source: Market share data sourced from Kantar Worldpanel other information taken from 
The Economist, The Guardian and retailer websites. 
Price guarantees more generally, are intended to signal low prices to customers. 
However, all retailers adopting similar price guarantees signal the same message to 
                                                 
7 Loyalty Rewards and Insurance: Every little Helps, The Economist, November 2011 
8 The main concerns identified in the report related to supply chain practices (Competition Commission 
2008) 
9 Tesco had several promotions over the years for example If you spend over £50 you receive 5p off 
per litre of petrol 
10 The Guardian, ‘Tesco to accept Sainsbury's Brand Match money-off vouchers’, 11 April 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/11/tesco-to-accept-sainsburys-brand-match-money-off-
vouchers. 
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customers in the market (Hviid 2011). In turn consumers perceive prices to be more or 
less equivalent across retailers who offer such price match promises. In this context, 
consumers are likely to choose their preferred grocery retailer by considering other 
aspects of the retail offer other than price, for instance location.  Given the homogenous 
nature of products in grocery retail, loyalty schemes can be an important tool for 
grocery retailers wishing to differentiate themselves from rivals.  As outlined in the 
above figure, Tesco and Sainsbury’s were the first to offer loyalty reward schemes to 
their customers. Following the introduction of the Clubcard in 1995, Sainsbury’s 
introduced the Nectar Card in 2002.11 Tesco therefore had a first mover advantage in 
this respect.  We note that in 2011, the Tesco Clubcard had 15 million subscribers 
compared to the 18 million subscribed to the Nectar Card.12 This difference in 
subscriber numbers can be explained by the fact that the Nectar Card is available at 
other participating retailers, while customers of Tesco can only use the Tesco Clubcard 
at Tesco outlets.  In the past, Asda experimented with loyalty cards, however ultimately 
has stuck to the slogan ‘No Clubcard. No gimmicks. Just lower prices every day’. 
Interestingly, high end retailer Waitrose, was known for criticizing loyalty cards in the 
press for an invasion of privacy. Nonetheless on October 25th 2011 they introduced 
‘MyWaitrose’.13 The MyWaitrose loyalty card follows a different model and offers 
participants a daily free newspaper and coffee.   
Tesco offers its consumers a fixed ratio loyalty program, where the monetary 
value of the loyalty discount depends on a customer’s total purchases over a given time 
period. For every pound spent, the customer receives 1 Clubcard point. 14 Once 100 
Clubcard points have been earned, the customer earns the equivalent of a £1 voucher. 
Thus the more products that a customer purchases at Tesco, the higher the reward they 
receive. Tesco’s customers receive a voucher based on the value of accumulated points 
on a quarterly basis, either electronically or physically by receiving paper vouchers in 
the post. These vouchers can be saved over the year or even years to be spent by 
customers on bigger value rewards, like a holiday, for example. Similarly to the Tesco 
                                                 
11 Retailing: Spies in your Wallet, The Economist Printed Issue, November 5 2011 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 This promotion of £1 = 2 pts was running since 2009 but is no longer in place. 
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Clubcard, Sainsbury’s offer 2 points per £1 spent, but consumers are rewarded with a 
£1 coupon for every 200 points accumulated.15  
Participants of both the Tesco Clubcard and Sainsbury’s Nectar Card, can spend 
their accumulated loyalty points in the form of coupons or e-coupons. Rewards can be 
spent on an extensive list of leisure activities including an airline discount or hotel 
voucher.16 Retailers often engage in further promotional activities such as ‘double your 
points’ or ‘quadruple your points’ for select activities and/or products. These vouchers 
can then be spent in store or on products and services provided by other companies in 
different markets namely, entertainment and travel. Such promotions offer consumers 
an added incentive to spend the loyalty points on a reward. In turn, the cost of the 
coupon to the retailer is likely to be, at least partially, internalized by another company 
who accepts the coupons through an agreement.  
An important distinction between the two leading retailers is that Tesco is a 
highly integrated firm and likely relies on fewer agreements to enable consumers to 
collect points across different products. For example, Tesco operates its own bank and 
insurance services and therefore enjoys a greater flexibility in the offers it can make to 
customers. This advantage is not available to Sainsbury, instead is bound by agreements 
with insurers.  Further, Sainsbury’s credit card it is operated by American Express. In 
the past, Sainsbury allowed customers to collect Nectar points when purchasing 
insurance through a specific price comparison website. On the other hand, Clubcard 
points can be collected by purchasing products sold by Tesco (including insurance 
products) and/ or alternatively, points can be collected by using the Tesco credit card 
on purchases of any item. 
Loyalty programs, such as the Tesco Clubcard, confer benefits to consumers but 
are also a mechanism used by retailers to gather information on consumer behaviour 
and to help tailor their offers. Tesco is active across a variety of different grocery retail 
formats and is present in other markets. Tesco Home stores for example are aimed at 
non-food items. The Direct catalogue and Extra stores supply anything from toys and 
electronics to furniture. The vast scope of Tesco’s operations has meant that the retailer 
                                                 
15 Sainsbury recently cut the value of its loyalty scheme by half during the spring of 2015. See for 
example an article by The Guardian, ‘Sainsbury’s Nectar points cut angers customers’, 10th April 2015. 
16 Tesco offers its consumers the possibility to double the value of their vouchers and spend them on 
various different leisure activities namely, discounted meals, holidays and adventure parks among 
many others. 
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has compiled a rich set of consumer data. The Economist offers some insights into the 
data advantages of Clubcard to Tesco.17  The Clubcard offers the retailer access to 
essential customer information and enables Tesco to channel personalized offers. For 
example, insurance companies are likely to rely on general demographic statistics to 
determine risk rates to set insurance product prices. On the other hand, the Clubcard 
allows Tesco to enjoy additional insights into consumer characteristics, consumption 
patterns and behaviour over time. Thus the retailer can discriminate between consumers 
and target low risk individuals with their insurance products.  
Students at the London School of Economics, performed an experiment to 
demonstrate how Tesco uses Clubcard information when setting insurance premiums. 
The students firstly applied for car insurance with a blank Clubcard and then applied 
using their own personal Clubcards.18 They received different insurance rate offers 
varying by as much as 18% in price, if compared to the benchmark data-free Clubcard. 
For example those who had never purchased alcohol using their Clubcard, received 
significantly lower quotes for car insurance. This simple experiment evidences Tesco’s 
ability to leverage itself into other markets using customers’ data obtained through a 
loyalty scheme. This aspect of loyalty schemes is beyond the scope of this paper and 
rather a direction for future research.  Instead, we focus on the competitive aspects of 
the loyalty scheme itself and thus the next section considers the rationale for loyalty 
scheme strategies in the context of the lock-in effect and artificial switching costs.  
1.3 Economic Theory of Loyalty Schemes 
Throughout this section we present the main literature on switching costs and 
also look at the effects of loyalty scheme strategies in different types of markets.  We 
focus on publications that look at competition in nondurable goods markets as this is 
consistent with the products sold to consumers in the groceries sector.  In durable goods 
markets, for example for washing machines, retailers typically engage with customers 
on an infrequent basis.  On the other hand, when selling perishable items such as fresh 
groceries, retailers engage in repeated interactions with consumers and therefore face 
different incentives to a durable goods seller. We also briefly touch on the effect of such 
strategies in intermediate markets to highlight the role of wider market features in 
                                                 
17 ‘Loyalty Rewards and Insurance: Every Little Helps’, The Economist, November 5th 2011, (available 
online http://www.economist.com/node/21536605) 
18 ‘Retailing: Spies in your Wallet’, The Economist, November 5th 2011 (available online 
http://www.economist.com/node/21536604) 
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assessing the impact of loyalty discounts. The literature we present in this section 
indicates that when firms implement loyalty scheme strategies market outcomes and 
welfare effects depend on the number of factors.  For example, the number of time 
periods entering the model, extent of product differentiation, number and symmetry of 
firms and ultimately, the design of the loyalty scheme itself (Caminal & Claici 2007, 
Fong & Liu 2011, Caminal 2012). On this basis loyalty reward schemes can either 
soften or intensify competition.  
In presenting the literature in this section, we examine firms’ strategies in the 
presence of switching costs more generally, and explain why firms have the profit 
incentive to create endogenous switching costs in some markets. We conclude by 
outlining a simple two period model à la Hotelling by Lal and Bell (2003) where 
grocery retailers compete through frequent shopper programs. This model does not 
explicitly model switching costs.  Instead the authors rely on the Hotelling linear city 
framework to restrict behaviour of consumers depending on their position on the unit 
line. Due to the set-up of this model, consumers are assumed to differ in the way their 
behaviour changes in response to a repeat purchase discount. This is the exact type of 
assumption we propose to test empirically in the context of our empirical work.  First, 
let us consider the fundamentals of switching cost theory.  
Klemperer (1987) explains that consumers face significant costs of switching 
between brands in a variety of different markets.  Switching costs which arise without 
the intervention of sellers are known as exogenous switching costs.  The size of such 
switching costs arise independently to the firms’ pricing and other strategic decisions 
(Caminal & Matutes 1990).  For example, transaction costs are incurred by consumers 
when switching between providers even if both brands are entirely identical (Klemperer 
1987).  Typical examples include the transaction costs associated with switching bank 
accounts, mobile network providers or energy providers.  Firms may also have the 
incentive to create switching costs through their own strategic behaviour (Klemperer 
1995). For example, providers can affect switching behaviour of customers by entering 
into contracts (Fudenberg & Tirole 2000).   
Alternatively, retailers can introduce strategies such as repeat purchase 
discounts and loyalty schemes to create artificial switching costs (Klemperer 1987).  
This type of strategy is the focus of this thesis and we note that loyalty scheme related 
switching costs are assumed to be endogenous as they arise as a result of firms’ direct 
actions (Klemperer 1995).  Thus, models of endogenous switching costs by definition 
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assume that firms determine the size of switching costs themselves (Klemperer 1995, 
Farrell & Klemperer).  Firms have the incentive to create these switching costs as they 
can lock-in consumers allowing the firm to enjoy market power over this segment of 
its customers (Klemperer1995).  In this context,  it has been argued that firms compete 
vigorously ex ante to gain and establish a large market share and are thus able to enjoy 
an ex post monopoly over locked-in consumers who face high costs of switching 
(Farrell & Klemperer 2007).   We note this incentive applies to both exogenous and 
endogenous switching costs. 
 In light of the above, it can be shown that firms have a profit incentive to focus 
on growing and maintaining market share in the presence of switching costs.  Further, 
considering multiple periods of competition, these incentives may also increase the 
intensity of competition between rival firms leading to lower average prices (Rhodes 
2014).  Thus, when considered in a multi-period dynamic setting, the effects of 
switching costs on consumers, firm strategies and equilibrium outcomes, depend on a 
number of factors.  Below we consider a few scenarios which offer general insights on 
switching costs and associated firms’ incentives.  We then outline models of 
endogenous switching costs and of course those specific to loyalty schemes (point (v) 
below).  Klemperer’s (1995) provides a comprehensive literature review setting out the 
different ways switching costs can arise and their effects on market outcomes and 
welfare. Following Klemperer (1995), the main switching cost types are caused by the 
below factors: 
i. Compatibility or interoperability of equipment create switching costs if 
the products are not interchangeable between different brands (e.g. pen 
and cartridge or computer hardware); 
ii. Transaction costs lead to lower switching by consumers (e.g. cost of 
switching bank accounts or electricity provider); 
iii. Costs of learning to use new brands (e.g. switching computer operating 
systems); 
iv. Uncertainty about quality of untested brands create a perceived risk of 
switching (e.g. changing medicine); 
v. Discount coupons and loyalty rewards linked to repeat purchases; 
and 
vi. Psychological costs of switching related to noneconomic brand loyalty 
effects which alter consumers’ preferences for known brands.   
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Firstly, let’s consider the scenario where switching costs arise due to the 
learning involved in consuming an untested product (point iii above).  This is somewhat 
similar, but distinct to search costs incurred when consumers search for a product to 
buy.  Learning related switching costs arise where the consumer invests substantial time 
to learn how to use a product and faces switching costs with respect to switching to 
other products in the market (Klemperer 1987).  This increases differentiation in the 
market and in this context, firms can achieve additional profit through greater market 
share. These types of switching costs arise even if ex ante the two products are 
otherwise identical (Klemperer 1987).  In other words, in this example, switching costs 
increase differentiation due to psychological attachment consumers have with respect 
to well-known brands or products they have tried and tested in the past (Klemperer 
1995).  As switching costs increase perceived differentiation between brands and 
products, there is a strong relationship between a firm’s current market share and its 
future profitability (Klemperer 1995).  In fact, it can also be shown that markets with 
switching costs are more attractive to entrants than markets without consumer 
switching costs and can result in higher firm profits and prices (Beggs & Klemperer 
1992).   
With the knowledge that consumers are partially locked-in due to switching 
costs, firms tend to face the trade-off between harvesting consumers by charging higher 
prices or investing in market share through lower average prices (Klemperer 1995, 
Anderson & Kumar 2007, Rhodes 2014).  In some cases this leads to a bargain-to-rip-
off game where firms offer low prices to grow market share and then charge higher 
prices in future periods (Farrell & Klemperer 2007).  In other words, anticipating that 
consumers will not switch away, a firm with a degree of market power can harvest 
customers who face switching costs by charging higher prices.  Alternatively, it may 
seek to invest in growing its market share and therefore choose to reduce prices and 
avoid losing market share.  This trade-off in the context of a dynamic model of multiple 
periods of competition can lead to ambiguous welfare outcomes.  The outcome in terms 
of prices and welfare generally depends on the assumptions entering a model, namely 
the number of stages of competition (Rhodes 2014).  Let us consider a few examples 
where exogenous switching costs lead to either lower or higher prices.   
Villas-Boas (2006) considers a dynamic infinite period model of overlapping 
generations of consumers. Consumers and firms are forward looking, and these firms 
sell experience type goods. Thus in the model, consumers are uncertain about their 
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future preferences and learn about a product only after consuming it.  This scenario 
assumes switching costs of the type number (iii) above.  Villas-Boas model shows that 
prices decrease to the extent that firms value the future.  Thus in certain periods firms 
compete more aggressively and cut prices as this allows them to achieve higher market 
share in the future period.  In the model, once a large enough number of consumers 
experience the good they are less likely to switch away.  Then the firm exploits these 
customers and charges higher prices.  In the model consumers only live for two periods.  
As a result, the price oscillates from low to high.  The price is set lower when the firm 
seeks to incentivise consumers to try a product and then set high once a sufficient 
number of customers have experienced the product.  If the model is extended to so that 
consumers live for more than two periods, higher prices may arise at equilibrium 
(Villas-Boas 2006).  This is because the firm may have lower market share among 
“younger” customers, however, it will have a large market share of “older” customers 
who are locked in by learning related switching costs associated with experience goods.  
Anderson and Kumar (2007) apply a two-period duopoly model where firms are 
asymmetric in their ability to attract loyal repeat buyers.  This model is also extended 
to a model of multi-period competition and the results also hold under this extension.  
The scenario considered by the authors is based on empirical evidence of the 
relationship between well-known brands, greater customer loyalty and lower average 
prices.  The assumption that a firm’s pricing strategy increases loyalty of customers 
endogenizes the size of the firm’s loyal base of customers.  In doing so, the model 
creates a trade-off for the firms between harvesting old customers and investing in new 
ones.  The authors show that as firms gain market share, they engage in more 
promotional activities and at equilibrium they offer lower average prices compared to 
rivals. In fact, Anderson and Kumar show that it is the “stronger” firm with the strongest 
brand and highest market share offers lowest average prices compared to the smaller 
rivals.  
This result is contrary to what competing models of switching costs predict: 
firms raise prices as they gain market share due to the relative market power they enjoy 
over their customers who face either actual or perceived costs of switching (Klemperer 
1995, Rhodes 2014).   Rhodes (2014) also shows that switching costs can reduce prices 
paid by customers.  The author applies a Hotelling model of infinite number of periods 
to show how switching costs redistribute overall welfare over time.   His model assumes 
that firms are more patient than consumers which leads to lower prices.  In this context, 
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a firm’s incentive to lock-in a given consumer is outweighed by that consumer’s 
incentive to not be locked-in.  Rhodes finds evidence of significant price heterogeneity 
in the short run in a dynamic setting.  In addition, by assuming multiple generations of 
consumers, Rhodes is able to show that switching costs transfer welfare between 
different generations of consumers.  Consistent with other models of switching costs, 
the firms find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma.  In other words, it may be beneficial 
for them to make it more difficult for customers to switch due to the additional market 
share they can achieve. However, this behaviour also intensifies price competition and 
reduces the profits earned by competing firms (Rhodes 2014).  
The above examples illustrate the many incentives and trade-offs faced by firms 
when consumers are locked-in through exogenous switching costs which arise without 
the intervention of firms.  In particular we noted the effects on firm incentives 
associated with a “harvest” versus an “invest” strategy respectively.  We note that a 
recent trend in the literature are models of switching costs incorporating a greater 
number of periods of competition (Rhodes 2014). This represents an important 
improvement because in reality, firms are generally forward looking and competition 
takes places over a long time horizon (Rhodes 2014). A multi-period model allows the 
researcher to better understand firm and consumer strategies in a dynamic setting. 
Preferences of consumers can change over time and firms may also change their 
strategies in response.  Again, these types of effects can only be captured by considering 
multiple stages of competition.  We note that this likely explains why more recent 
literature on switching costs incorporates multiple periods of competition revealing the 
diverse set of market outcomes in the presence of different types or a combination of 
switching costs.  We now consider the main features of models of endogenous 
switching costs.  
Point (i) above references the switching costs which arise as a result of 
incompatibility or interoperability of products.  Setting the level of compatibility of 
products can also be an ex ante strategic decision by a firm and would therefore 
represent an endogenous switching cost. For example, tying pre-installed software to 
hardware can increase costs of switching for consumers to other types of software.  
Additionally, printers and ink cartridges or razors and razor blades are generally only 
compatible within the same brand.  This incompatibility creates costs of switching for 
consumers.  Knowing this, firms can make strategic decisions to make products 
compatible, or not. Matutes & Regibeau’s (1992) relatively static duopoly model 
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considers such a scenario and looks at the incentives of firms to standardize 
components.   The authors assume that two firms produce differentiated products that 
are compatible components that can be combined into a system of products (e.g. 
computer and keyboard). Consumers obtain no utility from purchasing a single 
component, therefore firms have the incentive to produce compatible components.   
The firm operating in a duopoly market sells either a system of their own 
components or offers components compatible with the rival firm.  The Matutes and 
Regibeau paper considers these distinct scenarios and assumes that individuals value 
variety but have no brand preferences.  Thus the degree of compatibility of components 
shifts demand in turn affecting the firms’ strategies. The authors consider several 
pricing and product compatibility scenarios captured through bundling strategies and 
find that in most cases mixed bundling is at a least a weakly dominant strategy. By 
selling the components as part of a mixed bundle, consumer demand for the system of 
components increases due to the fact that individuals value variety.  However, the firms 
would prefer not to offer a bundled discount as it would make them better off.   
As pointed out by Klemperer (1995), in the scenario considered by Matutes and 
Regibeau, differentiation mitigates the anticompetitive effects of switching costs 
because due to their preferences for variety, consumers have the incentive to use more 
than one supplier.  On the other hand, we also note that as in Anderson and Kumar’s 
model with brand related switching costs, firms can rely on repeat purchase discount 
strategies to artificially increase the degree of perceived differentiation in the market 
and increase market power of firms (Klemperer 1995, Farrell & Klemperer 2007).   In 
the case of endogenous switching costs, Farrell and Klemperer (2007, p. 2001) explain 
that there are also a number of other different incentives to consider namely that 
“[m]arket participants may seek to either raise or to lower switching costs in order to 
reduce inefficiencies (including the switching cost itself), to enhance market power, to 
deter new entry, or to extract returns from a new entrant.”   
According to Klemperer (1995), “[t]he simplest way to endogenize switching 
costs is to add to existing models [which consider switching costs] an initial ("zeroth") 
period, in which firms make compatibility or other choices that determine whether or 
not switching costs subsequently arise; we expect switching costs to be chosen where 
they raise future profits more than any current costs to firms of creating them.”  Thus 
the general framework assumes that the firm itself sets the size of switching costs ex 
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ante and then competes against rivals.  We now consider the seminal model of 
endogenous switching costs set out by Caminal and Matutes (1990).  
The authors apply a two-period Hotelling model of endogenous switching costs 
and consider a differentiated product duopoly where firms can discriminate between 
new and repeat buyers.  The authors compare outcomes under different price 
commitments and show the type of commitment in place matters for the market 
outcomes and prices paid by consumers.  The authors find that under both coupons and 
price commitments, consumers pay decreasing prices.  Price commitments themselves 
are shown to enhance competition and coupons, on the other and, tend to decrease 
competitiveness of markets. Caminal and Matutes explain that this outcome arises 
because a price commitment does not have an impact on the profits earned from loyal 
consumers in the second period and as a result, firms compete more aggressively in the 
second period. The implementation of a coupon which does not require a commitment 
on future prices is not costly to the firm as it can raise prices to compensate for the cost 
of the coupon.  This reduces welfare of consumers paying higher prices. 
We next consider an example of how a discount strategy creates an endogenous 
interdependence between demands for two unrelated products.  In presenting this model 
we note that the same interdependence is created between time periods as a result of a 
repeat purchase discount.  Gans and King (2006) evaluate the effects of a joint purchase 
discount for groceries and petrol in an oligopoly setting.  The authors’ model 
demonstrates how the strategy changes outcomes in the market compared to a uniform 
pricing strategy. The model assumes that the discount is determined ex ante (i.e. the 
model endogenizes the discount) and rivals respond in the next period. When rivals 
react, the discount softens price competition due to the prior commitment to offer 
bundled discounts. Overall industry profits are reduced if all firms resort to the same 
strategy representing another form of the prisoners’ dilemma previously encountered.  
The results also indicate that the discount induces consumers to consume a brand mix 
that does not reflect their preferences. Thus the strategy is an effective tool used to 
increase loyalty of customers by increasing relative switching costs. The discount 
creates a strategic interdependence between otherwise independent purchases (Gans & 
King 2006). 
Like in the above example of bundled discounts for petrol and groceries, multi-
period models of competition allow the researcher to vary assumptions on the nature of 
price commitments in place.  This applies to both models of exogenous and endogenous 
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switching costs.  It can be shown that price commitments may or may not be necessary 
in sustaining a competitive outcome in a dynamic setting (Farrell & Klemperer 2007).  
For example, there may be sufficient incentives in place for a forward looking firm to 
continue to compete vigorously against rivals without any price commitment being in 
place.  In practice, firms can commit to future prices in different ways with varying 
effects as captured by the Caminal & Matutes (1990) model of endogenous switching 
costs.  We next consider an extension of the above model which considers a dynamic 
model of competition in the presence of loyalty schemes.  
Caminal & Claici (2007) model the competitive effects of linear and lump-sum 
discounts attributed to loyalty schemes and consider the effects on firms’ market shares 
and social welfare.  The model adopts a multi-period dynamic framework and is based 
on a groceries market characterised by monopolistic competition with free entry. The 
result shows that a loyalty scheme has pro-competitive effects if there are a large 
number of firms in the market and these firms are also able to commit to future prices.  
In the model firms initially face identical demand. However, when ex ante one firm 
decides it will offer a loyalty discount for repeat purchases this affects other firms’ 
strategic decisions. In the model, a loyalty scheme strategy is the dominant strategy for 
all firms. As more consumers sign up to the scheme, the firm offering a loyalty scheme 
differentiates itself from rivals and increase its market share. This creates two 
competing effects, as discussed in the literature on exogenous switching costs.  
On the one hand, firms compete more vigorously because they anticipate lower 
future equilibrium prices and fight for market share. We note that this set-up assumes 
that the firm is able to discriminate between groups of consumers.  In other words, as 
consumers are locked-in by the strategy and without commitments to future prices, the 
firm can raise prices to past consumers while offering lower prices to newcomers.  This 
result can be shown by extending the analysis to an overlapping generations model 
which shows that firms have the incentive to discriminate between new and old (repeat) 
buyers when they can differentiate between them.  Thus with few competing firms the 
strategy can be shown to have anti-competitive effects.  However, in most cases, 
Caminal and Claici argue that loyalty rewarding schemes produce pro-competitive 
effects so long as a commitment mechanism is in place.  Thus, although the loyalty 
scheme is shown to influence demand and act as a business stealing device, the authors 
note that loyalty schemes typically increase social welfare and lead to lower average 
prices. 
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In Caminal and Claici’s model it is assumed that firms can observe each other’s 
pricing and future commitments to prices.  This increases transparency in pricing 
behaviour in the market and increases the risk of collusion. Fong and Liu (2011) apply 
a dynamic overlapping generations model with an unlimited number of firms and show 
the conditions and loyalty scheme structure that tend to facilitate sustainable tacit 
collusion. The model specification implies that across time periods, firms can recognize 
their own repeat customers but do not differentiate between new customers and rivals’ 
customers. The results the authors obtain build on the standard two-period model 
outcome. Compared to uniform pricing equilibria and two-period models of loyalty 
discounts, the authors demonstrate that loyalty rewards enable tacit collusion under 
both commitment and non-commitment to rewards and prices. Regardless of product 
and consumer heterogeneity, different loyalty rewarding pricing structures are shown 
to facilitate tacit collusion regardless of the market structure. The collusive outcome is 
sustainable for a wide range of discount factors when firms compete using different 
loyalty schemes. Here, without a commitment to future prices, the loyalty reward 
structure nonetheless results in a collusion sustaining discount factor and lower payoffs 
for deviating firms. 
Basso et al. (2009) consider the moral hazard associated with loyalty programs 
and use a Hotelling duopoly model to show that the introduction of Frequent Flier 
Program (“FFPs”) loyalty schemes can alter competition in the market. The authors 
find softening of price competition when firms implement the strategy. The authors 
show that FFPs soften competition rather than intensify it because prices and profits 
move in opposite directions. With a FFP in place, the airline can charge higher prices, 
while the more expensive the FFP is to operate, the higher the profits for the airline.  
This finding is also consistent with the fundamentals of switching cost theory outlined 
by Klemperer (1987, 1995).  In other words, firms have the profit incentive to invest in 
creating endogenous switching costs in some markets as this allows the firms to enjoy 
greater market power over the segment of locked in consumers and to charge higher 
prices. 
In the model firms choose prices and FFPs simultaneously and find themselves 
in a prisoner’s dilemma. Both airlines hope that the other airline will choose not to 
operate an FFP in order to achieve maximum profit by being the only airline to offer an 
FFP in the market. Profits are lower if both airlines offer an FFP, and higher if neither 
of them do, even though equilibrium prices are lower. Although these equilibrium 
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results are insightful, the authors’ primary focus throughout the paper is to address how 
Frequent Flier Plans create a problem of moral hazard. The workers’ demand becomes 
less elastic as their employer pays for the cost of the ticket, creating the moral hazard 
problem.  The results show that the FFPs exacerbate this existing issue because they 
enable the airlines to charge higher prices by coercing business travellers to purchase 
more expensive tickets with side-payments via the FFP.  The authors note also that their 
model “[…] contrasts with the switching-cost approach in which the FFPs can, 
depending on the model, raise or lower prices and airline profits. [They] also showed 
that more costly FFPs may lead to higher profits than less costly plans, as they provide 
less efficient ways for firms to compete.”19 
Caminal’s (2012) more recent paper addresses the alternative implication of 
loyalty programs, unrelated to endogenous switching costs. This approach considers 
the different design efficiencies of the reward schemes including first period lump-sum 
discounts and future price commitment designs. Caminal recognizes that private and 
social incentives may not align in real world markets where the “[discount] policies are 
always less efficient than price commitment, and may imply even lower surplus than in 
the absence of behaviour based price discrimination (Caminal 2012, p. 26)” This 
makes it particularly important to understand whether the type of loyalty program 
structure will reduce or improve efficiency. Although the model considers a monopolist 
firm, the reader is able to make inferences on the implications of the results under 
alternative market structures. For example, loyalty rewards can generate efficiency 
gains by encouraging consumer participation because “consumers are willing to pay 
up-front for the promise of future low price (Caminal 2012, p. 5).” 
However, when considering a competitive setting across multiple time periods, 
Caminal (2012) argues that the design efficiency of a loyalty scheme will be difficult 
to measure because firms anticipate rivals’ actions and multiple equilibria are likely to 
arise. Caminal (2012) assumes that the monopolist offers a ‘contract’ which bundles 
together the first and second period consumption, including the respective discount. 
Consumers are differentiated as being either first time or second time buyers. The firm 
is thus able to price discriminate between new and repeat buyers. If the monopolist is 
able to commit to future prices, there is an improvement in efficiency and total welfare 
                                                 
19 Basso, L.J., Clements M.T., Ross, T.W., ‘Moral Hazard and Customer Loyalty Programs’, American 
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 1, Nr. 1, 2009, p. 116 
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because consumer participation increases.  More generally, Caminal argues that for the 
set of loyalty rewarding designs that encompass credible price commitments for future 
periods will improve the efficiency of the market equilibrium. However, if firms offer 
a discount without a price commitment in place, total welfare may not increase. While 
it may be difficult to quantify in practice, the loyalty reward scheme design has an 
important impact on the efficiency of the market equilibrium. 
Many (albeit not all) of the models discussed thus far have applied some version 
of the Hotelling model. The Hotelling framework exposes consumers’ relative 
preferences to shocks to account for differentiation and consumer heterogeneity. 
Caminal (2012) explains how “[i]n this set up [loyalty rewards] allow firms to retain 
previous customers, even when rival firms offer goods or services that better match 
their current preferences. As a result, [loyalty rewards] are welfare reducing because 
they cause a mismatch in the allocation of consumers. However, in this view it is 
unclear whether [loyalty rewards] tend to relax or exacerbate price competition.” 
Therefore the insights offered by such models are subject to assumptions on consumer 
preferences and differentiation. Particularly as competition generally takes place along 
a far greater number of parameters than suggested by the Hotelling framework. This 
motivates us to focus our empirical work on the analysis of consumer preferences for 
loyalty schemes by considering the interaction of multiple dimensions of retailer 
characteristics.   
Although our main focus is on loyalty schemes in the end-consumer market, 
there are valuable insights to be gained from analysis of loyalty discounts in upstream 
markets in terms of how the differences between these two environments drives 
outcomes. In upstream markets, multi-product suppliers can reward loyalty on both 
product combinations and quantities of goods purchased, much like in retail markets. 
In intermediate markets, firms can offer either bundled loyalty discounts, which are 
achieved by customers through purchases of multi-product bundles, or loyalty rebates 
that are defined as quantity based discounts (Greenlee et al. 2008).  Considering the 
features of intermediate markets, the scope for exclusion as a result of contractual 
arrangements, which include discounts, can have a significant impact on prices in the 
long run if rivals exit the market.  In upstream markets, the buyer-seller relationship is 
characterised by lumpy contracts and few interactions between buyers and sellers.  
Contractual arrangements between sellers and buyers can lead to artificially induced 
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switching costs in consumers.  Therefore in both upstream and end-markets, loyalty 
discounts can lock-in consumers.   
In upstream markets, effects of loyalty discounts are associated with severe 
foreclosure effects akin to tying and bundled discounts and also pro-competitive effects in 
terms of lower prices and greater intensity of competition (Faella 2008, Elhauge 2009, 
Whish 2009, Economides 2010, Federico 2011, Zenger 2012). Loyalty rebates in general 
distort the competitive process by inducing loyalty via increased switching costs (Elhauge 
2009, Faella 2008).  Economides (2010) argues customers in these markets may perceive 
non-participation in a loyalty scheme as the equivalent to receiving a disloyalty penalty. 
Compared to the no-discount benchmark, loyalty rewarding schemes leave customer 
surplus unchanged because the firm benefits from locking in consumers and increases 
prices in future periods (Economides 2010). Thus the customers find themselves in a 
form of prisoners’ dilemma. The customer could have been better off not participating 
in the loyalty scheme altogether if other customers signed up to the scheme. In addition, 
the commitment to future discount rates increases transparency which may facilitate 
collusion and lead to higher prices (Economides 2010).  
The above models analyse firm strategies in the presence of one specific type 
of switching cost. However, it is possible that in some markets, consumers face 
endogenous and exogenous costs of switching between sellers or products (Shi 2012). 
Shi (2012) considers a two-period model of both exogenous and endogenous switching 
costs.  The model is an extension of the above Caminal and Matutes (1990) model of 
endogenous switching costs. Shi (2012) extends the Hotelling model to consider the 
effects of exogenous and endogenous switching costs on market outcomes, which 
respectively, affect competition in very distinct ways.  In the model, product 
differentiation is captured through transportation costs and firms set the size of 
endogenous switching costs through a loyalty scheme.  Exogenous switching costs and 
the transportation costs entering the model have different effects on the size of 
endogenous switching costs chosen by the competing firms.  As firms compete for 
market share through loyalty scheme strategies, endogenous switching costs are shown 
to increase in the presence of higher transportation costs.  As part of this result, Shi 
finds that when transportation costs are high, consumers place more weight on the brand 
and are less responsive to loyalty schemes.   
Thus there are two opposing effects to consider here.  The brand effect arising 
from transportation costs on the one hand, and on the other hand, the cost and 
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effectiveness of the loyalty scheme in attracting consumers.  Shin shows that when 
exogenous switching costs increase due to the brand effect, loyal consumers are 
unaffected by a loyalty scheme.  Due to the brand related exogenous switching costs, 
consumers do not switch and loyalty discount redemption rates are high.  As such, the 
loyalty scheme becomes a costly consumer retention tool and on that basis, the level of 
endogenous switching costs set by the firm decreases at equilibrium.  Shin demonstrates 
that both of these switching costs help retain customers and reduce brand switching in 
the market.  In addition, Shi (2012) finds that a prisoner’s dilemma arises at equilibrium 
because when both firms set higher endogenous switching costs they also lose more 
profits under this strategy.  Shi’s model underlines the complex nature of real world 
markets where consumers are likely to face opposing incentives when deciding whether 
or not to switch between retailers or products. We consider this important aspect of 
switching costs when looking at the competition policy framework for the assessment 
of markets with switching costs. 
In light of the literature reviewed and presented above, the resultant effects of 
loyalty schemes on the market in question will typically depend on the market structure 
and the nature of consumer preferences.  For example, it has been shown that in a 
duopoly, loyalty schemes are generally considered to be anticompetitive, while under 
monopolistic competition, loyalty schemes are associated with largely procompetitive 
effects (Caminal & Claici 2007).  The role of consumer preferences is also important 
because the loyalty scheme has to increase switching costs for a large number of 
consumers to have an impact on competition through a lock-in effect. The lock-in effect 
itself then creates an artificial monopoly over consumers which can exclude rivals who 
are unable to compete with an equally attractive offer, either in terms of price, quality 
or other product characteristics.   
On the basis of the above literature, we note a common assumption in models 
of both endogenous and exogenous switching costs. Keeping all else constant, these 
models assume that consumers incur switching costs in the same way. As far as we are 
aware, there exists only one recent publication which explicitly assumes that consumers 
have heterogeneous switching costs (Biglaiser et al. 2016).  Biglaiser et al. (2016) 
consider a two-period model of exogenous switching costs under a duopoly. Unlike 
previous models, consumers are forward looking, have heterogeneous switching costs, 
make their choice of seller on the basis of price and the type of customer base the seller 
actually has.  Thus, in this specific scenario, low switching cost consumers’ behaviour 
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is observed and followed by high switching cost consumers.  The main result is that 
pricing decisions of firms are affected by the assumption of heterogeneous switching 
costs as well as profits and market shares. The authors provide an important 
contribution in that “[…] heterogeneity of switching costs has complex strategic 
consequences which have largely been ignored in the literature. It will influence the 
strategies of firms, the equilibrium distribution of clients, and the value of 
incumbency.”20   
Considering the above, we note the possibility that consumers may be 
heterogeneous in their switching costs and that some consumers may not perceive any 
switching cots when faced with repeat purchase discount. Lal and Bell (2003) apply 
this assumption to a variant of the Hotelling model used to analyse the impact of 
frequent shopper programs on market shares and profits in grocery retailing. We note 
however, that this specific model does not endogenize switching costs in the traditional 
way as described by Klemperer (1995).  Instead, the model explicitly assumes that some 
shoppers are simply loyal and are unaffected by the presence of a loyalty discount.  
Oher shoppers are not loyal and are instead cherry-pickers who seek to find the lowest 
prices regardless of the brand.   
Lal and Bell begin their paper by presenting the results of an empirical analysis 
of a product specific promotion on store profits. Using scanner level data the authors 
perform an empirical analysis to show that promotional discount strategies impact 
consumer behaviour and increase retailer profits. The empirical analysis shows that that 
high value customers who spend the most in store are the least impacted by the 
programs, so-called loyal customers. Also, the schemes have a positive effect on profit 
due to the impact on behaviour of those customers not classified as the loyal type. The 
“empirical research suggests that supermarket frequent shopper programs, as 
currently implemented, are an attempt to get customers to spend more at a store in 
exchange for a discount—be it a ham, turkey or a discount.”21 We note that this 
overarching conclusion does not distinguish between loyalty schemes and promotional 
product discounts.  
                                                 
20 Biglaiser, G., Crémer J., Dobos, G., ‘Heterogeneous switching costs’, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, Vol. 47, p. 63, 2016. 
21 Lal & Bell (2003) 
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The authors also derive a theoretical model to explain the results of the empirical 
analysis. Lal and Bell note that their model is an extension from previous work in 
industrial organization on competition between two stores where consumers shop for a 
basket of goods.22 The theoretical framework relies on the Hotelling model to represent 
consumer preferences along the usual linear city. The model is derived assuming a 
symmetric duopoly that incorporates consumer shopping costs. The authors provide an 
extension to include a loyalty scheme offered by a single firm and also where both firms 
offer a frequent shopper program. Below we present and explain the scenario derived 
by Lal and Bell (2003) where only one retailer offers a loyalty scheme as this best 
reflects the UK groceries market.23  
The analysis assumes that two supermarkets, A and B, are located at the two 
ends of a line of unit length and consumers are located uniformly along the line 
connecting the two stores. Consumers are distinguished by two specific behaviours; 
they are either loyal customers or cherry pickers. A loyal customer only purchases from 
retailer A or B, but never both, and cherry pickers look for the best prices and shop at 
both stores to achieve a saving on their basket price. This saving, 2d, is achieved by 
cherry picking and purchasing the two baskets at two separate retailers rather than both 
baskets at one where a discount saving of d is achieved. Both retailers carry the same 
assortment of products as reflected in a typical basket of goods purchased by shoppers. 
The products available in store are assumed to be identical, however the prices of 
products are not always the same.  
The two retailers, A and B, set prices of the items in the corresponding grocery 
baskets to signal a price image captured by Pa and Pb. The corresponding promotions d 
are assumed to be determined exogenously by the sellers of the products. The 
framework also assumes that consumers can obtain a repeat purchase discount L by 
purchasing both baskets of goods at retailer A. The model assumes that the grocery 
retailers incur zero marginal costs. Consumers incur a shopping/travel cost c per unit 
distance travelling to and fro from a store and their own location. This travel cost c 
captures the degree of differentiation, where the line connecting the two stores is a 
vector along dimensions differentiating the two stores. Figure 1.2 below is an 
illustration of the linear city framework used to analyse loyalty rewarding schemes in 
                                                 
22 The authors refer to Lal and Matutes (1994) and Lal and Rao (1997). 
23 The UK groceries sector is characterised by the “Big Four” retailers, where two of the four offer a 
loyalty scheme. 
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Lal & Bell’s (2003) model. The below diagram applies to the version of the model 
where a proportion of shoppers located between xa and xb are cherry pickers and shop 
at both A and B to obtain a discount 2d. 
Figure 1.2 – Hotelling linear city framework with cherry picking shoppers 
 
Firstly, we follow Lal and Bell and consider the result of the benchmark 
Hotelling model. Here the authors assume no loyalty schemes or price promotions i.e. 
L=0 and d=0. Assuming that the marginal consumer is located at distance x from store 
A gives the following constraint: 2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 2𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 + 2𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝑐𝑐) 
𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎2𝑐𝑐  
Store A profits are: 2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 �𝑐𝑐 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎2𝑐𝑐 � 
Profits are maximised when: 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 = 0.5(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏) 
The symmetric equilibrium implies the following prices and profits: 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎
∗ = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏∗ = 𝑐𝑐 2𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 = 𝑐𝑐 
Considering the case of price promotions (where d >0), retailers A and B sell 
two baskets each at full price Pa and Pb respectively, and two baskets at a discounted 
price Pa – d and Pb – d. As noted above, the discount is determined exogenously by the 
manufacturers of the products. The model assumes that cherry pickers exist only if  𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 < 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏, where the consumers located between 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 and 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 cherry pick between the two 
stores to and pay Pa + Pb -2d. In order to ensure at least some cherry picking occurs, we 
must assume that the discounts compensate shoppers for the shopping costs they incur 
i.e. d > c. Also it follows that 𝑑𝑑 < 2𝑐𝑐  to ensure that not all consumers cherry pick. 
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If 𝑑𝑑 = 2𝑐𝑐, all consumers resort to cherry picking because the discount covers the 
shopping costs for all consumers, including those with the highest shopping cost of 2c. 
Thus, in the model, cherry picking occurs only if 2𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑑𝑑 ≥ 𝑐𝑐. 
We can define the relevant constraint that ensures cherry picking as follows.  
The consumer located at point 0 (where store A is also located) up to the consumer 
located at point xa will be indifferent between shopping at store A only and cherry 
picking where: [2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 0 − 𝑑𝑑;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑑𝑑 + 2c(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)]. The length of this and A’s 
resultant market share will therefore be as follows: 2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 0 − 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑑𝑑 + 2c(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
 
Which gives: 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑2𝑐𝑐  
It follows that the area from the consumer located at point Xb where she is indifferent 
between cherry picking or buying only from B up to the consumer located at point 1 
(where store B is located): [2𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 + 0 − 𝑑𝑑;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑑𝑑 + 2c𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏]. The length of this 
distance and B’s resultant market share is: 2𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 + 0 − 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑑𝑑 + 2𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 
Which gives:  
𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑2𝑐𝑐  
For the benchmark case d = 0, store profits were equal to c. In this case store A 
maximises: (2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑)𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 + (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑)(𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)= (2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) �𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑2𝑐𝑐 � + (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) �𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 − 1� 
 
Differentiating the profit function with respect to Pa: 
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𝜕𝜕 ��
𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑2𝑐𝑐 � + (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) �𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 − 1��
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎
 
= 2 �𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑2𝑐𝑐 � − 12𝑐𝑐 (2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) + �𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐� = 1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 − 2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑2𝑐𝑐 
Setting the above function equal to zero and assuming the symmetric equilibrium 
dictates 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎∗ = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏∗ we obtain the optimal solution: 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎
∗ = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏∗ = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑2 
The optimal solution results in equilibrium profits for seller A: 
Π𝑎𝑎 = �2 �𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑2� − 𝑑𝑑� �2𝑐𝑐 − 𝑑𝑑2𝑐𝑐 � + �𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑑𝑑� �𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 − 1� = 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑑𝑑2 �𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 − 1� 
Compared to the benchmark result where d = 0, the profits here are less than c for d > 
c and zero if d = 2c when all consumers cherry pick.   
Now we consider the scenario of price promotions and also that retailer A offers 
a loyalty scheme, i.e. d > 0 and L > 0. Therefore consumers who purchase both baskets 
at store A pay 2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿. Consumers located between 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 and 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 resort to cherry 
picking and pay Pa + Pb – 2d. In this scenario, for cherry picking to occur the discount 
must be greater than the travel cost and loyalty discount, d > c + 0.5L. However, travel 
costs must be sufficiently large to prevent everyone from cherry picking i.e. c + 0.5L 
< d < 2c.  We can define the relevant constraint that ensures cherry picking as follows.  
The consumer located at point 0 (where store A is also located) up to the consumer 
located at point xa will be indifferent between shopping at store A only and cherry 
picking which gives the following constraints: [2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 0 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑑𝑑 +2c(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)]. The length of this distance and A’s resultant market share will therefore 
be as follows: 2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑑𝑑 + 2c(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) 
Which gives:  
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑 + 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐  
Similarly, consumers located closest to B purchase both baskets at store B while 
consumers between 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 and 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 cherry pick between the two stores.  It follows that the 
area from the consumer located at point Xb where she is indifferent between cherry 
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picking or buying only from B up to the consumer located at point 1 (where store B is 
located) i.e. [2𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 + 0 − 𝑑𝑑;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑑𝑑 + 2c𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏]. The length of this distance and B’s 
resultant market share is: 2𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑑𝑑 + 2c𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 
The market share of B will therefore be: 
𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 𝑑𝑑2𝑐𝑐  
The firm then wishes to maximise the following: (2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿)𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 + (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑)(𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)= (2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿) �𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑 + 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 � + (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) �2𝑑𝑑 −  2𝑐𝑐 − 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 � 
i.e. 
𝛱𝛱𝑎𝑎 = (2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿) �𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑 + 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 � + (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) �2𝑑𝑑 −  2𝑐𝑐 − 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 � 
 
Differentiating the above profit function with respect to Pa gives: 
𝜕𝜕 �(2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿) �𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑 + 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 � + (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) �2𝑑𝑑 −  2𝑐𝑐 − 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 ��
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎
= 
= 2 �𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑 + 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 � − 12𝑐𝑐 (2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿) + �2𝑑𝑑 −  2𝑐𝑐 − 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 � = −4𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝐿𝐿 + 2𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 + 𝑑𝑑 + 2𝑐𝑐2𝑐𝑐  
Differentiating the profit function with respect to L: 
𝜕𝜕 �(2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿) �𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑 + 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 � + (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) �2𝑑𝑑 −  2𝑐𝑐 − 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 ��
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
= 
= −1 �𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑐𝑐 −  𝑑𝑑 + 𝐿𝐿2𝑐𝑐 � + 12𝑐𝑐 (2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿) − (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑) � 12𝑐𝑐� = 2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 + 𝑑𝑑 − 2𝐿𝐿 − 2𝑐𝑐2𝑐𝑐  
Setting the above first order conditions to zero and solving for Pa and L gives: 
Pa = d + 0.5Pb  
L = 1.5d – c 
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The optimal value of L implies that there is no more cherry picking as 2d – 2c 
– L < 0 when L =1.5d – c and d < 2c. Here the profits to both stores are c which is 
greater than the previous case where the model was restricted to only price promotions. 
The authors explain that the scheme is most effective at changing the behaviour of 
cherry-pickers versus the behaviour of loyal customers. When one retailer offers the 
loyalty scheme, this enables the participating firm to gain consumers by compensating 
for individuals’ ‘shopping around’ costs i.e. some consumers will no longer purchase 
from both firms and instead will purchase exclusively from one seller.  
The behaviour of loyal customers on the other hand, who have a strong 
preference for either retailer A or B, is unaffected by the program. However these loyal 
shoppers still benefit from a loyalty discount by purchasing from a single retailer.  In 
the model, the overall welfare change is due to a reduction in travel costs which is 
captured by the retailer in higher profits.  However, this model does not account for 
differentiation between retailers, nor the dynamic effects of competition over time.  
Thus, Lal and Bell’s model does not capture the potentially exclusionary effect of the 
loyalty scheme strategy.  For example, in contrast, Caminal and Claici (2007) note that 
under a duopolistic market structure, loyalty schemes can create perceived switching 
costs for consumers which distorts competition in the market.  Caminal and Claici 
explain that in duopoly setting, loyalty rewarding schemes are generally viewed as 
being anticompetitive.  
Lal and Bell extend their model to address the setting where both firms offer a 
loyalty program. However, we do not provide a full derivation of the model extension 
as this variant assumes that all firms in the market offer a loyalty rewarding scheme.  
Instead, we provide a commentary on the key insights from the results obtained by the 
authors.  When the model assumes that both retailers offer a loyalty scheme, cherry 
pickers are eliminated because their demand is entirely captured by one of the two 
retailers. Effectively, in this scenario the schemes cancel each other out, similarly to the 
outcome suggested by Caminal and Claici’s (2007) model of monopolistic competition. 
Lal and Bell show that offering the scheme is no longer effective at enhancing profits 
compared to the situation where only one firm offered a scheme. When both firms offer 
the loyalty scheme, their profits are still equal to c.  
The authors further extend the model to include two competing loyalty schemes 
and different customer segments. These consumers are differentiated by their travel 
costs c1 and c2. As before, “optimal” loyalty programs eliminate cherry picking because 
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the reward for buying both baskets at the same store is set to be at or above d. Here the 
loyalty scheme itself plays a limited role in affecting behaviour. Store profits vary 
depending on the level of d and are maximised when one segment of consumers cherry 
picks between the two stores. The authors conclude that based on the results, it may be 
difficult to change the behaviour of already loyal customers. Therefore retailers need to 
either make their loyalty reward lucrative enough to sufficiently compensate consumers 
for shopping around costs, or alternatively, target specific customer segments whose 
behaviour can be materially influenced through a loyalty discount. 
Comparable to its counterparts, the above model assumes a simplistic 
segmentation of preferences, even with the extension to include variable shopping costs 
c1 and c2. The model assumes that some consumers are loyal to a single retailer (maybe 
due to proximity or brand preference), others seek out the best promotional offers and 
the rest prefer a store offering a loyalty reward. From the above solutions, we can see 
that market shares and resultant profits are a function of several parameters including 
prices, promotions, shopping costs and the loyalty scheme. However, the model largely 
ignores the interaction between price and other dimensions of competition and 
differentiation in grocery retail markets such as product range, quality of service and 
quality of products. Therefore the extent to which loyalty schemes change consumer 
behaviour may not be fully captured by the model. It is far more likely that customers 
choose their preferred grocery retailer based on a wider combination of store 
characteristics in addition to the level of price. 
We previously noted that this model is structurally different to the models of 
endogenous switching costs outlined further above. These models endogenize costs of 
switching in the zeroth period and the firms themselves set the size of the switching 
costs.  On the other hand differences in preferences for repeat purchase discounts in the 
Lal and Bell (2003) model are captured through shoppers’ relative positions in the 
Hotelling linear city framework. An interesting aspect of the above model is that it 
assumes that some consumers are not affected by the presence of a repeat purchase 
discount, while others are.  In the Lal and Bell model, loyal customers remain loyal by 
definition not because they are locked-in through a repeat purchase discount.  Perhaps 
they are locked in due to brand preferences but this point is not really considered by the 
authors. Instead, the model assumes that so-called cherry-pickers are impacted by the 
loyalty discount who shop around for good deals.   
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The Lal and Bell model is a highly simplistic view of the groceries sector which 
does not consider specifically the role of endogenous switching costs which arise due 
to the presence of loyalty schemes. However, the assumption applied does raise an 
important question. That is: do different types of consumers behave differently when 
there is a repeat purchase discount available?  As stated above, to the best of our 
knowledge this point has not been explicitly addressed by models of endogenous 
switching costs in industrial organization.  Instead, it is typically assumed that the firm 
can create artificial switching costs by offering repeat purchase discounts without 
considering the fact that this may not actually create switching costs for everyone.  In 
other words, the literature to date largely ignores the heterogeneous nature of switching 
costs which may arise in some markets (Biglaiser et al. 2016).  Further, the models 
unrealistically assume that all consumers redeem a loyalty discount if they visit the 
retailer offering a loyalty program.  Instead, it is entirely possible that some consumers 
simply will not sign up to the scheme due to personal preferences and still visit the 
retailer offering the scheme on a frequent basis.  
In light of the above literature, this thesis proposes the hypothesis that when 
firms implement loyalty schemes this will affect the behaviour of only a proportion of 
consumers in the population through artificially created switching costs.  It follows that 
the behaviour of certain individuals will be unaffected as they prefer not to participate 
in any loyalty scheme at all, regardless of which retailer they choose.  Thus their choice 
of retailer is independent of the availability of a repeat purchase discount.  We discuss 
further below how empirical analysis can help inform and/ or test assumptions entering 
theoretical models. We next look at the empirical evidence on discounts tied to 
customer loyalty.  
1.4 Empirical Evidence on Discount and Loyalty Scheme Strategies 
This section presents empirical evidence on the effects of discount based pricing 
strategies adopted by firms, including loyalty rewarding schemes.  We first consider 
the type of data available to retailers when making strategic pricing decisions and 
promotional strategies.  We then present empirical evidence of how loyalty schemes 
based on repeat purchase discounts are likely to impact consumers’ choice of seller and 
the prices paid by consumers.  In doing so we note that few empirical papers assess the 
effects of loyalty schemes in dynamic retail markets.  We note that this may be due to 
the difficulties in observing and quantifying switching costs.  Farrell and Klemperer 
(2007, p. 1980) explain that because “switching costs are usually both consumer-
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specific and not directly observable, and micro data on individual consumers’ purchase 
histories are seldom available, less direct methods of assessing the level of switching 
costs are often needed.”  We also note that the majority of the existing empirical 
literature on endogenous switching costs focuses on frequent flier programs.  In fact, 
the effects of frequent flier loyalty schemes are also driven by the well-known principal 
agent problem rather than just artificial switching costs faced by consumers.  We keep 
this point in mind in evaluating the results of such models. 
In marketing and operational research there are models for maximizing loyalty 
card and scanner data (Pauler & Dick 2006). For example, retailers can use the data to 
identify the bestselling items and target promotional activity accordingly.  Further, the 
retailer can identify more profitable products that can be used to cross-subsidize 
discounted products (DeGraba 2006). In other words, this is a type of “loss leader” 
strategy where a retailer advertises one popular discounted product (the loss leader) but 
recoups the losses because consumers purchase other products during the same 
shopping trip (DeGraba 2006).  More generally, loyalty cards and store scanner-level 
data offer a retailer revealed preference data on its consumers’ shopping behaviour and 
respective sociodemographics.  Considering the above, retailers like Tesco and others, 
can analyse extensive data to achieve optimal product offers, store-specific promotions 
and personalized discounts. Tailoring store offers to suit the most profitable consumer 
segments can maximize store profits (Pauler & Dick 2006). Loyalty schemes ensure a 
repeated interaction between the retailer and consumers to reveal essential knowledge 
of long term consumption patterns.  
Consumers in the groceries market may face search costs as consumers may not 
be able to observe the quality of a product before consuming it, which is a feature of an 
experience good. Avery (1996) considers how this impacts the way consumers shop 
around for products, discounts and promotions.  Avery (1996) performs an empirical 
analysis of survey data on the applicability of Stigler’s theory of “Economics of 
Information”.  The focus of the paper is on the process of consumers’ pre-shopping and 
in-store search activity in the US groceries market.  In this scenario, before making a 
purchasing decision, consumers repeatedly engage in search activity to better inform 
themselves about products and their prices. This process improves purchasing 
outcomes for consumers, so long as the marginal benefit of search is at least equal to 
the cost of search. However, consumers differ in their preferences for search activity as 
a result of the underlying determinants of search costs. Following Stigler’s definition, 
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the magnitude of search costs depends on an individual’s monetary situation, the 
opportunity cost of engaging in search and the transportation cost (Avery 1996).  
The type of pre-shopping search activities considered in the Avery (1996) paper 
are coupon collecting, coupon swapping, tracking promotional activity and viewing 
various forms of advertising. The findings suggest that consumers engage in search 
activity to different degrees depending on their demographic characteristics. In 
addition, consumers are shown to be generally poorly informed about prices of products 
in store as suggested by previous research in the field.  Avery argues that consumers 
are largely unaware of specific product prices and that instead, consumers focus on 
understanding the general pricing strategies and promotions of specific retailers (Avery 
1996).  In other words, the retail offers differentiated by retailer brand.  
We also know that promotions are an important component of the competitive 
process in some retail markets.  Volpe (2013) analyses promotion driven competition 
in an oligopoly setting by examining dynamics of pricing strategies of supermarket 
chains in the Unites States. Volpe’s results show that the strategic promotional 
behaviour contributes to price variation in the groceries market in the US. Using data 
on prices and promotions from two major supermarkets, Volpe finds empirical evidence 
that the retailers will seek to match each other’s promotional activity. The retailers seek 
to promote items that will incentivise consumers to switch from a rival store. This 
strategic firm behaviour is consistent with the evidence of greater more intense price 
competition in the presence of switching costs. 
Consumers who are relatively price insensitive will likely not be influenced by 
a discount and will make their purchasing decision based on other dimensions of their 
preferences (Wang 2010). The retailer can focus on identifying patterns in product 
preferences among shoppers to personalize stores. Differences in consumer price 
sensitivity may not be perfectly observable to the firm. To allow for customers to self-
select, firms can offer joint purchase discounts. Wang (2010) analyses data on bundled 
discounts for joint purchases of gasoline and groceries in Australia. He explores the 
retailers’ motivations to offer the bundled discounts. In contrast to theoretic models, 
Wang did not find evidence for exclusionary conduct or predatory intent. Instead, he 
finds that the ‘loss leader’ advertising method is the most likely explanation for 
applying the bundled petrol discount to groceries. For petrol to be a profitable ‘loss 
leader’ advertising tool, there is a minimum spend attached to the rebate as we see in 
real life markets. Furthermore, Wang argues that consumer price sensitivity will affect 
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behavioural decisions. Price insensitive consumers do not have the incentives to redeem 
their vouchers or join a loyalty scheme compared to price sensitive individuals. Thus 
price sensitivity, i.e. consumers’ elasticities of demand, would need to be estimated to 
explicitly measure the effects of bundled discounts on profits. 
Asplund et al. (2008) estimate cross-sectional data to identify presence of 
behaviour based pricing in the newspaper market in Sweden. The data shows that 
newspapers discriminate depending on the amount of competition they face in their 
local area. The authors argue that discounts targeted at rivals’ customers increase the 
presence of price discrimination. For example, newspapers in locations with higher 
competition offer discounts to students. More generally, discounts are targeted 
depending on consumers’ levels of price sensitivity. The results further evidence an 
existing relationship between market power and the value of the discount. Where the 
newspaper enjoys greater market power, a discount is not offered. In fact, the discount 
value is found to be inversely related to the firms’ market share. Newspapers facing a 
higher number of rivals in their area offered a greater discount. While the data did not 
show evidence of switching costs, existence of such costs could be a potential 
explanation for the targeted discounts (Asplund et. al. 2008).  These results suggest that 
discounts are associated with pro-competitive effects when there exist a sufficient 
number of competing firms in the market. 
We previously discussed how some consumers join a loyalty schemes to avoid 
the so-called disloyalty penalty. There is evidence to suggest that this effect may also 
deter consumers from switching in future periods. Morell et al. (2009) present 
experimental evidence to support this claim. Morell et al. (2009) show that consumers 
who are subject to targeted discounts can make irrational decisions in future. The 
researchers perform a lottery style choice based experiment on a group of randomly 
selected individuals. Risk preferences and loss aversion statistics were calculated. The 
likelihood of switching to a different option was greatly reduced by participation in the 
rebate scheme. They explain this behaviour by the Cumulative Prospect Theory which 
predicts that targeted rebates harm consumers because they are less likely to be willing 
to switch to a better offer. Morell et al.’s analysis of targeted rebates, supports claims 
of competitive harm from targeted discounts creating perceived switching costs. 
Let us also consider Hartmann and Viard (2008) who challenge the ‘lock in’ 
effect associated with shopping frequency reward programs.  The authors argue that 
frequent shoppers do not experience high artificial switching-costs. They use data on 
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531 golfers, some of whom participate in a golf club loyalty program based on the ‘buy 
10 get 1 free’. The paper aims to measure switching costs by constructing a dynamic 
demand model with forward looking consumers. The approach relies on firstly deriving 
choice probabilities that incorporate the customers’ expected utility based on the 
discounted value of different purchasing decisions. The specification is then refined to 
suit the specific loyalty scheme data which is estimated using random parameters logit 
(i.e. mixed logit model). The data and model allow measurement of elasticities of 
demand under the reward program and without. The loyalty reward scheme is shown 
to have no effect on the respective elasticity of demand of customers. Hartmann and 
Viard argue that customer’s ex-ante valuations determine the effectiveness of the 
scheme.  
This result is comparable to that of Lal and Bell’s (2003) where loyalty schemes 
primarily influenced the behaviour of cherry-pickers. Hartmann and Viard suggest that 
frequent shoppers already have a brand preference for the product with the loyalty 
scheme attached. Because they are already assumed to be loyal customers, their 
behaviour is not influenced by the scheme. Based on the data, the impact on elasticities 
is akin to the firm offering equivalent price reductions absent the loyalty scheme. At 
the same time, we should recognize that golf enthusiasts will probably have stronger 
brand preferences for golfing courses compared with customers choosing between 
grocery stores. The authors offer an alternative explanation on the role of loyalty reward 
schemes unrelated switching costs. They suggest that their findings could be supported 
by loyalty schemes acting as a mechanism for volume related price discrimination that 
reduces uniform prices. Alternatively, they argue that loyalty reward programs could 
be a mechanism for exploiting the principal agent problem which has also been 
explored in the context of frequent flier programs. 
An empirical research paper in marketing by Liu and Yang (2009) looks at how 
competing loyalty schemes influence individual program effectiveness. They focus on 
the US airline industry and perform a two-stage least square estimation with the value 
of sales as the dependent variable. Loyalty scheme effectiveness is shown to be 
determined by the relative market share of an individual airline. Thus suggesting that 
additional features associated with larger airlines, such as complementary resources, 
would enable them to obtain additional incremental sales from loyalty reward schemes 
(Liu & Yang 2009). It is widely acknowledged that airlines are subject to a costly 
minimum efficient scale due to significant economies of scale and network effects 
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associated with operations. Thus the finding that airlines with high market share reap 
the greatest benefits from loyalty programs is consistent with airline market features 
(McCaughey & Behrens 2011). This is also consistent with the literature on switching 
costs which explains companies’ focus on in investing in market share through 
strategies that include loyalty schemes and repeat purchase discounts. While previous 
studies suggested that competing loyalty schemes lead to a zero-sum game, the results 
do not support this argument (Liu & Yang 2009).While there is some evidence to 
suggest that market saturation will reduce loyalty scheme effectiveness, the effect is 
eliminated under high category expandability.  
As a complementary analysis to the initial regression exercise, Liu and Yang 
(2009) estimate survey data using a two-stage panel regression analysis. The estimates 
provide a measure of attitudinal loyalty and the influence on loyalty scheme 
effectiveness, market share and scheme membership. The sample features 166 
respondents’ attitudes on 11 of the most recognized US airlines. Consumers are 
segmented by their preferences for category expandability. The authors define high 
category expandability as the airlines’ ability to compete in other product markets. This 
feature improves the airline’s competitive edge in the airline industry for consumers 
with preference for high category expandability. The results support the previous 
regression analysis that suggested that airlines with higher market share have a more 
effective FFPs. On the other hand, small market share airlines who offered loyalty 
schemes did not see their FFP have an influence over their members booking frequency. 
This effect was measured using a simulated scenario to compare members’ and non-
members’ booking frequency for a particular airline. 
In light of the evidence that larger airlines achieve greater gains from their FFPs, 
as compared to smaller airlines, antitrust concerns may arise if these airlines also enjoy 
hub dominance at airports. Prior to regulatory intervention, the first phase of analysis 
would have to seek to identify the causes of reduced competition at particular airports 
(Lederman 2007). FFPs could be seen as a mechanism to isolate participating airlines 
from intense competition at a given airport. The schemes alter behaviour and entice 
travellers to book flights which enable them to keep earing towards their FFP rewards 
(Lederman 2007). These effects must then be weighed against improvements in welfare 
arising from greater economies of scale and enhanced networks as many FFPs rely on 
partnerships between airlines and these agreements can have mixed welfare effects. As 
previously mentioned, achieving FFP scale in terms of additional airline partners, 
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should improve the effectiveness of the program because of the importance of networks 
within the airline industry.  
The distortionary effects on behaviour, can offer an airline further market power 
over segments of customers making FFPs a useful tool for airlines wishing to preserve 
their hub dominance. Using data on fares, passenger numbers and FFP scale over time, 
Lederman’s (2007) paper looks at the relationship between demand, variation in an 
airline’s dominance and FFP enhancements achieved through additional partnerships 
over time. The results present evidence that loyalty schemes can distort competition by 
influencing demand and equilibrium ticket prices. Unlike previous work, this empirical 
model enables Lederman to isolate the effects of changes to the FFPs and their resulting 
impact on demand at the airline’s hub airport. The estimates show that FFPs can impact 
the equilibrium outcome both in terms of higher demand and fares. Enhancements to 
FFPs at airports where an airline is dominant, contributes to further increasing fares and 
passenger numbers.  
Another study relies on actual FFP airline data and is carried out by McCaughey 
and Behrens (2011). The data is sourced from an anonymous US airline. The authors 
consider whether FFPs lead to members paying higher prices as a result of premiums. 
The results show evidence of behavioural effects associated with FFPs. The scheme’s 
data shows that the airline is able to exploit different willingness-to-pay of travellers 
between the different tiers of the scheme (e.g. gold and silver membership) and to 
charge differentiated premiums. This result supports Lederman’s (2007) estimates of 
increased equilibrium fares under FFPs and the principal agent problem of moral hazard 
explored by Basso et al. (2009). McCaughey and Bahrens argue that the optimal 
strategy for the airline would be to introduce even further tier segments within their 
FFP to fully exploit variation in WTP. 
To analyse the airline FFP data, McCaughey and Bahrens apply discrete choice 
analysis using the mixed logit model. While there may be an additional computation 
burden, the approach allows to control for correlations between alternatives and 
individuals (McCaughey & Bahrens 2011). This among additional features, makes the 
mixed logit an attractive option for panel survey data as well as revealed preference 
data. The authors were able to estimate consumer behaviour attributed to different 
levels of program membership. The model also accommodated demand segmentation 
to identify preferences of specific demographic groups, namely income level, gender 
and FFP membership. Unlike other versions of the model, the mixed logit allowed 
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McCaughey and Bahrens to identify variation in taste over individuals as well as across 
different groups of individuals. Section 1.6 looks at the various applications of discrete 
choice models such as the mixed logit. Next, in light of the theoretical and empirical 
literature, we consider the competition policy considerations when investigating or 
assessing markets with the presence of either exogenous or endogenous switching costs.  
1.5 Competition Policy & Switching Costs 
The previous section presented literature on switching costs and loyalty 
rewarding schemes.  Earlier models suggested that switching costs create poorer 
outcomes for consumers in terms of higher prices and lower welfare (Klemperer 1995, 
Rhodes 2014).  We note however, that alternative models show how switching costs 
can intensify competition between firms and lead to lower average prices. This section 
considers competition policy in the presence of switching costs with a specific focus on 
loyalty scheme strategies. We begin by discussing if and when intervention is 
appropriate and in doing so refer to the recent Competition and Markets Authority 
(“CMA”) investigations into energy and banking where switching costs were deemed 
to be particularly problematic.  This section seeks to highlight the importance of 
adopting a consumer oriented competition policy in markets with switching costs and 
more generally. Additionally, we note that in reality, consumers are likely to face more 
than one type of switching cost when faced with choices between different brands 
(product or retailer).  We therefore also discuss the effect that artificial switching costs 
may create on top of brand related switching costs, particularly in terms of locking in 
consumers and excluding rivals.   
Even though it can be shown that switching costs intensify competition between 
firms in some situations, switching costs are generally assumed to be welfare reducing 
(Farrell & Klemperer 2007).  Farrell and Klemperer (2007, pp. 2005-2006) argue that 
while switching costs may not strictly soften competition between firms competing 
across different factors, they are however, likely to make competition more fragile. 
Farrell and Klemperer note that on the basis of the evidence it is far more likely that 
switching costs are welfare reducing, result in markets performing less well and higher 
average prices. Thus they suggest that in some markets, intervention may be required 
to reduce switching costs. For example, in markets where firms strategically make 
products incompatible to increase their market power.  In such situations, regulations 
may be required to discourage practices which seek to raise switching costs (Klemperer 
1995, Gans & King 2001). We begin by considering switching costs which arise 
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irrespective of firms’ compatibility or pricing strategies.  In such markets, carefully 
designed remedies to increase the rates of switching may be necessary to make markets 
more competitive (Waterson 2003).   
As explained above, switching costs which exist in markets for various different 
reasons, allow firms to enjoy a monopoly over a segment of locked-in consumers. In 
turn, consumer behaviour and lack of switching makes firms compete less aggressively 
for consumers and reduces the intensity of competition in the market.  However, 
competition policy historically focused on firms’ behaviour and has sought to remedy 
abuse of dominance through behavioural or sometimes structural remedies (Waterson 
2003).  However, in some markets, intervention which targets consumers specifically 
may be required to improve the functioning of markets and outcomes for consumers 
(Waterson 2003).  Waterson (2003) considers the example of the UK energy market 
before it was investigated by the CMA over ten years on.   
On the surface, the market itself seems potentially competitive and there are a 
number of different suppliers. However, switching between providers is not common 
place and consumers are not necessarily informed about available alternatives, even if 
the information is publically available.  In this case, Waterson notes that regulators 
should consider whether intervention may be required to improve switching in the 
market.  For example through price comparison websites and through introduction of 
swift and low-cost switching services. We now look at the UK competition authority’s 
intervention in two distinct markets with high exogenous switching costs, including the 
consumer retail energy market.  
The CMA recently completed Market Investigations (“MIs”) into energy24 and 
retail banking25.  We refer to these as the Energy MI and the Banking MI respectively. 
In the context of these investigations, the CMA considered the reasons for low 
switching rates in these respective markets and quantified average benefits of switching 
for different groups of consumers in terms of financial savings (Energy MI 2016, 
Appendix 9.2, Banking MI 2016, Appendix 6.2).  The CMA concluded that low 
switching levels in both markets were one of the reasons resulting in overall poorer 
outcomes for consumers. In the context of its findings following these investigations, 
                                                 
24 The final report and other materials relevant to the investigation can be accessed here: 
https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/energy-market-investigation 
25 The final report and other materials relevant to the investigation can be accessed here: 
https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/review-of-banking-for-small-and-medium-sized-businesses-smes-in-
the-uk 
53 
 
the CMA proposed a number of remedies to encourage customer switching.  This is 
consistent with the consumer focused policy considerations outlined by Waterson 
(2003).  
In the context of these MIs, the CMA found a number of common features of 
consumer behaviour in these two markets. Let us consider these similarities. Firstly, in 
both markets the CMA identified low levels of switching.  One of the explanations set 
out by the CMA, was that consumers were disengaged with retail energy markets 
(Energy MI 2016, para 125) and the CMA also found low levels of consumer 
engagement in the personal current accounts markets (Banking MI 2016, paras 64-66).  
This was found to be the case despite the benefits of switching identified and quantified 
in both of these markets. In the context of the Banking MI for example, some banks put 
forward the argument that low levels of switching was a reflection of high customer 
satisfaction.  The CMA argued however, that given the gains associated with switching, 
in a well-functioning market with low switching costs, it would be expect to observe 
far greater switching by consumers of personal current accounts in the market (Banking 
MI 2016, para 6.25).  In the context of the Energy MI, the CMA found that there were 
more severe issues in disengagement and customer response among prepayment 
customers compared to others. Differences in switching costs were also identified in 
the context of the retail banking investigation.  In the Banking MI, overdraft users were 
found to be as likely to search as other consumers however, they were less likely to 
switch than other consumers (Banking MI, para 6.44). Both findings suggest that 
consumers can be heterogeneous in their switching costs for a variety of reasons. 
In terms of the remedies proposed, the CMA noted that the detriment arising to 
consumers due to excessive prices in the retail energy market amounted to about £1.4 
billion a year between 2012-2015 and that the detriment varied by customer group 
(Energy MI, paras 194-195).  Thus among the proposed remedies, the CMA outlined a 
package of customer centric remedies to help “customers engage to exploit the benefits 
of competition and to [protect] consumers who are less able to engage to exploit the 
benefits of competition.”26 This presents a shift in competition policy towards consumer 
focused remedies to improve the functioning of markets.  In addition, the CMA 
proposed an entire current account switching package in the context of the Banking MI 
(paras 14.1-14.163).  The package of remedies aims to improve the switching process, 
                                                 
26 Energy MI 2016, para 206. 
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increase transparency between providers to help consumers inform themselves and 
raise awareness of the benefits of switching among consumers.   
We note however, that the above market investigations looked at markets with 
very specific characteristics. Namely, high levels of market concentration and stable 
market shares over time.  Further, in these markets providers sell experience goods 
where trust in the brand matters to consumers. In addition, proportionately large 
numbers of customers did not actively switch between providers.  The CMA found that 
consumers were generally disengaged and typically uninformed about alternatives 
available.  Thus there were a number of interrelated factors which exacerbated the 
negative effects associated with switching costs.  However, absent some of the market 
features outlined above, switching costs may be less problematic.  For example, in 
markets where the vast majority of consumers are active switchers, this may create the 
right incentives for firms to compete vigorously for market share. In this context, the 
decision of whether to intervene in a market where endogenous and/ or exogenous 
switching costs prevail, must be evaluated in the context of the wider aspects of a 
market, namely, price trajectory over time, distribution of market shares between firms 
over time and whether any one firm has significant market power. We now consider 
the treatment of endogenous switching costs from a competition policy perspective.  
The two main competition concerns associated with loyalty schemes are 
interrelated.  The strategy creates endogenous switching costs which can be shown to 
lock-in consumers thereby softening price competition and may also exclude rivals who 
are unable to compensate consumers through lower prices.  The scope for exclusion in 
the context of repeat purchase discounts, arises because the consumer’s desire to obtain 
a loyalty discount in future, creates an interdependence between purchase decisions 
over time. In turn, the seller establishes a sort of monopoly over its customers as they 
are locked in.  This strategy may therefore exclude rivals in future time periods as 
consumers are unwilling to switch away. Consumers may find themselves in a 
prisoners’ dilemma, whereby they would have been better off not participating in the 
scheme.  We note that exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm can result in detriment 
to consumers’ welfare through either higher prices, lower quality or lower innovation 
(EC Guidelines 2009, paragraph 19).   
Prevention of exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings is therefore a 
central element to competition policy.  In reviewing the economic theory of loyalty 
schemes we noted both the exclusionary and pro-competitive aspects of the strategy.  
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In this context, the risk of exclusion or softening of price competition, should be 
balanced against any pro-competitive effects that may arise due to the strategy, in 
particular where it intensifies competition between rival firms. For example, Gans and 
King’s (2001) consider a model of different regulatory regimes in the context of 
technological endogenous switching costs. Gans and King (2001) argue that regulators 
face a trade-off between imposing regulations which reduce switching costs against the 
amelioration costs which arise as a result of the intervention. The authors’ model shows 
that ameliorating switching costs results in lower prices, however, consumers or firms 
may end up absorbing these costs, mitigating the positive effects of the intervention.  
Thus we note that any intervention into markets of endogenous switching costs, needs 
to be balanced against the likely benefits of the remedy and who is likely to absorb the 
costs of the intervention.  
We now look at the likely competition implications of endogenous switching 
costs where other switching costs are already present in the market, say those related to 
brand effects.  As found by Shi (2012), the presence of exogenous switching costs may 
reduce incentives for firms to create endogenous switching costs.  This occurs because 
the effect of exogenous switching costs outweighs the effect of endogenous switching 
costs.  Consumers redeem their loyalty discount and the firm makes lower profits as a 
result.  We note the possibility that this effect could go both ways. For example, if we 
were to assume a scenario where endogenous switching costs outweigh the effects of 
exogenous switching costs, firms’ would have the incentive to offer customers repeat 
purchase discounts.  This is the case of the Caminal and Claici (2007) model where in 
the context of homogenous products, each forward looking firms’ dominant strategy is 
to offer a repeat purchase discount.  Depending on the number of firms in the market 
and the type of price commitment, the strategy results in either a procompetitive 
outcome (large number of firms) or an anticompetitive outcome (small number of 
firms).  
On the basis of the discussion above, we note the importance of considering the 
wider features of a market in the assessment of firm strategies.  In this context, different 
types of empirical analyses can supplement the insights offered by theoretical models, 
albeit these approaches also face certain limitations (Waterson 2014).  For example, 
competition authorities can empirically assess the effects of business strategies through 
a counterfactual. However, establishing an accurate counterfactual can prove 
challenging or impossible due to the complex nature of real-world markets and the 
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plethora of economic variables to consider (Economides 2010, Greenlee et al. 2008).  
More generally, empirical techniques in competition cases have been steadily evolving 
and are becoming an essential component to an effects based approach. In this context, 
market definition and merger control assessments have become increasingly more 
reliant on sophisticated empirical techniques (Lianos & Genakos 2012). These 
techniques are also being applied outside of merger control to different competition 
policy areas (Lianos & Genakos 2012).   
It is also widely recognized that different sectors have distinct features and 
important nuances.  In this context, empirical methods allow the research to understand 
such differences (Waterson 2014).  For example, the same strategy may have very 
different effects depending on the type of market under investigation. In this context, 
empirical modelling would reveal such idiosyncrasies. We note also that the researcher 
can turn to discrete choice experiments (“DCEs”) to inform an assessment of a very 
specific competition question. For example, DCEs can be applied to test an assumption 
entering theoretical models involving consumer choice (Farrell & Klemperer 2007).  
Following Farrell and Klemperer (2007, p. 1980) [w]here micro data on individual 
consumers’ purchases are available, a discrete choice approach can be used to explore 
the determinants of a consumer’s probability of purchasing from a particular firm.” 
We consider this approach further in Section 1.6 below where we also introduce the 
concept of discrete choice experiments, including setting out some examples of its 
applications.  We also explain the nature of trade-offs involved when adopting such an 
approach compared to theoretical modelling.  In doing so we also highlight the 
additional insights which can be achieved through a discrete choice experiment, in 
particular in the context of informing the assumptions entering a theoretical model.   
1.6 Applications of Discrete Choice Analysis 
Drivers of consumer decision-making have long interested researchers across 
disciplines (Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 20-21, Keane & Wasi 2013).  Discrete choice 
models can be used to analyse consumer behaviour using actual consumer data or 
experimental data collected using some form of instrument.  For example, one of the 
empirical papers we presented above, applied the mixed logit model to analyse the 
effect of frequent flier programs participation on choice of air fares using actual airline 
passenger data (McCaughey & Behrens 2011).  This model is one of the more flexible 
alternatives available to researchers.  We note however, that in practice it may be 
difficult to obtain micro-level consumer data.  In such cases, the researcher can design 
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an experiment for the collection of micro-level consumer data which can also be 
estimated using a discrete choice model (Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 20-21). 
We note that one of the applications of empirical techniques in the context of 
switching costs, is to test aspects of theoretical models (Farrell & Klemperer 2007).  
This specific application is the focus of this thesis and below we outline a few examples 
of discrete choice models to show how discrete choice methods can be applied to the 
assessment of different types of hypotheses on consumer choice.  The examples of 
discrete choice modelling we present below are intended to demonstrate the flexibility 
afforded to the researcher to test different hypotheses on consumer choice.  The 
underpinnings of discrete choice models can be traced to Lancaster (1966) who 
suggested that individuals gain utility from the characteristics and features of goods.   
Tirole (1988, p. 99-100) explains how the Lancastrian approach differs from 
traditional models in industrial organisation that assume a form of vertical and/or 
horizontal differentiation. Instead, Lancaster’s framework assumes that “[g]oods are 
defined as bundles of characteristics, and the consumers have preferences over 
characteristics. The consumers may have heterogeneous preferences over 
characteristics.”   DCEs typically require carefully constructed instruments through 
which data can be collected on the population of interest.  Data can be collected either 
through a lab experiment or a survey for example.  This data can then be fitted to a 
number of different discrete choice models allowing for the estimation of preferences.  
For example, the mixed logit model allows the researcher to test for presence of 
preference heterogeneity between individuals.      
We note that applications of choice modelling stretch across disciplines, 
including but not limited to, marketing, transportation studies, migration economics, 
environmental economics, and health economics.  Let us consider some examples of 
applications of discrete choice experiments to different contexts.  In marketing research, 
discrete choice modelling assists in the optimisation of advertising strategies, allows 
demand forecasting for new products and has numerous other applications (Keane & 
Wasi 2013).  Seetharman et al. (2005) present a review of applications of multi-category 
choice models used in marketing research. A number of the models outlined in the paper 
rely on discrete choice modelling.  Using scanner-level (revealed preference) data, these 
models help explain different shopping outcomes by estimating consumer purchasing 
patterns across different categories of products.  
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 Chung and Rao (2003) adapt the nested logit model to measure preferences for 
bundle attributes. The authors implement a survey and collect a sample of 136 
undergraduate students.  The data is then used to measure preferences for a computer 
hardware bundle. This particular model informs the researchers about the optimal 
design for a pure bundle of a system of complementary goods. Each bundle is defined 
by a set of observable attributes which vary across alternatives. This framework allows 
estimation of consumer willingness-to-pay for the bundle attributes. By applying a 
latent class specification as part of the estimation procedures, the authors are able to 
identify heterogeneity in consumer segments. The model is a type of generalized 
extreme value (“GEV”) model also in the logit family of models. 
Le Cadre et al. (2009) rely on a variant of the nested logit and estimate consumer 
preferences for French telecom operator bundle offers. They note that most research 
assumes that the consumer valuations are known to the firm, while in the real world, 
consumer preferences may not be clearly observable. Motivated by the gap in literature, 
the authors construct an approach to model consumer preferences for service bundle 
offers. They use data from an extensive questionnaire of 1014 families in France. Part 
of the questionnaire asks consumers to answer demographic questions and to grade 
bundle offers in terms of their reservation prices and attribute ratings. This ‘grading’ 
approach is the basis of latent class modelling that allows for segmentation of data 
based on taste heterogeneity. The findings allow the authors to define an optimally 
priced bundle and identify more profitable market segments.  
Using questionnaire data from 1000 Seoul households, Shin et al. (2009) 
construct a GEV nested logit model and estimate consumer heterogeneity and 
preferences for telecommunications services. The research concentrates on bundling 
from a consumer welfare perspective rather than a marketers’. Their model allows them 
to adjust for different preference assumptions from economic models of commodity 
bundling. The empirical work presents estimates of willingness-to-pay and welfare 
gains for consumers when choosing the bundled goods. This approach also allows Shin 
et al. to isolate the effect of a bundled discount on consumer behaviour.  
The work outline above mainly relies on the standard logit or variants of the 
nested logit specification.  The main downside of standard logistic regression models, 
is that they require for the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (“IIA”) condition 
to hold. This is because an individual’s choice of alternative will most likely be 
correlated over an unobserved factor i.e. variation in taste. By implementing the mixed 
59 
 
logit, the researcher can help overcome this limitation.  In addition, this specification 
allows the researcher to estimate heterogeneity in preferences, segment the data based 
on observable characteristics and accommodate various substitution patterns in 
decision making (Hensher & Greene 2003, Train 2009).  For example, using the mixed 
logit, Hess and Polak (2005) model passenger preferences for airport choice in regions 
with multiple airports. They refer to a sample of passenger survey data on 5097 
respondents which they segment by traveller type (e.g. business vs. leisure).  Previous 
models on airport choice applied the standard CL, leaving a gap in the literature on 
variation in taste within and across market segments (Hess & Polak 2005). Hess and 
Polak improve on previous approaches by implementing both the standard logit and 
mixed logit models to capture preference heterogeneity. Their research paper offers 
important guidance on the pros and cons associated with applying the mixed logit.  
Wine economists, Bonaria Lai et al. (2008), implement both the mixed logit and 
multinomial logit to estimate taste heterogeneity for Sardinian wine. The data is 
collected using an online survey with a consumer sample of 138 wine drinkers. The 
authors champion the mixed logit model for its flexibility in measurement of 
preferences and choice.  On the other hand, Dahlberg et al. (2012) perform an analysis 
of local migration data on 1444 individuals in Sweden to estimate preferences for public 
services. The approach uses the Stata mixlogit command by Hole (2007). The 
estimation enables the researchers to identify preferences for community characteristics 
and to test for heterogeneity in these preferences within and across different 
demographic groups. 
Using a sample of 557 Israeli households, Blass et al. (2010) apply an ‘elicited 
choice probability approach’ to measure preferences for electricity reliability. The 
authors derive a linear version of the mixed logit model which requires a minimal 
computational effort compared to the non-linear version. Even with the random 
parameter specification, this particular approach does not necessitate simulation 
methods. The authors outline a novel, less cumbersome, alternative compared to stated 
preference approaches (Blass et al. 2010). The survey respondents evaluated a series of 
hypothetical electricity bills differentiated by their respective characteristics. However 
Blass et al. (2010) required survey respondents to perform an additional task. Unlike 
the usual stated preference approach where respondents choose one of several 
alternatives, Blass et al. ask respondents to note down percentage grades to indicate the 
percentage likelihood of choosing either alternative. This approach is in contrast to a 
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standard practice which requires respondents to only have an option to state 0% or 
100% per alternative i.e. either the chosen or rejected alternative (Blass et al. 2010). 
The analysis enabled the researchers to identify differences in taste, derive individuals’ 
preferences and WTP of individual respondent segments. 
In the field of health economics, Regier et al. (2009) apply the mixed logit 
model and compare several estimation techniques. The authors use survey data on 
individuals’ choices of genetic testing alternatives. Since data estimated with 
simulation methods may not always converge to a maximum, Regier et al. apply both 
the maximum simulated log-likelihood and Hierarchical Bayes (“HB”) procedures. The 
HB procedure allows the authors to verify that the classical approach of maximum 
simulated likelihood converges to a global maximum.   We note that the mixed logit 
also accommodates willingness to pay estimation which has important uses in 
healthcare economics.  In this context, Hole (2008) applies the mixed logit to measure 
patients’ preferences and willingness-to-pay for general practitioner appointment 
characteristics. Hole (2008) uses data of 409 respondents in the UK, collected using a 
survey constructed with a D-optimality algorithm.27 The data is fitted to a number of 
model specifications including the standard multinomial logit, latent class and mixed 
logit. Because demographic variables enter the estimation process as interactions with 
the primary explanatory variables, Hole also tests different versions of these models, 
with and without interaction terms.  
The examples we presented above show how DCEs enable the researcher to 
address specific consumer oriented policy and behaviour questions. In addition, in some 
markets consumers are central to firms’ strategies and the competitive behaviour 
(Waterson 2003). For example, it can be shown that low levels of switching in 
consumers can reduce the competitiveness of markets and lead to poorer outcomes for 
consumers. However, theoretical models in industrial organisation typically focus on 
the behaviour of firms, ignoring important aspects of consumer behaviour (Waterson 
2003). Thus, competition policy and the economic models used to study competition 
issues, should closely consider consumer behaviour in such markets (Waterson 2003). 
In this context, discrete choice experiments offer the tools to assess the assumptions 
entering theoretical models.  Namely the drivers of consumer choice and determinants 
of switching and equally non-switching.  
                                                 
27 Chapter II of this PhD thesis contains an appraisal of different techniques in survey design. 
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A discrete choice experiment typically presents respondents with a survey 
containing a series of questions that mimic, to a certain degree, a multi-period model 
of competition. A typical assumption in a DCE is that consumer preferences are 
constant at the level of the individual, thus the data only represents a snapshot in time. 
While a DCE approach is unable to capture changes to consumer tastes over time, it 
can identify differences in tastes between groups of consumers.  It should also be noted 
that in the context of various types of experiments, it is challenging to recreate complex 
real world markets and to engage participants who reflect typical consumers (Waterson 
2014).  In addition, consumers may not always respond in the same way as they would 
in real world markets.  For example, consumers may state they like high quality, when 
in fact price is by far the most important determinant of choice. Care must therefore be 
taken in designing a discrete choice experiment used to estimate preferences in the 
population.  We dedicate the next chapter to this area and in doing so we outline our 
preferred discrete choice model, the mixed logit, and consider different approaches for 
the collection of data. 
1.7 Conclusion 
The literature review presented in this chapter focused on the role of switching 
costs in different types of markets and theoretical model set-ups.  In Section 1.2, we 
outlined features of the UK groceries market where a number of retailers offer 
customers loyalty schemes.  This type of market represents an environment where 
consumers face artificial costs of switching due to the strategic behaviour of competing 
retailers.  Section 1.3 considered the role of exogenous and/ or endogenous switching 
costs in determining firms’ strategies and outcomes in a retail market. On the basis of 
the literature presented in this chapter, we found that costs of switching may either 
soften or intensify competition. However this generally depends on a number of factors, 
like the number of firms competing, the number of periods of competition entering a 
model and the nature of price commitments in place. 
We found that more often than not, switching costs are associated with welfare 
reducing effects.  When consumers are locked-in, due to actual or perceived switching 
costs, firms have a profit incentive to invest in market share and exploit such exogenous 
switching costs. We also found that in some markets, firms have the profit incentive to 
create endogenous switching costs through strategies incorporating repeat purchase 
discounts and loyalty schemes. Such models assume that firms decide the size of 
endogenous switching costs ex ante then compete against rival firms. Further, we found 
62 
 
that heterogeneity in switching costs has largely been ignored in the theoretical 
literature. This is the case even if switching costs (exogenous or endogenous) 
themselves can been shown to have a direct impact on firms’ strategies, market shares 
and anticipated profits.  More generally we found that the effects of loyalty schemes 
are not well known in the literature, particularly from the perspective of the consumer 
as theoretical models focus on the strategies of firms.  
Sections 1.4 and 1.6 presented some examples of applications of discrete choice 
methods, including experiments, for modelling determinants of consumer choice, 
highlighting the versatility of the approach across different markets.  In light of the 
evidence presented in this chapter, including the competition policy considerations set 
out in Section 1.5, we propose a discrete choice experiment to model preferences of 
consumers.  This type of approach is adaptable to different settings and can assist the 
researcher in testing the assumptions which enter theoretical models.  In this spirit, we 
propose to test empirically whether consumers differ in the way they incur artificial 
switching costs due to their heterogeneous preferences for loyalty scheme strategies. In 
doing so we are able to determine whether consumers are likely to be heterogeneous in 
their costs of switching when retailers offer repeat purchase discounts.  The empirical 
evidence on consumer preferences in the UK groceries market presented in the third 
chapter of this thesis, suggests that consumers differ in their costs of switching when 
firms implement loyalty schemes, with at least some consumers’ choice of retailer being 
completely unaffected. Our findings have direct implications for the theoretical models 
used to analyse these strategies which have generally ignored this aspect of the market.  
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2.1  Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology for a discrete choice experiment on 
consumer preferences for loyalty scheme discounts and other grocery retailer features.  
The experiment is inspired by theoretical literature on endogenous and exogenous 
switching costs which prevail in a number of different markets.  We performed a review 
of the literature in the first chapter and found that firms have the incentive to create 
artificial switching costs in some markets by introducing loyalty scheme strategies.  
However, the models used to analyse loyalty schemes typically assume that consumers 
will react in the same way to the strategy.  In other words, these models assume that 
consumers are homogenous in how they incur artificially created switching costs. We 
argue that this is unlikely to be the case in real world markets because consumers have 
diverse tastes more generally.  We propose instead that consumers are heterogeneous 
in their switching costs when firms implement loyalty schemes.  
In reality, some consumers simply will not care about receiving a repeat 
purchase discount while other consumers on the other hand, may choose a retailer 
specifically on the basis that they offer a loyalty scheme. We therefore propose to 
challenge the assumption that consumers are homogenous in switching costs artificially 
created by retailers.  This chapter outlines a D-efficient survey designed on the basis of 
actual grocery retailer features in the UK groceries market. We estimate the data 
collected as part of this process using the flexible mixed logit model. In doing so we 
overcome some of the limitations of theoretical models discussed in the previous 
chapter.  The approach in survey design outlined in this chapter focuses on obtaining 
robust parameter estimates and we therefore outline a survey designed following 
efficiency design theory.  The results of the empirical analysis are presented in the next 
chapter.   
When revealed preference (“RP”) data is unsuitable or unavailable, researchers, 
marketers and regulators can follow a stated choice approach to analyse the effects of 
different business strategies on consumer choice and demand. DCEs rely on a stated 
preference (“SP”) approach for data collection and the analyst can choose between 
different discrete choice models to estimate the data once it has been collected 
(Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 20-21). By undertaking a stated choice (“SC”) approach, the 
researcher can re-create true market scenarios and produce the necessary data to model 
consumer preferences, estimate substitution patterns between alternatives and 
undertake forecasting procedures (Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 51-65). Therefore a well-
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executed discrete choice experiment (“DCE”) can inform the researcher on a range of 
issues. For example, in the UK, the competition authority uses surveys to collect data 
recognizing that: 
“…when conducting competition investigations and the evidence from these 
surveys is an important component of its findings. Survey evidence is also proving to 
be useful in remedies work.” (Competition Commission 2010) 
Rather than assuming a specific type of consumer, DCEs allow the research to 
measure various types of behaviour, both rational and irrational.  Stated choice studies 
have been a popular tool amongst researchers because of their ability to generate data 
that captures realistic market decisions which can be analysed using a discrete choice 
model (Huber & Zwerina 1996, Louviere et al. 2000, p.1). The process of implementing 
a stated choice experiment requires carefully constructed hypothetical choice scenarios 
to present to study participants (Bliemer & Rose 2009). The generated questionnaire 
typically presents respondents with 2-4 hypothetical scenarios (i.e. choice situations) 
and these questions are typically presented in survey format.    
In responding to the survey, participants choose between alternatives which are 
distinguished by their features, otherwise known as attributes.  The research much 
choose the number of alternatives and corresponding attributes to enter the design 
(Bliemer et al. 2008). Attributes of available choice alternatives will differ in their 
dimensions, referred to as levels of alternatives, such as different prices or levels of 
quality. Respondents must choose their preferred alternative from the options presented 
to them based on these observable characteristics and trade-offs which define each 
available option. Typically respondents are faced with trade-offs between higher prices 
and higher quality versus lower prices and lower quality for example.  The sample size 
requirement, number of choice situations and the unique combinations of attributes and 
their levels to create a questionnaire, are typically drawn from an underlying 
experimental design (Bliemer & Rose 2009).  
The quality of the experimental design itself therefore drives the precision and 
statistical significance of parameter estimates when performing the empirical analysis. 
In other words, there exists a relationship between the statistical properties of stated 
choice experiments and the econometric models used to estimate the experimental data.  
Designs which have been derived on the basis of the statistical properties of discrete 
choice models are called “efficient designs”.  Here, efficiency refers to the minimisation 
of the standard errors of parameter estimates. Researchers have been increasingly 
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relying on efficiency based designs, namely D-efficient designs (Huber & Zwerina 
1996, Bliemer et al. 2008).  D-efficient designs are increasingly used in applied research 
because their purpose is to minimise the standard errors of the parameters at design 
stages and improve the quality of the results obtained when estimating parameter 
values.  This is also our chosen approach in the context of the pilot and final survey 
designs.  
In this chapter we present the evidence showing that D-efficient designs offer 
empirical advantages over traditional orthogonal designs.  For example, we explain that 
Daniel McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit, and the extension to the flexible mixed 
logit model can be accommodated at design stages through a D-efficient design.  We 
also note that by introducing the empirical model at design stages we are able to achieve 
improvements in the precision of parameter estimates when fitting the data to different 
specifications (Bliemer & Rose 2009).  In presenting the benefits of efficient designs, 
we also outline certain trade-offs compared to orthogonal designs, in particular that the 
researcher must assume prior values for the mean coefficients of the variables of 
interest. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the role of SC studies 
in applied research.  In doing so we highlight the versatility of the approach compared 
with other methods.  Section 2.3 focuses on the econometric models that we propose to 
use to estimate our data. We derive McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model and the 
extension to our preferred model, the flexible mixed logit model. We explain how both 
these models can accommodate stated preference data and allow the researcher to 
measure behaviour using maximum likelihood estimation. After reviewing our 
preferred econometric models, Section 2.4 outlines the trade-offs between efficiency 
based designs versus traditional orthogonal designs.  
We then outline additional considerations in survey design in Section 2.5 and 
Section 2.6 considers different methods available to draw a representative sample of 
the population of interest.  We also outline the biases associated with different types of 
survey data collection methods.  Throughout Section 2.7, we present the qualitative 
evidence on the groceries market we collected to determine the relevant attributes and 
their respective levels to enter the experimental design. In doing so we present the 
design of the pilot survey also in Section 2.7 and discuss the results in Section 2.8.  In 
Section 2.9, we outline the final survey design, explain the underlying considerations 
in the design of survey questions on respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics. 
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2.2 An Introduction to Stated Choice Methods: Theory & Practice 
Over the last 50 years, various institutions have to an extent relied on stated 
choice data where revealed preference data was unavailable, inaccessible or simply 
unusable. Stated choice methods provide the tools to assess the effectiveness of 
business strategies, evaluate policy decisions and to forecast demand for new products 
(Louviere et al. 2000, p. 21). In this context, a stated choice experiment can be the 
optimal method to obtain panel-level data and measure consumer behaviour and 
preferences. This approach allows the researcher to isolate the independent influence 
of variables on some observable outcome (Bliemer & Rose 2009). The process typically 
involves asking a sample of respondents to answer a sequence of questions in a survey 
format. These questions typically ask the study participants to choose between 
alternatives that are differentiated by specific distinguishing features that the analyst 
has chosen to enter into the underlying experimental design.  
The approach allows for the collection of a rich and unique data set to model 
individuals’ preferences for different product or service features. For example, choice 
experiments allow forecasting procedures, can provide information on willingness-to-
pay (“WTP”) estimates for new service improvements and can assist in the formulation 
of policy design. In this context, stated preference methods have been applied across a 
variety of sectors such as environmental economics, healthcare, marketing, and 
transportation studies to name a few. The UK’s competition authority has also 
frequently implemented SC studies during market investigations and merger reviews 
(Competition Commission 2010, pp. 44-62) 
Nonetheless, some economists argue that revealed preference data is strictly 
superior because it reveals what people actually do instead of what they say they would 
do (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 21). However, both revealed and stated preference data are 
subject to their own advantages and limitations and must thus be used in context of the 
empirical investigation at hand. Even if revealed preference data is available, it may not 
be particularly useful or appropriate for the researcher (Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 20-
24). In real world markets, explanatory variables of interest such as price, may not 
produce sufficient variability over time to allow for an estimation of preferences.  In 
addition, variables of importance can be highly collinear in real world markets which 
creates problems for data estimation. In light of these statistical considerations, even if 
we had access to revealed preference data on grocery retailer choice, properties like 
collinearity and autocorrelations in the explanatory variables could hinder our ability to 
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accurately isolate the determinants of behaviour in the market. Carefully constructed 
stated preference experiments founded on economic principles of choice behaviour will 
produce data that is equivalent to RP data (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 21). The data 
obtained from a stated choice experiment can overcome statistical problems associated 
with RP data and will be equally suitable for the same econometric models that measure 
discrete choices for RP data.  
In light of the advantages and versatility of stated choice methods for recreating 
true market scenarios, we argue that economists should most certainly be interested in 
stated preference techniques (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 21). Economic principles of 
consumer choice theory are rooted within stated preference methods. These principles 
are founded on the paradigm of choice that is integral to choice experiments.28 This 
includes both the design of the choice experiment and the various choice models that 
can be used to estimate the SP data (Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 2-3). The consumer’s 
choice paradigm found in DCEs was first proposed by Lancaster (1966). Lancaster 
(1966) offered a novel approach to measuring the utility gained from consuming 
different goods and services. Prior to Lancaster’s contribution, goods were assumed to 
be the objects of utility itself. Instead, Lancaster (1966) proposed the novel idea that 
individuals gain utility from the characteristics and features of services and/or products. 
More precisely the elements of the paradigm of choice define: 
“…the function that relates the probability of an outcome to the utility 
associated with each alternative, and the function that relates the utility of each 
alternative to a set of attributes that, together with suitable utility parameters, 
determine the level of utility of each alternative.” (Louviere et al. 2000, p 34) 
Incorporating the paradigm of choice to a stated choice study requires that the 
available alternatives are differentiated by a set of characteristics that provide varying 
levels of utility to the consumer. The recorded sequence of choices made by different 
respondents provides information about the relative importance of alternatives and 
attributes i.e. characteristics. Following the choice paradigm described above, the 
researcher can estimate the utility associated with different alternatives and their 
respective characteristics by deriving the probabilities of choice. The alternatives 
chosen by a given study participant are assumed to provide them with the highest level 
                                                 
28 Please refer to Louviere et al. (2000) Chapter 1 for a complete overview of the paradigm of choice 
and its relationship with discrete choice models. 
69 
 
of utility compared to the rejected options. Due to the nature of choice experiments, 
stated preference studies will produce discrete choice data of either ranked choices or 
alternatively, chosen or rejected options i.e. 0/1 outcome. Preferences can then be 
estimated using discrete choice models which are founded on the principles of random 
utility theory. 
Random utility theory states that behaviour in the population can be defined by 
a broad set of individual behaviour rules. This relationship can be represented by an 
indirect utility function that is derived below in this section. This equation contains a 
random component that represents the unobservable determinants of choice such as 
random taste variation in the population (Louviere et al. 2000 p. 34). The observable 
components of choice are the attributes and levels of chosen alternatives. The general 
random utility model that captures choice behaviour can be adapted to derive the family 
of discrete choice models. When formulating the underlying experimental design to 
populate a survey, the researcher must specify the indirect utility function which 
contains the attributes and levels that define available alternatives. Subject to the study 
objectives, the collected data can be estimated by selecting the preferred functional 
form from a range of discrete choice models like the conditional logit and mixed logit 
models (Louviere et al. 2000, p 34). The different functional forms found in existing 
discrete choice models, produce their own respective choice probabilities that 
accommodate different behavioural specifications. Hence, the choice of the 
econometric model that relates utility to estimated choice probabilities is integral to the 
experimental design of the study. Consequently, the researcher must select a choice 
model based on the type of data that will be generated by the SC study. 
As mentioned above, the experimental design refers to the matrix of values that 
are used to generate the final survey questions (Bliemer & Rose 2009). A given design 
matrix contains the different combinations of attributes and their respective levels, as 
specified by the researcher in the indirect utility function. Attributes enter the model as 
the explanatory variables and the different combinations of attributes define the 
differences between alternatives that are presented to respondents. The researcher can 
specify the dimensions of the attributes and decide the number of alternatives that the 
respondent will face in any given choice task. For example, price and quality attributes 
vary in magnitudes and can be used to describe the features of a given alternative. Each 
alternative in a given survey question will be distinguished by the specific combinations 
of levels of prices and quality i.e. their magnitudes. The combinations of attributes and 
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levels are contained within a design matrix which is then used to populate the survey.  
The columns of the design matrix contain the specific alternatives and their respective 
attributes that are varied within the design. The rows on the other hand, each represent 
a distinct survey question.  
The general process of creating a survey for a discrete choice experiment is 
outlined in Figure 2.1 below. “Independent of how the matrix is set out, the 
experimental design performs the same function, that being the allocation of attribute 
levels to choice tasks...”29  The design in Figure 2.1 is only an example of a possible 
matrix structure, which can take one of two forms. The first approach, which is also the 
example matrix below, assumes that each row represents a different choice situation 
and each column is a different attribute within the experiment. In this case, groups of 
columns form different alternatives within each choice task. The other possible 
approach assumes that each row of the matrix is an individual alternative while each 
column represents a different attribute. For this type of matrix format, multiple rows 
are combined to form a single choice situation.  
The example presented below follows the first approach (rows indicate choice 
situations) and assumes a design with 2 attributes, travel time and cost/fare that take on 
two levels each. First, the researcher must specify the indirect utility function for each 
alternative, “car” and “train” i.e. specifies functions V1 and V2. The attributes can then 
be matched with a specific alternative. This is achieved by adjusting the utility function 
of the model presented in Figure 2.1 below. The β coefficients in this particular example 
capture the mean effect on utility of alternative-specific attributes x1, x2, x3, x4. In the 
example below, x1 represents the travel time associated the alternative “car”, while x3 is 
the travel time associated with choosing “train”. Then, x2 represents the cost of driving 
a car and x4 indicates the fare associated with travelling by train. The researcher must 
also specify if the attributes are generic or alternative-specific. In this example, β1 is 
generic as it appears in both utility specifications, while the other βs are alternative-
specific. β1 captures the mean effect of travel time on utility, while β2 represents the 
effect of car travel cost on utility. Following the collection of survey data, the model 
parameters β that capture the mean coefficients for “car” and “train” can be estimated 
by the researcher using a statistical software package. 
                                                 
29 Bliemer, M.C.J., Rose, J.M., ‘Constructing Efficient Stated Choice Experimental Designs’, 
Transport Reviews, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2009, p. 588 
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Once the utility functions have been specified as described above, the design 
matrix is populated using a specific type of coding scheme. “The most common ones 
are design coding (0, 1, 2, 3, etc.), orthogonal coding ({-1,1} for two levels, {-1,0,1} for 
three levels, {-3,-1,1,3} for four levels, etc.), or coding according to the actual attribute 
level values.”30 In the below example the experimental design coding is orthogonal. In 
this example, each attribute has 2 levels respectively. These -1/1 values are later 
replaced with actual attribute levels of the design. Looking at the first row of the 
experimental design, a “-1” for x2 indicates a cost of $1 for the car alternative. The third 
row contains a “1” under x2 to indicate a cost level of $1.50 for choosing a car. For a 
“good” design, the levels of attributes must vary sufficiently between alternatives and 
across the choice tasks to isolate the effect on utility. Effectively, the research wants to 
know the contribution that each attribute has on the overall level of utility. The 
underlying experimental design therefore determines the quality of the survey data and 
precision of parameter estimates. The final data set is the product of any design 
assumptions, such as the attributes and attribute levels chosen by the researcher. 
Figure 2.1 – Experimental design process 
(Ngene Manual 1.1.1, ChoiceMetrics 2012, p. 57) 
The stated preferences methodology outlined by Louviere et al. (2000, p. 255), 
states that the researcher must firstly define the unique study objectives of the choice 
experiment. The study objectives must be supported by a combination of relevant 
theoretical, qualitative and quantitative evidence. This facilitates appropriate selection 
of the key attributes that are known to have at least some effect on consumer behaviour 
and the choices they would make in the real-world. After defining the study objectives, 
                                                 
30 Ngene Manual, version 1.1.1, 2012, p. 59 
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researchers can choose how attributes are allocated within the design matrix by 
following one of several methods in experimental design theory. Typically, researchers 
choose to adopt either an orthogonal or efficient design approach. The designs primarily 
differ in the assumptions imposed by the analyst, specifically on the type of correlation 
structure between attributes in the design matrix. We discuss this in greater detail 
further below. 
Let us consider the trends in the literature in the context of the types of 
experimental designs being used for survey data collection.  
A common application of SC studies is to design policy and/or evaluate the 
efficacy of policies in achieving company objectives. This requires an understanding of 
the expected consumer valuation for products that are not yet available on the market. 
In light of increasing global pressures to reduce carbon emissions, transportation 
economists have turned to discrete choice experiments to analyse preferences and 
prospective demand for alternative fuel vehicles (Achtnicht et al. 2012, Hackbarth & 
Madlener 2013). A recent study by Hackbarth and Madlener (2013) is one of many 
published papers that contributes to the already vast DCE literature in transportation 
studies. The sample of 711 German drivers answered a web based survey on choice of 
vehicle. The questionnaire presented the participants with 15 hypothetical choice 
scenarios in addition to sociodemographic questions. The authors’ choice experiment 
applies a mixed logit specification which allows them to explore expected willingness-
to-pay for different vehicle features and simulate how changes in these characteristics 
will likely affect market shares. The findings from the study seek to improve policy 
design by the German government to effectively shift households’ consumption 
towards more fuel efficient automobiles. However, the authors do not provide further 
information on the chosen experimental design for the study. 
Choice experiments are also prevalent in healthcare studies because they are 
effective at addressing various policy issues (Bekker-Grob et al. 2012). DCEs in 
healthcare were first used to value utility enhancing features of patients’ experiences, 
such as waiting times or friendliness of the staff. Applications of SC studies to date 
have stretched across a wide range of policy issues. For example, using an orthogonal 
design, Marti (2012) performs a discrete choice experiment to determine preferences 
for smoking cessation treatments. The 131 selected respondents who answered the 
questionnaire were cigarette smokers and were also asked to provide sociodemographic 
information. The respondent information was used to segment preferences using the 
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mixed logit model. The orthogonal design produced a total of 16 choice situations that 
were divided into two separate blocks of 8 questions. The two blocks were then divided 
among the respondents. Therefore, an individual respondent faced 8 hypothetical 
choice scenarios on their preferred medications, which were differentiated by measures 
of price, expected side-effects and drug effectiveness.  
Bekker-Grob et al. (2012) undertook an extensive literature review of DCEs in 
health economics. The authors find that the primary aim of choice experiments in 
healthcare economics is to derive monetary measures as performed by Marti (2012). 
Such measures include WTP estimates for different medical products and services to 
measure the relative importance of time, risk and health outcomes as captured by the 
underlying differences in features of the alternatives presented to respondents. The 
studies reviewed by Bekker-Grob et al. (2012) that cover relevant information on 
experimental design, have predominantly used variants of orthogonal designs. More 
recently however, there has been a shift towards the implementation of DCEs that use 
a D-efficient design strategy. The authors’ review of the literature demonstrates that 
health economists are continuing to contribute to the ongoing evolution in experimental 
design theory by progressively acknowledging the importance of introducing design 
efficiency in the construction of their DCEs. 
  Instead of relying on traditional orthogonal designs, researchers are making 
increasing use of more flexible econometric models and state-of-the-art D-efficient 
designs. Louviere et al. (2011) and Bekker-Grob et al. (2012) stress that the lack of 
detailed publications on DCE methodology and lack of best-practice guidelines remains 
one of the biggest challenges for applied researchers undertaking a stated choice study. 
This issue arises because there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach in the design of 
discrete choice experiments.  This creates confusion over the optimal choice of design 
for a given context and publications frequently omit information on the experimental 
design used to collect the data. This is problematic because the experimental design 
plays a pivotal role in the accuracy and effectiveness of the stated choice study. 
In addition, best-practice guidelines are ever evolving, thus making them a 
moving target for researchers (Louviere et al 2010). This is largely due to the fast paced 
evolution of this dynamic field, where inevitably state-of-practice lags behind the 
approaches that are currently state-of-the-art (Louviere et. al. 2010, Bekker-Grob et al. 
2012). As a result, there is limited guidance on the appropriateness of outlining specific 
behavioural and statistical assumptions in a given choice experiment (Louviere et al. 
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2011). Throughout different fields of study, academic literature on DCEs rarely offer 
sufficiently detailed information on why specific assumptions were imposed, nor do 
they reveal important details on the overall process taken for design generation.    To 
mitigate these risks and to improve the accuracy of the results at the estimation stage, 
the researcher must have well-defined research objectives and gather appropriate 
qualitative evidence at survey design stage (Bekker-Grob et al. 2012).  In addition, there 
are a number of dedicated researchers whose work focuses on methodological concerns 
in choice modelling experiments (Louviere et al. 2000, Bliemer & Rose 2009, Scarpa 
& Rose 2008, ChoiceMetrics 2012). In addition, we refer to the UK’s Competition 
Commission’s (2010) guidance report addressing methodological concerns in this area. 
Combining the sources of evidence outlined above we note the following essential steps 
in determining the survey’s experimental design (unrelated to sampling and data 
collection methods).  The researcher must: 
(i) define the study objectives; 
(ii) select the econometric model that will be used once data is collected;  
(iii) choose between creating a labelled or unlabelled SC experiment;31  
(iv) perform qualitative research and undertake a pilot study to select DCE 
alternatives, attributes and levels to include in the design matrix and 
define the number of choice situations to present to study participants; 
(v) evaluate, compare and select an experimental design that incorporates 
all the desirable properties and required assumptions to achieve the 
study objectives outlined during the first stage of the experiment. 
(Louvière et al. 2000, Bliemer & Rose 2009, Scarpa & Rose 2008, 
Competition Commission 2010) 
In the first chapter we addressed point (i) by defining our study objective: 
evaluate, in a realistic setting, whether loyalty scheme discounts determine (or not) 
consumers’ choice of retailer in the UK groceries market. The next section addresses 
point (ii) above.  We discuss alternative discrete choice models and in doing so derive 
McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit and provide an extension to the mixed logit model 
by following Train (2009).  We conclude that the mixed logit (“ML”) is our preferred 
                                                 
31 A labelled choice experiment defines alternatives with a name or brand. A labelled alternative would 
be defined as “German car” or “American car”. Alternatively, an unlabelled choice experiment defines 
alternatives as A, B, C…etc. or 1, 2, 3…etc. 
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specification for the estimation of data because it is the least behaviourally restrictive 
compared to the alternatives. 
2.3 Selection of the Econometric Model 
When choosing between econometric models at survey design stages, the 
researcher must decide which model will be best suited to achieve the research 
objectives (Train 2009, p.19). The different models used in DCEs are differentiated by 
their distinctive choice probabilities that are used to estimate the data (Rose et al. 2008). 
Hence different types of data will be more suited for a particular discrete choice model. 
We note that the methodology outlined in this paper is formulated for both the mixed 
logit and McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit models as they share a common 
functional form. 
The conditional logit (“CL”) model is the so-called workhorse of discrete choice 
models as it has been by far the most widely used in DCEs (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 65). 
In the literature, researchers sometimes refer to the conditional logit model as the 
multinomial logit model because functionally, the multinomial logit model can be 
expressed as the conditional logit. While the conditional logit model has been widely 
used, it suffers from certain restrictive properties such as the key assumption that 
consumers are homogenous in their preferences. On the other hand, the mixed logit can 
be adjusted to approximate any choice model by varying some of the assumptions 
imposed (Train 2009, p. 19). Hence, the main distinction between these two models is 
that the mixed logit offers significant advantages in terms of flexibility in 
accommodating a variety of preferences. Advances in computational capabilities paved 
the way for ever increasing use of simulation based methods in discrete choice 
modelling as required by the mixed logit model (Train 2009, p.134). Below we explain 
how the conditional logit can be extended to the mixed logit specification i.e. random 
parameters logit, to accommodate less restrictive statistical properties. 
Following McFadden (1974) and Train (2009), we derive the conditional logit 
and the extension to the flexible mixed logit. McFadden’s conditional logit model can 
be derived by assuming Lancaster’s objective characteristics interpretation of utility. 
Recall that this approach assumes that the characteristics of products and services 
generate utility for consumers, not the product or service itself. When using survey data, 
each individual choice situation faced by the respondent is treated as a choice moment 
at time t where t = 1,…, t. Data constructed from a stated choice experiment represents 
a form of panel data because each hypothetical choice scenario is treated as a moment 
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in time. The choice probabilities are then derived by capturing that variability in 
preferences over the repeated set of finite choices. We provide the extension of the 
model to panel data after firstly deriving the basic behavioural model below as defined 
by Train (2009). 
Both the conditional logit and mixed logit models are part of a wider family of 
random utility models (“RUMs”) and can be derived following the same approach. 
RUMs are founded on the principles of ordinal preferences with origins from the Neo-
Classical theory of individual choice (Bately 2008).32 McFadden adapted the RUM to 
practical applications and “reconstituted RUM from a model of an individual engaged 
in repeated choices, to one of the choices of a population of individuals.”33 The 
intuition behind the approach can be described as follows. Firstly, we assume that the 
researcher observes that decision maker n chooses between available alternatives J. 
However, we also assume the researcher is unable to observe the actual amount of 
utility the decision maker gains from making that particular choice. Instead, the 
researcher observes the set of choices made by individual respondents over the set of 
choice situations. By selecting a specific alternative, the individual obtains a level of 
utility that can be expressed by the observable characteristics of that chosen alternative. 
This utility can be defined as  𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, where j = 1,…,J. Therefore, the choices made by 
respondents represent relative utility differences between alternatives and the different 
attributes, instead of absolute utility. 
The underlying approach assumes utility maximising behaviour, whereby the 
respective decision maker will choose the alternative that maximises his or her utility. 
The decision maker knows the utility he or she obtains, however this is not observable 
to the researcher. The behavioural model is derived by assuming that alternative i will 
be chosen if and only if,  𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ∀ 𝑗𝑗 ≠  𝑖𝑖. The set of observable attributes faced by 
the decision maker and also observed by the researcher, can be represented by a vector 
xnj ∀ j. In addition, the researcher can observe some of the decision makers’ individual 
characteristics denoted as sn. Thus we can derive a functional relationship which relates 
the observable factors to the decision maker, with a function: 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑉𝑉(𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 , 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛). This 
function is known as the representative utility function. 
                                                 
32 Please refer to Bately (2008) for further information on the theoretical underpinnings of RUMs. 
33 Bately, R., “On Ordinal Utility, Cardinal Utility and Random Utility”, Theory and Decision, Vol. 64, 
Issue 1, 2008, p.1 
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As pointed out by Train (2010, p. 15), V will often depend on parameters that 
are unknown to the researcher and must be estimated using quantitative methods. As 
the researcher cannot observe utility in its entirety, it is assumed that 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≠ 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛. 
However, utility can be decomposed to derive a decomposed utility function: 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =
𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, where 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 represents the unobserved segment of utility that is part of  𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 but 
not captured by 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛. We treat 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 as random because it is unknown ∀ j alternatives. The 
random component represents the unobserved influences that are also determinants of 
choice. The joint density of random vector 𝜀𝜀′𝑛𝑛 = (𝜀𝜀n1, … , 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)  is a function 𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛). This 
density is necessary to make probabilistic statements about decision makers’ choices. 
The density function can be derived by assuming that the probability that the decision 
maker n chooses alternative i is: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = Prob�𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 > 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ∀ j ≠ i� 
                         =  Prob�𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 > 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ∀ j ≠ i�  
              =  Prob�𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∀ j ≠ i�          
Using the density function of the unobserved portion of utility we can derive 
the probability density distribution expressed as an integral:  
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  Prob�𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∀ j ≠ i� 
� �𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∀ j ≠ i�𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛
𝜀𝜀
 
Here 𝐼𝐼(∙) is the indicator function which equals 1 when the above expression 
holds true and 0 otherwise (Train 2009, p. 15). Hence the survey response data must 
also be arranged with “0” representing the rejected options, while “1” indicates the 
chosen alternatives. Different assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved 
portion of utility determine the resulting model and functional form of the underlying 
choice probabilities. Following Train (2009, pp. 34-37), the random term in the logit 
model assumes a distributional property derived in McFadden’s (1974) seminal work. 
The random portion of utility 𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛) follows an identically and independently 
distributed (“iid”) extreme value distribution, or otherwise known as the Gumbel and 
type I extreme value distribution. The distribution is a limiting distribution for an 
increasing sample size that describes the distributions of maximum and minimum 
values of a sample of independent and identically distributed random variables. The 
solution to the above integral is the formula for the logit model given by a closed form 
expression (Train 2009, p.36): 
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𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐽𝐽
 
Following Train (2009, pp. 50-51) the expression can be extended to panel data, 
of the type that can be generated using surveys. Assuming individual n chooses 
alternative j in a given choice moment (or survey question) t we have the utility function  𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 and the choice probability can be expressed as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  =  𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐽𝐽
 
Recall that we are not measuring the absolute levels of utility here; the value of 
importance is the relative utility being measured using the unique set of choices made 
by individual respondents. To measure utility, the researcher must establish what is 
actually observable when estimating the data. A stated choice experiment requires 
specification of observable characteristics i.e. attributes, their levels and final choices 
of alternatives to present to respondents. Recall that the researcher observes the choices 
made by respondents and the alternatives chosen by respondents are defined by the 
corresponding attributes of alternatives found in vector 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 which corresponds to 
individual n. Thus the observed portion of utility is 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽) =  𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛′ 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, where 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 is a 
vector of individual-specific coefficients, or so-called weights, that are part of the 
observed portion of utility 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽). The choice probabilities can be solved using 
maximum likelihood because they are globally concave in parameters 𝛽𝛽 (Train 2009, 
p. 37). With the assumption that 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽) =  𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛′ 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 we can reformulate the above logit 
probability: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  =  𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛′ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝐽𝐽
 
To summarize, when applying the standard logit formula, the researcher 
estimates the utility individual n obtains from choosing alternative j at choice situation 
t given by: 
𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝛽𝛽′𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛. 
 The observed portion of utility 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽) = 𝛽𝛽′𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 represents the utility 
achieved given the chosen alternatives j by an individual respondent n at choice moment 
t. The expression allows estimation of parameters of utility captured in 𝛽𝛽 based on the 
chosen alternatives presented in a questionnaire, and these will be captured in the vector 
of attributes 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 for each individual. The primary advantage of the standard logit 
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formula above is that it can be solved analytically. However, the conditional logit 
suffers from certain restrictive properties. For example, the choice probabilities imply 
proportional substitution between alternatives and assumes the property of 
independence from irrelevant alternatives (“IIA”) (Train 2009, pp. 42-46). The IIA 
condition states that an individual’s choices will only depend on available alternatives 
in terms of the relative odds of choosing either alternative. The logit probability 
imposes a constraint that does not allow for variation in consumer’s choice in the face 
of additional alternatives and their respective attributes. Most importantly, the standard 
logit will not be able to accommodate random taste variation because it assumes that 
preferences are homogenous across the population. Train (2009) argues that researchers 
aiming to capture additional variation in preferences should opt for the mixed logit 
model. 
In light of the limitations of the conditional logit, the mixed logit is a very 
attractive model and has been increasingly implemented in applied research (Keane & 
Wasi 2013). The ML assumes that some or all of the estimated parameters in 𝛽𝛽 are 
random and follow an assigned probability distribution, which most often is a standard 
normal. The mean coefficients of the attributes can be simply interpreted as the mean 
weights on utility of the different attributes that enter the model with respective standard 
deviations representing the estimated distribution of taste among the population. This 
assumption specifies that preferences are heterogeneous for that particular attribute. For 
example, if we assume that the price attribute is randomly normally distributed, then 
we are implying that different individuals will assign different weights to the effects of 
price on their utility, whereby the differences between individuals are captured in the 
standard deviations of the estimated mean coefficients. The researcher can specify the 
type of distribution that best suits their assumptions about the data, such as log-normal 
or normal. The mixlogit command in Stata accommodates both the log-normal and 
normal distributions which we also use to analyse our data in chapter three of this 
research paper.  
The mixed logit choice probability is defined as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  �� 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛′ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽
′𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
�  𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽)𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽 
(Train 2009, p. 138) 
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The above choice probabilities are calculated by taking draws from a mixing 
distribution 𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽), whereby “[t]he mixed logit probability is a weighted average of the 
logit formula evaluated at different values of β, with the weights given by the density f 
(β). In the statistics literature, the weighted average of several functions is called a 
mixed function, and the density that provides the weights is called the mixing 
distribution. Mixed logit is a mixture of the logit function evaluated at different β’s with 
f (β) as the mixing distribution” (Train 2009, p. 135). This mixing distribution can be 
discrete, normal, triangular or alternatively uniform. Thus given a suitable choice of 
mixing distribution, the mixed logit is able to accommodate any form of utility 
maximising and non-maximising behaviour (Train 2009, p. 136). Assuming that the 
density of 𝛽𝛽 is normal with mean b and covariance W, the choice probability becomes:  
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  �� 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛′ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽
′𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
�  ∅(𝛽𝛽|𝑏𝑏,𝑊𝑊)𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽 
 
The researcher chooses an appropriate distribution for each of the respective 
attributes that enter the model and estimates b and W. Both b and W describe the density 
of 𝛽𝛽, and are the parameters of the distribution that can be denoted as 𝜃𝜃 (Train 2009, p. 
136). For panel data, the mixed logit probability will be the unconditional probability 
of a sequence of observed choices over time periods t. For survey data this will be the 
sequence of choices made across different hypothetical choice scenarios. These 
preferences vary across decision makers but not between choices made by an individual 
decision maker. Thus the unconditional probability is derived by calculating the 
product of logit formulas to capture the sequences of choices S made by the decision-
maker n. As we are calculating the product of the logit formula, we are using the product 
operator represented by Π: 
𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛) = �� 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛′ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽
′𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
�
𝑇𝑇
𝑛𝑛=1
 
The unconditional probability for the mixed logit using panel data is the integral of the 
above product of logit formulas. Calculations are made using simulation methods 
because the integral does not have a closed form solution unlike the standard logit 
formula. The choice probabilities will be evaluated over the values of 𝛽𝛽 using a density 
function 𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽|𝜃𝜃). As mentioned above, given a specific distributional assumption for 
the density of 𝛽𝛽, 𝜃𝜃 represents the underlying parameters of that distribution i.e. means 
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and standard deviations. Thus we can calculate the choice probabilities by integrating 
the following function:  
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝜃𝜃) = �𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽)𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽|𝜃𝜃)𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽 
The estimation requires simulation methods and is founded on the maximum 
likelihood estimator which has a convergence criterion to the true value of the 
population (Greene 2008). We will be using Stata and the mixlogit command written 
by Hole (2007) to estimate the data. To fit the ML specification, the data is estimated 
by taking draws from an underlying distribution which the researcher can specify. This 
includes the type of distribution and the number of replications R in parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟, 
where the rth draw is taken from the density distribution function 𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽|𝜃𝜃). The mixlogit 
command accommodates both the normal and log-normal distributions. For example, 
the log-normal distribution may be specified if the researcher knows for certain that a 
particular parameter will not contain any negative values (Hole 2007). The analyst can 
compare whether a given distribution will improve the model fit by estimating the data 
under different assumptions.  Following Train (2009, pp.144-145) and Hole (2007) the 
log-likelihood function for the model is 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃) = ∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 (𝜃𝜃) and the simulated log-
likelihood function below requires taking R draws from the assigned distribution of the 
parameters: 
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃) = � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1
𝑅𝑅
� 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟)𝑅𝑅
𝑟𝑟=1
�
𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
 
Compared to the standard logit, which allows for a closed form expression of 
the integral containing the probability density distribution, the mixed logit estimation 
procedure requires decomposition of the density function of unobserved portion of 
utility 𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛) into two parts. The first component contains the correlations in the data 
and the other follows an iid extreme value distribution like in the CL model. This first 
component can be assigned to any distribution and can therefore approximate any of 
the other choice model types. By decomposing the unobserved component of utility 
into two parts, the mixed logit is able to accommodate measurement of random taste 
variation to capture heterogeneity in the population.  
We also note that the two main models (conditional logit and mixed logit) that 
have been outlined in this section accommodate post-estimation procedures. Namely, 
forecasting, calculations of elasticities of choice and willingness-to-pay estimates for 
service and product characteristics (Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 55-61). The next section 
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review different approaches used to generate and evaluate candidate experimental 
designs including those which accommodate conditional logit and mixed logit models. 
2.4          Choosing an Experimental Design 
In this section we focus on two approaches in experimental design theory: 
orthogonal and D-efficient.  In discussing these two alternatives, we note that there are 
associated trade-offs between these types of designs. The orthogonality property has 
often been considered the traditional and state-of-practice approach (Bliemer & Rose 
2009).  On the other hand, efficiency designs offer an attractive alternative orthogonal 
designs. Efficiency designs accommodate various discrete choice model forms at the 
survey design phase which can lead to important improvements in the precision of 
parameter estimates (Bliemer & Rose 2009). In addition, efficiency based designs 
reduce the sample size requirement needed to obtain robust parameter estimates.  
Below, we outline these two main approaches and their corresponding limitations.  In 
doing so we place the most emphasis on D-efficient designs which we note on balance, 
offer the most flexible and attractive solution for the design of a discrete choice 
experiment.  The techniques discussed in this section are applied using the Ngene 
software in the context of the designs of the pilot and final surveys.  
 Recall that the experimental design, defined by the design matrix X = [Xn], 
contains the combinations of alternatives, attributes and their respective levels as 
assumed by the analyst (Ngene Manual, p. 89).  The design matrix itself is used to 
populate the questionnaire that is presented to survey respondents (Bliemer & Rose 
2009). In the previous sections we defined the experimental design of a stated choice 
experiment as representing the underlying combinations of characteristics that produce 
a given choice moment i.e. the survey question. The choice tasks that are presented to 
respondents over the course of a questionnaire, are derived from the underlying 
experimental design that the researcher manipulates at survey design stages. Choice 
experiments that do not require many alternatives, attributes and levels can be obtained 
using a full factorial design (Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 84-85).  
The full factorial of an experimental design describes all possible combinations 
of attributes and all of their respective levels. However, full factorial designs are rarely 
used in practice because of the large set of choice situations that are required. In 
addition, the approach does not eliminate strictly dominant choice situations nor 
unrealistic ones. The choice situations produced by a full factorial design will depend 
on the number of attributes, attribute levels and alternatives. In practice, the final 
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number of choice tasks is generally extracted from the full factorial design that contains 
the universal set of all possible profile combinations (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 90).We 
follow Bliemer and Rose (2009) and the Ngene software manual34 to explain how to 
derive an efficient experimental design. As previously defined, during each survey 
question t, survey respondents N choose the preferred alternative out of J total number 
of alternatives over a total of T survey questions. The alternatives J are assigned Kj 
number of attributes and each attribute 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛 has ljk number of levels. The number of 
choice situations T created by a full factorial design will be: 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = ∏ ∏ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗=1𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛=1 . 
Considering the above mathematical expression and product operators, the size 
of the design will be increasing in the number of attributes, levels and alternatives 
chosen by the researcher. For example, if we have a design with J = 2 alternatives, each 
alternative has 3 attributes and each attribute has 4 levels, the design will produce a 
total number of survey questions T = (4*4*4)*(4*4*4) = 4,09635.  While a full factorial 
will be suitable for simple experiments, in practice, the total number of choice situations 
generated by a full factorial will produce too large a choice set for any one respondent 
to handle (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 90, Bliemer & Rose 2009). This concern can be 
overcome by implementing a fractional factorial design. There are different types of 
fractional factorial designs with corresponding assumptions and requirements that can 
be imposed by the analyst. The process of constructing the experimental design from a 
full factorial is presented under Figure 2.2. The diagram below shows that “car” and 
“bus” are the relevant labelled alternatives, whereas “time” and “cost” represent the 
attributes of these alternatives that vary respectively according to specified levels within 
the design i.e. magnitudes of the attributes. 
Figure 2.2 – Process of generating an experimental design 
                                                 
34 Ngene Manual, ChoiceMetrics, Version 1.1.1, p. 63, 2012 
35 Ibid. 
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Design Process: Full Factorial  Experimental Design  Choice Situations 
(Bliemer & Rose 2009) 
Firstly, to obtain good quality SP data, the survey design must reflect reality and 
equally must be able to isolate the individual contribution of each attribute on utility. 
Therefore each alternative within a given choice task must exhibit trade-offs in the eyes 
of the respondent and should vary sufficiently across choice tasks. For example, in 
every choice task, no one alterative should be strictly dominating the other (Bliemer & 
Rose 2011). Furthermore, the design must exhibit sufficient variation in attributes and 
levels throughout the survey questions (Louviere et al. 2000). To achieve the outlined 
requirements, researchers can rely on different approaches, each with their respective 
strengths and weaknesses. There are various fractional factorial designs, including 
orthogonal, random and different variants of efficiency based designs. In this paper we 
focus on D-efficient designs as they are the most widely accepted in efficient design 
theory compared with other measures (Bliemer & Rose 2009). Before discussing D-
efficient designs in greater detail we consider a more traditional approach and 
associated limitations. 
Prior to the emergence of efficient designs, orthogonal designs were commonly 
used in applied research because orthogonality is a well-known statistical property that 
is very desirable in linear models. A design is said to be orthogonal “if it satisfies 
attribute level balance and all parameters are independently estimable.”36 Orthogonal 
designs are generated by imposing the property of orthogonality on the attributes 
contained in the columns of the design matrix (Bliemer & Rose 2009). The property 
was initially incorporated into SC designs because orthogonality has established 
statistical advantages found in linear regression models (Bliemer & Rose 2009) .  
The variance-covariance (“VC”) matrix of a linear regression model is given by 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 = 𝜎𝜎2[𝑋𝑋′𝑋𝑋]−1, where 𝜎𝜎2 is the model variance and X defines the matrix of attribute 
levels in the design or the matrix of data to be used in estimation (Bliemer & Rose 
2009). When the matrix X is orthogonal, the elements of the VC matrix are minimised. 
This property ensures that the design does not exhibit multicollinearity and that the 
standard errors, (i.e. square roots of the sample variances) are minimised. When 
generating an orthogonal fractional factorial from the full factorial, orthogonality can 
                                                 
36 Ngene Manual, p. 64, ChoiceMetrics, 2012 
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be maintained only to an extent because a fractional factorial design will create its own 
specific correlation structure within the design matrix.37 
Orthogonality however, is not necessarily a desirable statistical property in the 
context of DCEs because discrete choice models are non-linear by definition (Bliemer 
& Rose 2009). Compared to D-efficient designs, the only clear advantage of using an 
orthogonal design is that it does not require a priori assumptions on the parameter 
values at design stages. Firstly, orthogonality does not ensure that a design excludes 
behaviourally implausible choice tasks. In these situations the design can be manually 
manipulated to remove implausible scenarios. However, these types of adjustments can 
distort the desired orthogonal correlation structure of the design (Bliemer & Rose 
2009). In linear models, orthogonality is advantageous because the correlation structure 
prevents multi-collinearity and minimises the standard errors of parameter estimates. 
While this holds true for linear models, the property of orthogonality will most likely 
not be appropriate for the non-linear econometric models used at estimation stages, 
namely the mixed logit (Bliemer & Rose 2009). We explain below that the asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix associated with the family of discrete choice models is 
calculated differently. Due to the limitations of the orthogonality property in discrete 
choice models, researchers have instead suggested the efficiency design approach may 
be an improvement (Bliemer & Rose 2009, Scarpa & Rose 2008, Quan et al. 2011). As 
a starting point, we provide an overview of the theory of efficient designs. 
The “efficiency” of the experimental design refers to the expected standard 
errors of parameter estimates within the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix (Quan 
et al. 2011). By definition, data obtained using an efficient design will produce 
parameter estimates with the lowest possible standard errors. These designs are 
generated by incorporating the functional form of the specific econometric model at 
survey design stages. Hence, this method integrates the statistical properties of non-
linear discrete choice models before any data is collected. There are several algorithms 
proposed in the literature that evaluate candidate designs based on restrictions imposed 
by the analyst. The algorithms that can be used to evaluate designs using the Ngene 
software are reviewed later in this section.  The evaluation compares designs to locate 
the “best” design that will produce the smallest standard errors during the estimation 
                                                 
37 Louviere et al. (2000) outline a detailed approach for deriving orthogonal fractional factorial designs. 
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stages (Quan et al. 2011). We will now outline how efficiency can be measured by the 
researcher when evaluating candidate designs.  We also consider the types of 
assumptions that can be imposed on the experimental design.38  
Efficiency in experimental design theory, refers to the standard errors contained 
within the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the model. The metric used to 
compare designs is the value of the determinant of the asymptotic variance-covariance 
matrix. Thus to calculate the relevant measure of the efficiency of a design, the analyst 
must firstly calculate the determinant of the asymptotic variance-covariance (“AVC”) 
matrix denoted by Ω. Let us first define the AVC Ω𝑁𝑁 matrix for a sample of N 
respondents. For the CL, the asymptotic-variance covariance matrix will be a K x K 
matrix that will generally depend on the experimental design 𝑋𝑋 = [𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛], vector of 
individual choices (or survey outcomes) 𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁 = �𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛� and parameter prior values 
assumed by the researcher. The design expected to generate the lowest comparable 
standard errors for parameter estimates should be the preferred design. Candidate 
designs are evaluated by comparing the D-statistic of each unique AVC matrix which 
assumes a single hypothetical respondent i.e. Ω1. This approach produces a single 
statistic to facilitate the process of design comparisons and we explain this point further 
below. 
As previously noted, the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix is not 
equivalent to that of a linear model’s VC matrix. In this case, the maximum likelihood 
estimator (“MLE”) of the AVC matrix for the CL model is the negative of the inverse 
of the expected Fisher information matrix (Scarpa & Rose 2008). The Fisher 
information matrix itself contains the second order derivatives of the log-likelihood 
function of the CL. The same procedure applies to the mixed logit model. The 
researcher must evaluate the information matrix that corresponds to the mixed logit 
model to achieve higher levels of efficiency for parameter estimates (Sándor & Wedel 
2002). This procedure can be interpreted either as maximising information or as 
minimising the variance and standard errors of the parameter estimates in the AVC 
matrix. As shown by the function below, the AVC is derived either analytically or using 
simulation methods, by taking the negative inverse of the expected second derivatives 
                                                 
38 The approach and adapted notation we present is largely taken from Chapter 7 of the Ngene Manual 
(2012) which summarizes the literature on efficient design methodology. 
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of the log-likelihood function of the discrete choice model’s functional form that was 
outlined in the previous section (Bliemer & Rose 2009): AVC = Ω�𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛� = �𝐸𝐸�𝐼𝐼�𝛽𝛽, 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛���−1 = �−𝜕𝜕2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽′� 
With the model specific log-likelihood function L: 
𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝛽𝛽) = ���𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 log𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐽𝐽
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
(𝑋𝑋,𝛽𝛽) 
The matrix is in effect populated by the researcher at survey design stages who 
selects the relevant attributes, levels and the prior values to be assigned to parameters 
in β. In other words, the AVC matrix Ω𝑁𝑁 will depend on the underlying experimental 
design 𝑋𝑋 = [𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛], parameter values β and the outcomes (responses) of the survey i.e. 
choice indicator is 𝑌𝑌 =  𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 that can take on values of 0 or 1. In other words, 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 will 
be equal to 1 if respondent n chooses alternative j during survey question t, and equal 
to 0 otherwise.  As a result, and contrary to orthogonal designs, researchers wishing to 
generate efficient designs must make assumptions about prior parameter values β to 
calculate the second order derivative of the log-likelihood function and to derive the 
AVC matrix. As the researcher does not know for certain the value of β, he or she must 
make an assumption on parameter value priors which we can denote as 𝛽𝛽�. The 
assumptions the researcher makes on these prior parameter values will have a direct 
impact on the quality of the design and precision of final parameter estimates.  
To achieve unbiased and accurate estimates during empirical analysis, the 
assumptions made during the design of the DCE must be as consistent as possible with 
true population parameter values i.e. the means and the variances of explanatory 
variables in the utility function (Bliemer & Rose 2011). Generally, when designing the 
choice experiment, researchers have at least some information on parameters, either 
from previous research or theoretical underpinnings, which will allow them to assign 
prior values to the model parameters (Scarpa & Rose 2008). Incorporating at least some 
information on the parameter values enables the researcher to better allocate the 
attribute levels within the design of the stated choice experiment (Bliemer & Rose 
2009). This will deliver important efficiency gains in the design of the DCE, even if 
these are either small positive or small negative prior values (Scarpa & Rose 2008). 
There are two possible approaches to derive the AVC matrix; analytical or using Monte 
Carlo simulation techniques. The above log-likelihood function is the same for both 
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the standard CL and ML models and as a result, only the resulting choice probabilities 
of the respective models 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 are different (ChoiceMetrics 2012, p. 90). 
Researchers have also defined other criteria for choosing between designs that 
follow a similar approach to the D-error metric. These approaches impose different 
efficiency requirements, including but not limited to, minimising the standard error, 
accommodating willingness-to-pay estimation and minimising the sample size 
requirement. Regardless of which measure is chosen, any attempt to minimise the 
elements contained in the expected AVC matrix will minimise the expected asymptotic 
standard errors of the design (Bliemer & Rose 2009).  For the purpose of our DCE, we 
focus on the most widely accepted measure found in current literature for evaluating 
efficiency designs.  
This method requires the researcher to calculate a D-error estimate by taking 
the determinant of the expected AVC matrix that we outlined above (Scarpa & Rose 
2008). Once the expected AVC matrix has been defined by the researcher the D-statistic 
can be calculated by assuming N=1 (i.e. a single respondent) because it is much easier 
to evaluate designs based on a single value (Scarpa & Rose 2008). The designs derived 
using the D-error criteria are referred to as D-efficient designs. The design with the 
smallest D-statistic out of all possible designs is referred to as a D-optimal design (Rose 
& Bliemer 2013). Due to the multitude of possible combinations of attribute levels for 
any given design it may not be possible to evaluate the D-error for every single 
candidate design of a given stated choice experiment. Hence it is the relative size of the 
D-error that will matter in the SC experiment. Following Bliemer and Rose (2009), we 
drop the n subscript as we assume a single hypothetical respondent and the D-error can 
then be defined as:  
D-error = det �Ω� 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ,𝛽𝛽��1𝐾𝐾 
As noted above, the AVC matrix is a K x K matrix and for the D-error to be 
independent of the size of the problem, the D-error is normalized by the power  1
𝐾𝐾
 
(Ngene Manual, p. 92). There are three variants of the D-error statistic most commonly 
used by researchers. These approaches differ in the type of knowledge that will be 
required to set the prior values. Equation (i) below is the Dz-error (z for “zero) which is 
calculated by assuming that the parameters in 𝛽𝛽 are fixed and all have zero coefficient 
values i.e. that a particular attribute has zero effect on utility. Researchers have found 
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that specifying non-zero parameters can significantly improve the efficiency of a design 
compared to using simple zero value priors (Huber & Zwerina 1996). Thus, 
alternatively researchers can obtain an estimate for a Dp-error (p for “prior”) which 
requires that the parameter values in 𝛽𝛽 be fixed, non-zero and known with certainty. 
The equation in (ii) below provides the variant for fixed non-zero priors.  
On the other hand, researchers may want to address uncertainty over parameter 
priors. In this case, the alternative Db-error (b for “Bayesian”) should be used. Unlike 
other D-efficient designs, Db-efficient designs require the researcher to assume a 
distribution that contains the parameters prior value means and variances i.e. the range 
of possible values that a given mean coefficient can take. For the Bayesian D-error 
computation, priors 𝛽𝛽� are assumed to be random variables with a joint probability 
density function ∅ that can follow either a normal or uniform distribution.  Normal and 
uniform distributions have generally been the only type used in the literature so far 
(Ngene Manual, p. 92). This approach can effectively incorporate uncertainty over the 
assigned parameter prior values. These three alternative D-statistics are presented 
below with Ω1 indicating an AVC matrix which assumes N = 1 respondents. 
Variants of D-efficient designs: 
(i) Fixed zero prior values:   Dz-error = det�Ω1(X, 0)�1𝐾𝐾 
(ii) Fixed non-zero prior values:  Dp-error = det�Ω1(X,𝛽𝛽)�1𝐾𝐾 
(iii) Bayesian prior values:   Db-error = ∫det �Ω1�X,𝛽𝛽���1𝐾𝐾 ∅�𝛽𝛽��𝜃𝜃�𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽� 
(Bliemer & Rose 2009) 
The primary drawback of an efficient design is the need to assign prior values 
to parameters at the design stages. Any assumptions made during the design stage, 
including specification of priors, will influence the statistical efficiency of the design 
(Scarpa & Rose 2008, Quan et al. 2011). In this context, the generation of an efficient 
SC study must be adapted to the research objectives on a case by case basis (Quan et 
al. 2011).  Bliemer and Rose (2009) test whether misspecification of priors leads to 
significant reductions in efficiency of a design. However, the authors find that even 
with significant differences between specified priors at design stages and true 
population parameter values, the Dp designs performed well and remained more 
efficient than orthogonal ones producing relatively more robust parameter estimates 
with comparably smaller standard errors. In most choice experiments, researchers will 
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not know with certainty that the specified prior values are entirely accurate. After all, 
there would be no point in undertaking the SC study if parameter estimates were known 
with absolute certainty. At the same time, prior values play a central role in the 
generation of efficient SC designs (Bliemer et al. 2008).  
Considering the concerns over prior value accuracy, researchers may wish to 
control for this uncertainty during the experimental design process. In this context, 
Bayesian designs offer a particularly attractive solution because they can accommodate 
the uncertainty about the true value of the parameter estimates in the form of a 
distributional assumption instead of imposing strict fixed prior values on the design. To 
evaluate the expected efficiency of candidate designs requires taking numerous draws 
from the underlying distributions of the priors which are usually assumed to follow 
normal or log-normal distributions (Bliemer et al. 2008). The process takes draws from 
the distributions of parameters using simulation methods. The statistic used to evaluate 
Bayesian Db-efficient designs is provided in equation (iii). While all approaches require 
a search algorithm to evaluate different designs, to derive the Db-error will require 
additional simulation procedures and computational burden. 
There are several simulation procedures that can be used to evaluate Db-
efficiency which evaluated in detail by Bliemer et al. (2008). Irrespective of the 
simulation procedure used to find a design, the structured approach remains the same. 
Referring to the guidance of Bliemer et al. (2008), the approach for Bayesian 
approximation in experimental design generation is outlined as follows: 
(i) Take R draws from the specified random distribution of parameter prior 
values to obtain a possible parameter value ; 
(ii) the D-error is calculated for each of the parameter values 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗; 
(iii) the Db-error is given by the average D-error calculated over the different 
parameter values. 
The simulation procedures that take draws from the underlying distributions of 
model parameters tend to differ in the way that draws are taken from the prior 
distributions; usually either systematic or random draws. Equally, the convergence rate 
of these simulation procedures will be different. Bliemer et al. (2008) test the 
performance of available simulation procedures by considering their ability to 
approximate the Db-error to the true efficiency of the design and their speed. The 
different simulation methods are tested using the CL, but the results and 
recommendations presented by the authors are also valid for the mixed logit model. In 
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the literature, researchers have mostly used Pseudo-Random Montel Carlo (“PMC”) 
simulation to derive Db-efficient designs. The PMC simulation procedure takes R 
independent draws for each of the 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 parameters from their assumed prior distribution. 
The researcher specifies the number of draws that should be replicated. Then the Db-
error is computed for each of the draws and then the average Db-error can be calculated.  
The process can be described as taking draws 𝛽𝛽� (𝑟𝑟) = �𝛽𝛽�1(𝑟𝑟), … ,𝛽𝛽�𝐾𝐾(𝑟𝑟)�, 𝑟𝑟 =1, … ,𝑅𝑅, from the prior random distribution where the probability density function has 
K number of parameters ∅𝑗𝑗�𝛽𝛽�𝑗𝑗�𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗�. PMC draws are taken in a random fashion. This is 
contrary to the deterministic draws of an intelligent structure attributed to quasi random 
Monte Carlo methods. Randomness found in PMC methods may not always be a 
desirable property making the alternative quasi random sequences an attractive option. 
In their paper, Bliemer et al. (2008) find that PMC methods perform much worse in 
finding designs close to their true efficiency value than the alternative quasi random 
Monte Carlo methods which include both Halton and Sobol sequences. 
Regardless of the sequence type, reducing the number of draws will always 
reduce the accuracy of the model efficiency estimates. Compared to other procedures, 
Halton and Sobol sequences require fewer draws to achieve convergence to the true 
value of the design’s D-efficiency. The primary difference is that Sobol sequences offer 
more coverage of the different k number of attributes and their dimensions. Thus 
although they are functionally similar, the Sobol sequence will tend to converge to the 
true value of the efficiency measure quicker than when using Halton draws. The 
distinguishing features of the different sequences are outlined in detail in the paper of 
Bliemer et al. (2008). The Halton and Sobol sequences, among others, are available as 
part of the Ngene software.  
To address some further concerns over uncertainty, Rose et al. (2009) propose 
the model averaging approach for evaluating and selecting experimental designs.39 
This approach accommodates a variety of designs in the calculation of the average D-
error, namely the preferred Db-error incorporating Bayesian approximation. Using the 
Ngene software, this can be achieved by specifying several slightly different utility 
functions within the programming syntax. For example, the researcher may not know 
whether they will want to use a basic conditional logit or mixed logit model to estimate 
                                                 
39 The model averaging approach for creating efficient designs is supported by Ngene. 
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their data. The model averaging approach accommodates this uncertainty by allowing 
the researcher to specify both these models when evaluating candidate designs. The 
efficiency measure will be then be the average D-error of the design. The researcher 
can also assign weights to each of the utility specifications on the basis of their most 
and least favoured utility specifications. The efficiency measure will then be the 
weighted average D-error of the design. 
On the basis of the procedures described to this point, D-efficient designs can 
be computationally intensive to generate.  However, they offer empirically attractive 
features.   Let us now consider their impact on sample size requirements.  Not only do 
efficient designs minimise standard errors of estimated parameters, there is also exists 
an inverse relationship between the sample size requirement and statistical efficiency 
of a design (Rose & Bliemer 2013). Traditional theories of sample size requirements 
for SC experiments are directly taken from general sampling theory not exclusive to 
DCEs (Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 261-265). We discuss sampling methods in the next 
section.  Let us consider the Rose & Bliemer (2013) who suggest an alternative measure 
for efficiency based designs developed on the basis of samples size requirements.   
The authors propose a new measure to determine the sample size requirement 
to achieve efficiency called the S-efficiency statistic. The authors note that efficiency 
based designs, S- or D-efficient, will produce not only more reliable coefficient 
estimates, but also compared to orthogonal fractional factorial designs will deliver on 
cost efficiency due to the smaller sample size requirements. This result is achieved 
regardless of the specific type of efficiency measure used because the approaches both 
rely on some form of minimisation of the determinant of the AVC matrix. Specifically, 
the S-efficiency measure is concerned with the relationship between standard errors of 
a given design and the representative sample size requirements to achieve statistically 
significant estimates. Just as for D-efficient designs, the first stage requires the 
calculation of the AVC matrix of a particular model. 
Contrary to the D-efficiency criteria which focuses on the overall efficiency of 
a design, the S-efficiency incorporates the efficiency measure for individual parameter 
estimates. The process requires the calculation of the asymptotic t-ratios of each of the 
parameters considered for a particular design. With some algebraic manipulation, and 
assuming a vector of prior estimates 𝛽𝛽�  with a confidence interval of 95% Rose and 
Bliemer (2013) show that the sample size requirement is different for the different 
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attribute parameters k. From the equation we can see that the sample size requirement 
will depend on the size of the predicted standard error with respect to the magnitude of 
the predicted coefficients priors. The lower bound sample size requirement is given by: 
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 ≥ �
1.96∗𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1�𝛽𝛽�𝑘𝑘�
�𝛽𝛽�𝑘𝑘�
�
2
. 
The above equation illustrates how different types of parameters will require 
different optimal sample sizes to obtain statistically significant estimates, with more 
‘difficult’ parameters requiring a relatively large sample size. Thus the S-error measure 
will focus on the most empirically challenging parameter in order to calculate the 
optimal sample size and can be expressed as follows: 𝑆𝑆 − error = min. max
𝑗𝑗
{𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗}. 
Sample size estimates based on this measure are directly related to the prior 
values attributed to the parameters. Hence this efficiency measure will equally be 
subject to the same uncertainties as for prior value assumptions. The Ngene software 
reports the S-statistic in conjunction to the other efficiency criteria that have been 
specified by the researcher.  We note that as this efficiency measure is less conventional 
than others and we therefore favour a D-efficiency based design instead.    
In this section we have presented the main differences between approaches in 
experimental design.  In this context, we note that the evidence strongly suggests that 
it is worth investing in an efficient design.  The efficiency focused approach enables 
the researcher to obtain more accurate parameter estimates, improves their forecasting 
ability and removes the requirement of a large sample size that would have otherwise 
been necessary to achieve statistically significant parameter estimates (Bliemer & Rose 
2009).  The next section focuses on other important considerations in survey design.  
We review choice of search algorithms (column vs row), aspects of labelled vs 
unlabelled choice experiments, sample size requirements, attribute level balance 
requirements and the optimal number of choice tasks to present to respondents.   
2.5 Further Considerations in the Design of Discrete Choice Experiments 
When searching for a design, using computer software like Ngene, the 
procedure relies on algorithms.  In this particular context, once attributes have been 
specified by the researcher, algorithms are able to systematically search through all 
possible combinations of attributes and their levels by either swapping the rows or 
swapping columns of the design matrix (Bliemer & Rose 2009). The procedure allows 
the researcher to locate the designs that meet the criteria they have chosen to specify, 
including D-efficiency measures. Figure 2.3 below provides an example of a row 
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swapping algorithm and the underlying process which evaluates designs based on a 
given efficiency measure. 
Figure 2.3 – The Modified Federov Algorithm 
  
(Quan et al. 2011) 
 
In choosing what algorithm to use we refer to Quan et al. (2011) who assess the 
effectiveness of different algorithms that can be used while generating designs. The 
authors explore the main trade-offs between the two types of search algorithms used in 
SC studies, row versus column based swapping. Firstly, row based algorithms, as 
represented by the diagram above, offer speed advantages when used for the panel ML 
and CL models. Secondly, row based algorithms perform better when required to 
achieve utility level balance in a given design. On the other hand, column based 
algorithms are better suited for finding efficient designs that necessitate attribute level 
balance. However, column based algorithms do not easily satisfy the utility level 
balance property, and algorithms that swap rows are comparably less effective at 
achieving attribute level balance. In light of these differences between algorithms, the 
researcher must choose the algorithm that satisfies the properties that are more 
favourable for the particular DCE. In addition, researchers can use algorithms which 
are able to combine the two above objectives by systematically swapping rows and 
columns to derive different designs (Quan et al. 2011).   We now consider issues related 
to labelled choice experiments. 
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 When designing a choice experiment, the researcher has a number of different 
options in the way the survey is presented to respondents.  One of these considerations 
is whether the experiment should be labelled or unlabelled (Louviere et al. 2000 p. 121, 
Bliemer & Rose 2009). Labelled choice experiments require alternatives to be 
described by brand or descriptive names, whereas unlabelled choice experiments only 
rely on the characteristics of the available alternatives. For example, a labelled choice 
experiment on preferences for ice-creams would present respondents with a choice 
between alternatives labelled as “Ben & Jerry’s” and “Hägen-Daz” or for automobile 
preferences alternatives could be labelled as “German car” and “American car”. In 
contrast, unlabelled designs describe alternatives by their attributes only. The 
alternatives can then be labelled as A, B, C…etc. or 1, 2, 3…etc.  
Choosing between a labelled versus an unlabelled choice experiment is an 
important component of the design process. Brand names attributed to labelled 
alternatives signal additional information to respondents which can have indirect effects 
on choices they make between alternatives. Capturing these additional behavioural 
effects necessitates further empirical procedures when estimating the data. In practice, 
researchers have largely been ignoring the statistical effects associated with labelled 
choice experiments, partly due to the added estimation complexity (Louviere et al. 
2000, p. 120, Doherty et al. 2013). However, the behavioural effects attributed to 
labelled choice experiments can affect the results at estimation stages and the design 
process must account for this. Labelled choice experiments will typically require 
additional parameter estimates and this increases the size of the SC study at design 
stages and also increases the degrees of freedom of the model (Quan et al. 2011).  
In addition, the effects cannot be easily accounted for because they are 
unobservable to the researcher and are contained in the random component of the model 
(Louviere et al. 2000, p 120). For example, brand names can capture the emotional 
attachment that an individual has for a particular brand (Doherty et al. 2013). In this 
context, the respondent may not evaluate the all options presented to them in a given 
choice situation. When respondents do not fully evaluate options this is referred to as 
“attribute non-attendance” and this behaviour can influence the DCE.  However this 
effect cannot be observed by the researcher. Labelled experiments may also cause 
respondents to infer information that has been omitted in the choice experiment and this 
may result in omitted variable bias (Louviere et al.2000, p. 121). We note that eye 
tracking technology in controlled experiments could prove useful in this context, but 
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this approach is beyond the scope of this paper. There is experimental evidence on the 
impact of labelled choice experiments which we consider below. 
Doherty et al. (2013) perform a DCE using the mixed logit model to explore 
whether labelled alternatives influence respondents’ processing strategies when 
answering stated choice questions. In doing so, they are able to examine the effects of 
attribute non-attendance i.e. whether respondents fully evaluate the alternatives they 
are faced with. It is now widely recognized that individuals differ in how they process 
information as much as they differ in their preferences (Doherty et al. 2013). The 
authors explore the effects of labels by examining individuals’ choice of recreational 
sight. The paper finds evidence that labels influence respondents’ information 
processing strategies. The results show that a significant portion of survey participants 
had made their final choice by ignoring other alternatives. The experiment also showed 
that different demographic groups are shown to be influenced by labels to a different 
degree.  
To avoid such issues, we propose an experiment design which omits the retailer 
name.  Instead, we propose to provide respondents with realistic choice scenarios by 
including the attributes which reflect true retailer characteristics. This brings us to the 
issue of contextual realism.  One of the main drawbacks of SP data are the associated 
difficulties in achieving contextual realism in the design of choice situations (Louviere 
et al. p 24). To achieve contextual realism, the researcher must choose all relevant 
attributes and associated levels that correspond to the market or product being studied. 
At estimation stages this will minimise the effects of omitted variable bias and improve 
the accuracy of results. Therefore market research and pilot studies are an important 
source of information for relevant attribute and level selection. 
In preserving contextual realism, the researcher can also impose constraints on 
specific combinations of attributes and their levels presented to the respondents.  This 
avoids nonsensical scenarios with combinations such as very low prices and the best 
possible quality.  Even though such assumptions violate attribute level balance, this 
need not necessarily reduce design efficiency. The property of attribute level balance 
is the requirement that all attribute levels must appear an equal number of times for 
each attribute across the questionnaire (Bliemer & Rose 2009). Imposing this constraint 
on the design ensures that all the range of levels will be incorporated at estimation 
stages. However, attribute level balance may not produce the most efficient design 
(Bliemer & Rose 2009). This is a type of restriction reduces the number of candidate 
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designs from which the researcher can choose their preferred option. In addition, this 
property will generally lead to designs with a relatively large number of choice tasks 
when creating relatively large40 designs (Bliemer & Rose 2009). Removing the attribute 
level balance condition can actually improve the realism of a choice task. For example, 
for our SC experiment we want to ensure that the most expensive retailer would never 
have the lowest measure of quality. The flexibility of the Ngene software package 
enables the researcher to specify these types of constraints. 
Let us consider the importance of utility balance in efficient designs following 
Huber & Zwerina (1996). Utility balance refers to the differences between utility values 
of the alternatives in a given survey question. This design property ensures that 
dominant alternatives that unquestionably generate the greatest amount of utility are 
not presented in a given choice task next to alternatives that would likely never be 
chosen. This is the type of nonsensical scenario we mentioned above.  The most 
efficient design must exhibit some utility balance which accommodates just enough 
utility balance between alternatives to exhibit a degree of trade-off in the eyes of the 
respondents. 
We previously discussed the implications of information processing in the 
context of labelled versus unlabelled choice experiments. The number of questions 
presented to respondents in a given survey can also influence individuals’ engagement 
with the task at hand and resultant quality of responses (Hess et al.  2012, Bech et al. 
2011). Respondent fatigue and boredom can induce individuals to not evaluate in full 
the characteristics attributed to different alternatives which may impact the parameter 
estimates. While it may be obvious that too many choice sets can reduce respondent 
attentiveness, the literature in this area is inconclusive and does not provide clear 
indication with regards to the “perfect” number of survey questions (Hess et al. 2012, 
Bech et al. 2011). In the literature, the number of choice tasks is usually in the range of 
1 to 16 (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 261). To maximise response rates it is recommended 
to keep the number of survey questions to the lowest amount permitted by the design 
(Louviere et al. 2000, p. 261). Thus the key trade-offs to consider when choosing the 
number of questions to enter a design are (a) ensuring there are enough questions in 
order to capture a wide range of variation in preferences; (b) avoid deterring 
                                                 
40 The design we use would be considered large because it has a total of 4 alternatives with 5 attributes 
that include 4 attributes with 4 levels and 1 with 5 levels versus a so-called small design which would 
only have 2 alternatives and around 3 attributes for example. 
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respondents by including too many questions and; (c) avoid increasing the likelihood 
of respondent fatigue by including too many questions; (d) respecting the degrees of 
freedom implied by the number of attributes entering the model. 
Thus the aim of a smaller design has two objectives. Firstly to improve response 
rates, and secondly to reduce potential response bias that arises if respondents face too 
many questions. The process that determines the minimum amount of survey questions 
to achieve sufficient variation in the data, depends on the type of experimental design 
(Louviere et al. 2000, p. 259). We explained in the previous section that the full factorial 
increases with the number of alternatives, attributes and levels. Orthogonal designs 
typically require a larger number of choice sets compared to efficiency designs. This is 
partly because in order to achieve a design which maintains the orthogonality property 
will likely require many more choice sets than predicted by the degrees of freedom and 
attribute level balance (ChoiceMetrics 2012, p. 60). Using an orthogonal design will 
oftentimes require the researcher to split the full number of choice tasks amongst 
respondents. The optimal number of questions for an orthogonal design is derived by 
selecting the smallest main effects design from a full factorial.  Irrespective of the 
design, the minimum number of choice tasks will be bounded by below by the number 
of degrees of freedom required and for the attribute level balance condition to hold 
(Bliemer & Rose 2009).  
Recall that the property of attribute level balance is a condition that requires that 
attribute levels appear an equal number of times across the choice set. If the attributes 
differ in dimensions of levels this complicates the design procedure which must also 
achieve orthogonality in the correlation structure of the experimental design. In turn 
this tends to increase the number of questions in the candidate designs (Bliemer & Rose 
2009). In practice it can be difficult to identify a design that incorporates these different 
features, including numbers of attributes and their different dimensions of levels in 
addition to the orthogonality condition. Efficient designs remove some of the restrictive 
properties of orthogonal designs and typically allow for a smaller number of survey 
questions. Efficiency designs also minimise the required sample size for a given 
experiment. 
Rose and Bliemer (2013) highlight the lack of guidance on sample size 
requirements for stated choice experiments. The authors note that the literature suggests 
a sample size of 200 or 300 will typically achieve robust parameter estimates, however 
decisions on sample sizes are oftentimes made by researchers without a clear cut 
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statistical argument. Following Rose and Bliemer (2013) there exists a relationship 
between sample size and standard errors of parameters in 𝛽𝛽 that can be expressed as: 
𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁�?̅?𝛽� = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1�𝛽𝛽��√𝑁𝑁 . Here ?̅?𝛽 contains the means of the prior parameter estimates, the 
predicted vector of asymptotic standard errors of parameter estimates is given by 
𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁�?̅?𝛽� with a sample size N.  
The above relationship represents a key feature of efficiency designs in the 
sense that “an increase from 1 to 2 respondents will decrease the standard error by 29 
percent, from 10 to 11 by 4.6 percent, from 100 to 101 by 0.49 percent, and from 1,000 
to 1,001 respondents by 0.005 percent.”41  The equation above captures the reasons for 
investing in an efficient design: instead of increasing the number of respondents it is 
useful to invest in a more efficient designs because such an approach improves the 
accuracy of parameter estimates. We see that the marginal improvement of increased 
sample size on reductions in standard errors decreases steadily.  An alternative approach 
to minimise the sample size requirement is to assign different blocks of questions to 
different groups of respondents (Rose & Bliemer 2013). However this comes at the 
expense of having sufficient variability in the collected data set. 
For an efficient design, the degrees of freedom of the estimated parameters are 
also important.  This is because the number of rows in the design matrix represents the 
number of choice situations that will enter the survey. In addition, the researcher may 
want to ensure that the aforementioned utility or attribute level balance properties hold 
within a design. Introducing these statistical properties into the design will further 
increase the dimensions of the design and thus the degrees of freedom. Following 
experimental design theory, we can express the minimum number of survey questions 
T as a function of maximum number of estimated parameters K and number of 
alternatives J that will be displayed in each survey question (Quan et al. 2011). In a 
choice experiment where respondents pick one option from a choice of J number of 
alternatives we will have (J – 1)*T independent choice probabilities from each survey 
question (Quan et al. 2011). The lower bound maximum number of parameters will 
thus be (J  − 1)*T ≥ K , in addition to other constraints, such as attribute level balance.  
Sample size requirements and optimal number of choice tasks are both related 
to each other.  Each additional parameter to be estimated increases both the sample size 
                                                 
41 Rose, J.M., Bliemer, M.C.J., “Sample size requirements for stated choice experiments”, 
Transportation, Volume 40, Issue 5, 2013, pp 1021-1041 
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requirement and the necessary number of choice tasks.  Furthermore, if a researcher is 
estimating interaction effects as well main effects from the explanatory variables, this 
will increase the number of degrees of freedom of the design. However, the importance 
of interaction effects and their prior values may not be known to the researcher at the 
design stages of a SC study. This presents an additional element of uncertainty 
associated with the generation of D-efficient designs.  The next section reviews 
different methods for conducting surveys of human populations and associated biases 
which applies to the different methods. 
2.6  Methods for Collecting Survey Data 
This section looks at different ways researchers can implement surveys and 
draw a sample of the population of interest.  In addition this section also evaluates 
different techniques to survey human populations including face-to-face interviews and 
web-based surveys.  Typically the costs associated with performing a large survey are 
an essential consideration for many researchers, particularly PhD students.  We 
therefore also assess likely costs, financial and time-related, associated with each of 
these methods.  We conclude this section by outlining our proposed method for the 
distribution of our surveys as well as the collection of the data.  In presenting our 
proposed approach, we also highlight the likely advantages as well as inherent biases 
attributed to this method.  We briefly touch on ways to overcome such biases and how 
our approach can be improved upon in the context of a much greater budget.  
Let us begin by looking at the different ways that a sample may be drawn from 
the population of interest, which in our case is the general population of grocery 
shoppers in the UK.  We note that in drawing samples of the population there is the 
associated sampling error which arises simply because the process requires a sampling 
of the population (Stopher 2012, p. 270).  However, this method allows the researcher 
to improve the robustness of parameter estimates compared to non-random sampling 
methods of data collection. When collecting data for the purposes of a study on a 
specific group of people, the collected sample must of course also be representative of 
that population of individuals or households (Stopher 2012, p. 68).  There are a number 
of methods to achieve these two interrelated goals.  Firstly, the sampling frame must be 
identified where the sampling frame itself represents the target population.     
In the case of research which targets the general population, a suggested 
sampling frame can be a telephone directory (Stopher 2012, p. 266).  However, this 
method has a number of downsides as the directory may contain out of date numbers. 
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More generally on the basis of the evidence, finding an adequate sampling frame of a 
human population is very difficult (Stopher 2012, p. 267). Instead, the researcher must 
define a sampling strategy when drawing a sample of a population, typically on the 
basis random sampling methods (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 262).  Random sampling 
methods are advised in the context of modelling population parameters which are 
intended to represent the human population.42   
The reasons for drawing random samples from a population in the context of 
surveys, is based on fundamental statistics theory. In other words, a sufficiently large 
and random sample of the population will be unbiased and tend to produce robust 
estimates for parameters corresponding to the population being studied.  In practice, the 
most popular strategies are simple random sampling (“SRS” and exogenous stratified 
random sampling (“ESRS”) (Rose & Bliemer 2013). The traditional approaches of SRS 
and ESRS look at minimising the sampling error that arises from random samples.  SRS 
sampling typically requires a sampling frame and each individual in the sampling frame 
has an equal chance of being selected (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 262).  ESRS sampling 
on the other hand, requires segmentation of individuals into mutually exclusive groups 
each representing a proportion of the population of interest (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 
262).  The researcher than draws from these segments until a sufficiently large sample 
size has been achieved.  
As stated above, the main benefit of performing a random sample of the 
population is that it allows for the collection of an unbiased and representative data 
sample of the population and produces robust parameter estimates at estimation stages.  
This however requires a sufficiently large sample size.  In surveys which rely on 
random sampling methods, required sample size is determined on the basis of which of 
these sampling methods is used.  This is due to the relationship between parameter 
standard errors and sample size which captures the accuracy of parameter estimates 
(Louviere et al. 2010, p. 263).  When undertaking random sampling methods, it is 
advisable to compute the minimum required sample size to avoid estimation problems 
following the collection of data.    
We note however a number of difficulties associated with drawing a random 
sample from the general population.  Firstly, there are issues in determining the relevant 
                                                 
42 For a detailed evaluation of sampling methods please refer to Peter Stopher (2012) Chapter 13: 
Sample design and sampling, Collecting, Managing, and Assessing Data Using Sample Surveys, 
Cambridge University Press.  
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sampling frame when surveying the whole population. Secondly, due to the protection 
of individuals’ personal information there are a number of challenges associated with 
the ability to reach the target audience of UK households and draw a sample from this 
population.  Telephone directories have been used to carry out random samples of the 
population because individuals’ information can be readily access.  In addition random 
digit dialling using numbers randomly generated by a computer may be used to draw a 
random sample.  These methods may however suffer from problems of non-response, 
may not necessarily produce a sample which is representative of sociodemographic 
characteristics in the population, can be time consuming and come at a significant cost 
to the researcher if they decide to purchase a sampling frame from which to draw from.  
For example, the sampling frame could be a panel of paid survey respondents, however 
this is also likely to lead to other types of biases. 
The method of efficiency designs outlined above in Section 2.4, which is also 
our preferred approach, offers an alternative way to obtain unbiased parameter 
estimates of the population of interest.  Efficiency based designs are fundamentally 
unrelated to sampling theory, however, they are able to deliver the same benefits in 
terms of producing robust parameter estimates.  As such, efficiency based designs offer 
a way to overcome at least in part, some of biases which may arise when from not 
collecting a random sample of the population of interest.  This may be the case when 
studying the general population and sampling frame does not actually exist or when 
using convenience sampling methods.  
In this context, efficiency designs enable researchers to adopt more convenient 
data collection methods and still obtain robust parameter estimates.  Although having a 
sense of required sample size in the context of efficiency based designs is important for 
estimated parameter robustness, using an efficient design, the researcher is able to 
obtain robust parameter estimates on the basis of smaller sample sizes compared to 
other approaches.   PhD students in particular may opt for the most convenient approach 
when deciding how to sample the target population.  This is referred to as “convenience 
samples” (Stopher 2012, p. 336).  For example, the PhD student may approach and 
interview undergraduate students for the purposes of survey data collection.  Stopher 
(2012) explains that this type of approach is perfectly acceptable to test certain types of 
hypotheses. Let us now consider the main methods for conducting surveys of the 
population. 
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Among the various methods used to collect survey data, face-to-face interviews 
were traditionally the most common method (Stopher 2012, p. 104).43  In some surveys 
this type of technique can be essential if body language and respondent reactions are 
important in the context of the study. This method also typically requires a trained 
professional to carry out the interviews which represents an added cost to the 
researcher. In addition, Stopher (2012, pp. 105-106) explains that survey participants 
are likely to be put off by lengthy interviews, which can be exacerbated by human 
interviewers.  Humans also can make mistakes in recording information during these 
interviews.    Telephone surveys are also another way to collect survey data and this 
approach is relatively similar to the method of face-to-face interviews. The interviewer 
must read a script in the same way as for face-to-face interviews and record the 
responses.  The same issues arise in the context of both methods in terms of human 
error and increased length of interview time (Stopher 2012, 109). 
Another method which can be used to collect survey responses are postal 
surveys.  Respondents must firstly be selected, say using one of the random sampling 
methods, then they are sent a survey via post and self-administer the survey (Stopher 
2012, p. 107-108).  Like all self-administered surveys, this type of survey requires the 
participant to be able to understand the survey questions they face.    More generally, 
with the increase in the use of the internet, a very common approach among many 
practitioners are web-based surveys (Stopher, 2012, p. 104).  This also represents a self-
administered survey therefore respondents need to be able to understand the questions 
presented to them.   
Some important benefits of computer based surveys are: they can ensure 
respondent anonymity making respondents more likely to be more truthful in their 
responses, they can prevent question non-response, minimise error and include 
automated prompts. For example, we explain below that we include a number of 
different prompts in our survey including asking respondents whether they are the main 
grocery shopper in the household. On the other hand, there are some limitations in using 
web-based surveys when conducting surveys of the human population.  This issue arises 
because not all households have access to the internet and in some cases individuals 
                                                 
43 In evaluating the methods for conducting surveys, we place emphasis on the suggestions and 
evidence presented in: Louviere, Hensher, Swait’s (2010) book on Stated Choice Methods and 
Stopher’s (2012) book Collecting, Managing, and Assessing Data Using Sample Surveys.  Both of 
these books were published by Cambridge University Press. 
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may not possess the technological capabilities to be able to complete an online survey 
in the first place (Stopher 2012, p. 111).  This may lead to more educated individuals 
participating in the survey than those from say, more disadvantaged backgrounds.  Thus 
collecting survey data via web-based methods omits a proportion of the population from 
the sampling frame.  Collecting data through a web-based survey will therefore likely 
lead to a biased sample containing younger, more educated and wealthier households.  
This drawback must be considered in the wider context of the costs and benefits 
associated with each of the approaches we have covered in this section.  
In terms of “survey economics”, online surveys represent the most cost effective 
method in data collection techniques.  However, there are a number of different trade-
offs between different approaches, specifically, balancing accuracy and coverage with 
respect to the associated cost.  The main cost categories in survey design are (Stopher 
2012, (p. 356)): 
• cost of drawing the sample; 
• cost of building/ purchasing the sampling frame; 
• cost of recruiting respondents; 
• cost of surveying respondents; and 
• cost of data processing, cleaning and checking. 
Different alternatives in each of these categories represent their own cost to the 
researcher.  Surveys can therefore be administered for a variety of costs.  For example, 
surveys that do not require supervision, like online surveys, represent the cheapest 
alternative.  Let us consider each other survey method in turn below (Stopher 2012, pp. 
360-64).  Postal surveys require a sampling frame to draw from, which is typically 
specifically designed for a survey.  In this context, the sampling frame has to be 
purchased by the researcher which typically is very expensive. That is of course, if the 
sampling frame exists in the first place.  Postal surveys require investments into the 
careful design of the survey because this method is one of self-administration which 
also comes at a cost.   
The best quality method is the face-to-face interview and it comes with a hefty 
price tag. The evidence suggests that the cost of this methods is roughly $150-$500 per 
completed survey (Stopher 2012, p362). This represents a substantial cost to the 
researcher running the study.  However, face-to-face interviews are associated with 
high response rates, the least sample bias and highest level of accuracy in information. 
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Different trade-offs are therefore inherent to all the available survey methods.  On the 
basis of benefits and costs associated with the above approaches, in a perfect world with 
no budget constraints, the researcher would purchase/ acquire a sampling frame, draw 
a random sample from the sampling frame to reach the required sample size and then, 
of course, hire professional trained interviewers to perform face-to-face interviews. 
However, in the real-world, budgets are important and the “art of survey design is one 
of trade-offs or compromise, and this is certainly the case in survey economics.”44   
We acknowledge that online surveys may not be best suited for performing a 
study of the human population for the reasons outlined above.  On balance however, 
online surveys have become commonly used for the collection of data and the most 
appealing aspect of online surveys are the cost advantages.  We therefore propose to 
collect our survey data via an online survey platform and then test for sources of sample 
bias.  We also favour “convenience” sampling as a means to collect the data, instead of 
drawing a random sample.  This decision is also related to the time and cost associated 
with performing a random sample of the entire UK population. 
Recall that of the main considerations we had when designing the discrete 
choice experiment were robust parameter estimates and the financial cost and time 
associated with collecting the survey data. In this context, we strongly argue that the 
approach we outline further below does not compromise on quality simply because we 
are collecting the survey data via web-based survey and adopt a convenience sampling 
approach.   It is important to emphasise that we invested heavily in designing a survey 
which prioritises robust parameter estimates.  We revisit the issues associated with 
online surveys, in particular likely biases, in the context of the next chapter.  In Section 
3.2 we discuss the quality of the data we have collected, outline likely sources of bias 
and how we propose to control for them in our empirical analysis. The next part of this 
section outlines how we propose to collect our data via web-based survey.  
2.7       Pilot Survey: Design 
This section outlines a pilot survey designed on the basis of features of the UK 
groceries market.  The structural design of the survey itself (number of questions, 
combinations of values etc.) relies on techniques based on D-efficient experimental 
design theory.  In the previous sections we explained that efficient designs require 
                                                 
44 Stopher, P., Collecting, Managing, and Assessing Data Using Sample Surveys, Cambridge 
University press, p. 356, 2012. 
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assumptions to be made on the prior values of the coefficients of the parameters 
entering the design. The researcher must therefore establish a priori some 
understanding of the parameters being tested. A pilot study is therefore a useful tool to 
obtain prior information on attributes of interest.  We emphasise that the aim is not to 
obtain precise parameter estimates.  Instead, the goal is to roughly estimate the weight 
that individuals place on the different attributes entering the design. Section 2.4 
presented evidence that in the context of D-efficient designs, inclusion of prior values 
when evaluating candidate designs, leads to important improvements in efficiency of 
the chosen design at the end of the process (ChoiceMetrics 2012, pp. 99-100).45  
In addition, the pilot also enables the researcher to obtain feedback from 
participants on how to improve the aesthetics of the survey itself.  The results of the 
pilot survey are presented in the next section.  This section firstly explains every stage 
of the pilot survey design. We discuss the pilot survey’s target sample size, the 
algorithm used to evaluate designs, how the attributes were chosen to enter the design, 
how the attribute levels were chosen, present the attributes and levels selected to enter 
the design and how the design analysis was performed in Ngene. 
In terms of the target pilot survey sample size, at the outset we did not anticipate 
to collect a large number of responses.  Typically, to obtain meaningful results, the 
minimum recommended number of responses is 100 up to a few hundred responses per 
survey, including in the context of pilot studies (Stopher 2012, p. 256). Our aim was to 
collect 25-30 responses given the resources available.  Therefore, we acknowledge that 
the results presented in the next section are likely to be representative of a group of 
individuals not the population of UK households.  With greater resources we would 
have sought to have a pilot survey with a sample size of at least 100 participants. Even 
with a small number of responses, we are able to achieve the main goal of the pilot 
survey which is outlined above.  In other words, the information we collect enables us 
to get a sense of the weight that individuals place on different grocery retailer attributes 
that we can use in the form of prior values to generate the final design of the survey.  
We also rely on Bayesian methods which accommodate uncertainty about prior values 
                                                 
45 Recall that in Section 2.4 we explained that specification of zero priors is the least effective way to 
draw from a set of candidate designs as this will not produce the most efficient design for that specific 
set of attributes and levels.  We noted that on the basis of the evidence in the literature, specifying 
small negative or positive prior values represents a better way to determine the most efficient design. 
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assumed at the design stages.  We explain this further when outlining the design of the 
final survey.  
An important consideration in the design of a survey is that the researcher 
carrying out the survey and consumers in the population of interest are unlikely to share 
common preferences.  In this context, they are likely to place different weight on 
different product attributes (Louviere et al. 2000, p. 257).  To reconcile this problem, a 
qualitative assessment can help define the attributes that are likely to affect utility in 
the target population.  We undertook qualitative research into the UK groceries market 
to inform the design of the stated choice experiment, namely looking at the findings of 
the CC’s market investigation into the sector.  The CC looks at the importance of the 
retailer features to consumers by estimating demand using revealed preference data 
from over 13000 UK households obtained from Kantar. These individuals recorded 
details of their grocery shopping trips over a period of at least a few years. The 
competitive assessment looks at various aspects of the market including barriers to 
entry, consumer demand and defines the drivers of competition in the market. The CC 
finds that the important attributes to consumers, are prices of products, quality of 
products, range and number of products and level of service provided known as 
“PQRS” as well as the proximity.  In the short run, these variables can be adjusted 
relatively easily by the retailers and are thus considered to be important components of 
the dynamics of competition in the market (Competition Commission 2008, p. 49).  
The results of the CC (2008) investigation are corroborated by a comparative 
analysis between British and Spanish shoppers. Colomé and Serra (2000) analyse the 
relative importance of different attributes of supermarkets to compare British and 
Spanish shopper preferences. Respondents in the study rank a list of 9 attributes from 
most to least important. On average the top most important attributes chosen by UK 
consumers was the quality of products, convenience, available range and the prices of 
the products in that respective order. Colomé and Serra’s (2000) result includes 
‘convenience’ as a relevant characteristic for grocery retailer choice. This indicates that 
proximity, or driving distance from the store, will impact on consumer utility and the 
decision-making process.  
Store proximity in the UK groceries investigation was outlined as an important 
consideration for defining the relevant geographic market. The CC (2008, p.26) paper 
presents results from a consumer satisfaction report on UK’s grocery retail customers. 
The report finds that consumer satisfaction was highest with a greater number of 
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competing stores within their proximity. A more interesting result perhaps, was that the 
level of satisfaction increased significantly in the presence of a small store located 
within 5 minutes of the individual. This improvement in satisfaction was unrelated to 
the brand of retailer to whom the store belonged to. We considered it sensible to 
measure this variable in terms of drive-time given that most UK consumers drive a car 
to go grocery shopping (Competition Commission 2008, p. 69). The results of the CC’s 
report on distribution of stores in the UK informed our selection of the proximity 
attribute levels.   
The consumer analysis performed by the Competition Commission (2008, p. 
45) shows that within 20 minutes driving distance, around 85% of the UK population 
will have a choice of at least 4 different grocery stores. This is consistent with the 
chosen number of alternatives that enter the design. In addition, the empirical 
procedures undertaken in the CC investigation, used a maximum distance threshold of 
20 minute drive time. The 20 minute threshold indicates the maximum amount a 
consumer is willing to travel to the grocery store (Competition Commission 2008, 
Appendix 4.2). The findings on geographic store locations and consumers’ willingness 
to travel, suggest that with 4 options of grocery retailer, the respective proximity of the 
stores should all be within 20 minute driving distance. In context with the findings of 
the CC groceries market investigation, and to ensure sufficient variation in the data, we 
chose to assign four levels to the distance attribute of 5, 8, 12 and 17 minute drive times.  
Having defined levels for proximity, quality, range and service we had to choose 
the values to assign to the basket price attribute levels. In its investigation report, the 
CC found that throughout a typical week, shoppers tended to do one big weekly shop 
with some additional low expenditure trips to the store. Thus following from this 
behavioural observation, our price attribute is expressed as a value representing the 
weekly average basket price that could be expected at a given retailer. We wanted to 
ensure that respondents would face realistic basket prices in terms of how much they 
actually spend on an average weekly shopping trip. In this context, we calculated actual 
price differentials between the retailers based on the most frequently purchased items 
by UK households. We then ‘normalized’ these figures to maintain contextual realism 
by reflecting the actual expenditure of an average UK household on groceries.  
The prices for the respective basket of goods were collected using the retailers’ 
online websites. Out of the “Big Four” grocery retailers, Morrison’s did not offer online 
shopping at the time the price data was collected and therefore Morrison’s was omitted 
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from this study. Instead, we included retailer Waitrose, who offer online shopping to 
account for high income consumers with lower price sensitivity. The CC findings 
highlighted the fact that UK shoppers perceived the Big Four retailers, plus Waitrose, 
as “good substitutes” (Competition Commission 2008, Appendix 4.2). We also noted 
that given the recent branded product price match marketing strategies across the sector, 
prices of branded goods tend not to vary substantially between retailers. Therefore we 
collected data for the cheapest own-brand products to capture true price differentials 
between retailers. 
The approach used to calculate grocery retailer prices is consistent with the 
Competition Commission report. The report (Competition Commission 2008) used the 
food items listed on the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) to determine the price 
differentials between retailers. Items that fall under the CPI list are those that UK 
consumers purchase the most frequently and are determined from the results of the 
annual Living Costs and Food Survey. The products that were included in our 
calculations for average weekly basket prices, are taken from the 2012 CPI list 
published by the Office for National Statistics (“ONS”).46 From the full 2012 CPI list, 
we used 129 products; food, non-alcoholic drink and staple household goods such as 
bin bags. We excluded items for which we could not find comparable products on the 
retailer websites; for example, for own brand pro-biotic drinks. For further details the 
reader is directed to Table A.2.1 in the appendix which lists all of the items and prices 
we included in our price calculations and also the items for which we could not find 
comparable products.  Price data were collected using the grocery retailer websites over 
the course of two weeks during the month of January, 2013. 
Once the price data was collected, the figures were adjusted to ensure contextual 
realism and to calculate the “real-world” price differentials between retailers. To 
achieve contextual realism, it was not sensible to present the actual the sum of prices 
of CPI items because these values would not be indicative of the actual average weekly 
shopping trip faced by a typical customer. Therefore we normalized the basket prices 
to the levels of typical weekly expenditure by an average household in the UK, while 
maintaining the price differentials between retailers. Firstly, we determined the “base” 
price using ONS data on average household expenditure on groceries. The ONS report 
                                                 
46 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cpi/cpi-rpi-basket/2012/cpi-and-rpi-basket-of-goods-and-services---
2012.pdf 
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on households’ expenditure states that the average UK household had 2.3 people with 
an average weekly expenditure of £53.40 on food items and non-alcoholic drinks.45  
In this context, one of the four retailers was assigned the base price of £53.40. 
We chose Tesco’s profile to indicate the base price because it was the most “mid-
priced” retailer out of the 4 included. The results indicate that Waitrose is significantly 
more expensive than the other three retailers with a sum of prices equal to £305.57. 
Second most expensive is Sainsbury with £234.34, Tesco at £216.54 and Asda with 
£201.32. Using these sums of CPI listed product prices, we calculated the price 
differences between retailers in the form of percentages. In turn, these percentages were 
used to calculate 3 additional price levels. As we included both food and non-food items 
on our product list, we needed to adjust the average basket price to reflect the addition 
of these products. The non-food items, as a proportion of the sum of the total 129 
product prices, account for 7%, 5%, 5% and 6% of the total value for Waitrose, 
Sainsbury, Tesco and Asda respectively. The basket prices were augmented to account 
for non-food items using these percentages. The procedure enabled us to derive the 4 
different price levels based on “real-world” price differences between leading UK 
grocery retailers as presented under Table 2.1 above (decimal places were omitted). 
Following this approach, the total basket prices are both reflective of the typical weekly 
expenditure by UK households, and account for actual price differentials between the 
main grocery retailers active in the UK market.  
Having calculated the price levels, we used these values to compute the attribute 
levels for the loyalty scheme discounts for two of the four retailers. At the time of our 
study, only Tesco and Sainsbury offered consumers the ability to collect points using a 
loyalty scheme. Our calculations included the double or treble your reward promotion 
that has been regularly used by the retailers to provide some variability in the levels of 
the discount. The annual discount was calculated using the value of the average weekly 
basket price over the period of a year. The calculation we performed to derive the 
discount values followed the same loyalty point formula used by Tesco and Sainsbury 
to reward their customers at the time the experiment was carried out. For both retailers, 
the consumer receives £1 discount for every £100 they spend in store or online and the 
loyalty points can add up to a sizeable sum over the year. Recall that the discount 
collected via the loyalty schemes can be spent on a variety of products and activities 
such as travel and festivals. Further details on the loyalty scheme structures the reader 
is directed to the first chapter of this thesis.  
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On the basis of the design considerations and the qualitative evidence outlined 
above, we chose a total of 6 attributes each with 4 levels to enter the experimental 
design.  The loyalty discount represents the main variable of interest in the context of 
this experiment and is also an important part of several retailers’ business strategies in 
the UK.  These chosen attributes capture fully the most important features of the UK 
groceries sector and also represent important drivers of competition. We note that we 
chose to present 4 alternatives in each survey question because the vast majority of 
consumers have 4 grocery stores to choose from on any given shopping trip (see above).  
These are summarized under Table 2.1 below. 
The final set of attributes entering the design are the Average Basket Price, 
Loyalty Scheme Discount, Store Proximity, Service Quality, Product Quality and 
Product Range. The attributes representing quality, range and service were assigned 4 
levels to allow for sufficient variation within the experimental design, and to account 
for true market characteristics.   The survey also presents respondents with a description 
of each of the above attributes and provides some examples to help with the 
interpretation of the attributes.  As noted in the previous section, there are risks 
associated with self-administered surveys because individuals do not have the 
assistance of an interviewer who is able to explain the question to the survey 
Table 2.1 - Attributes and levels in the experimental design 
Attribute Attribute Description  Attribute Levels 
Basket Price  
The price of an average weekly shopping basket 
of goods including food, non-alcoholic beverages 
and basic nondurable household items. 
£53, £56, £61, 
£81 
Loyalty Scheme 
Discount 
The annual loyalty discount the average consumer 
can expect to receive. 
£0, £29, £32, £58, 
£63, £117 
Travel Time to 
Store 
Store location based on driving time to the store 
in minutes. 5, 8, 12, 17 
Product Quality 
The overall level of own-brand only product 
quality the consumer can expect in their shopping 
basket. 
Low, Medium, 
High, Very High 
Product Range  
The extent of product range in store in terms of 
product variety both within and across product 
categories. 
Low, Medium, 
High, Very High 
Service Quality 
The quality of service a customer can expect in 
store in terms of staff politeness, queuing times, 
cleanliness etc. 
Low, Medium, 
High, Very High 
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respondent.  It is therefore recommended to take extra care when designing a survey 
which requires self-administration.   
The survey presented to respondents therefore applies descriptive language not:  
“Quality of Service: Very High”.  The survey contains the type of description to help 
the participant understand how to interpret low or very high level of service. For 
example, in the survey, service levels are defined as follows: “Standard of Service: 
Overall friendliness and helpfulness of staff, check out waiting times, type of returns 
policy, cleanliness of the store, availability of parking spaces and overall shopping 
experience.”  The interpretation of these attributes and their levels was also facilitated 
by a description in the introduction of the survey.  Survey participants were aware that 
the survey was implemented to study the UK groceries sector and that it was designed 
on the basis of features of this market.  Therefore, participants can rely on their 
experiences of shopping across different retailers to gauge the significance (or 
insignificance) of these variables when choosing between retailers.  We acknowledge 
however, that this does leave room for interpretation.  In the empirical results chapter, 
we evaluate the estimates obtained for the qualitative attributes in terms of the weight 
we can place on their role in driving households’ choice of retailer.     
Let us also consider store size, which in the case of the CC model, enters as the 
actual size of the store in terms of square feet and is defined as an important driver of 
store choice.  We considered that displaying square footage of a store to survey 
respondents may require some degree of interpretation. Instead, we use the ‘range’ 
attribute as an indicator of store size. This reflects real world markets where stores with 
low levels of range of products and product categories tend to be small in size, while 
stores with an extensive range of products and product categories tend to be larger 
supermarkets or so-called “hypermarkets”.  Similar detailed descriptions were provided 
to respondents and these can be found in the Appendix.  Having defining the relevant 
parameters to enter the design, we now consider the experimental design evaluation 
process we undertook using the Ngene software.  
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In Sections 2.4 and 2.5 we explained the theory of experimental design and 
outlined the flexibility afforded to the researcher relying on this approach. The list of 
options available to the research when determining the experimental design to use for 
the study, which are also as accommodated by the Ngene software) can be summarized 
as follows: 
i. type of design e.g. D-efficient, WTP, S-efficient; 
ii. whether attributes are generic or alternative-specific; 
iii. number of alternatives to present to respondents; 
iv. attributes and levels to describe alternatives; 
v. constraints on combinations of alternatives, attributes and levels; 
vi. search algorithms to evaluate designs (e.g. column vs row based); 
vii. the number of rows to include in the design  matrix (i.e. number of survey 
questions); 
viii. choice of using dummy or effects coding for qualitative variables; 
ix. parameter prior values and distributional assumptions; 
x. interaction effects; 
xi. Bayesian approximation; and 
xii. use of the model averaging approach. 
 
We chose to specify generic alternatives within our design where respondents 
are presented with a choice of “Retailer A”, “Retailer B”…etc. To avoid confusion 
during the design generation process, we coded the 4 alternatives as T, S, A, W within 
the Ngene syntax code. These labels enabled us to impose constraints on the price, 
quality and discount combinations. The constraints imposed on the design aim to 
maintain a degree of realism in terms of the grocery retailer profiles in the real world. 
Firstly, the most expensive retailer was assumed to never exhibit the lowest level of 
product quality. Equally the cheapest alternative was specified not to be combined with 
a very high level of product quality. In addition we assigned constraints to ensure that 
the different discounts correspond to their respective basket prices. In addition, the 
design was constrained to include two alternatives without a loyalty discount to account 
for the two retailers who do not offer loyalty schemes 
When evaluating the efficiency of designs, the researcher can choose between 
various algorithms which systematically search for different designs by adjusting and 
alternating the combinations of levels of attributes within the design matrix (Scarpa & 
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Rose 2008). One can then compare the range of designs and their respective D-errors 
to find the lowest comparable error estimate.  Considering the different properties of 
search algorithms, in the design of our survey we argue that the most suitable is the 
most widely used row swapping algorithm; the Modified Federov algorithm (Scarpa & 
Rose 2008). We opted for this algorithm due to the speed and statistical properties 
associated with this type of approach. The row swapping algorithm draws choice sets 
from a full factorial or fractional factorial and calculates the D-errors for each design it 
constructs. The process is repeated until a specified “stop” criteria has been achieved, 
for example, when a certain number of iterations has been performed (Scarpa & Rose 
2008).  
The software also allows the researcher to specific the econometric model which 
will be used to estimate the data.  An accurate specification improves the efficiency of 
the design. We previously explained that our preferred model is the mixed logit.  
However we also noted the difficulties in assuming a mixed logit specification during 
the entire design evaluation process due to the computational burden. This problem is 
exacerbated when handling large designs with multiple alternatives and levels, such as 
our DCE. Following the advice of the Ngene software creators, we specified the CL for 
our pilot design given the common functional form between the CL and ML.47 In any 
case, we did not plan to run the pilot data using a mixed logit specification because due 
to the small  sample size this would not have been informative. 
To evaluate the various designs, Ngene requires the researcher to specify utility 
functions for each alternative to define the attributes, levels and corresponding prior 
parameter values. Recall that the utility function can contain either generic of 
alternative-specific parameters. Therefore the utility function provides the basis for the 
design of the experiment. The software then derives the AVC matrix by assuming a 
single respondent which is used to calculate the D-error to evaluate the efficiency of 
candidate designs. The software systematically evaluates candidate designs subject to 
the search criteria outlined in the program command syntax and saves the ones that are 
found to be the most efficient, including for example, Db-efficient designs that are found 
to have the smallest comparable Db-error. 
                                                 
47 The Ngene forum provided the relevant platform to obtain guidance from the creators of the software 
and can be accessed here: http://www.choice-metrics.com/forum.html 
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Instead of requiring the researcher to manually define a design matrix, the 
researcher specifies a representative utility function for each alternative that will be 
presented to respondents. The program automatically converts the utility functions into 
a design matrix that is evaluated using a search algorithm. This approach enables the 
researcher to assign specific attributes and levels to a given alternative, whereby the 
utility function contains the attributes and their levels that populate the experimental 
design. The Ngene syntaxes used to generate the pilot and main surveys can be found 
in Appendix.  
To generate a Dp-efficient experimental design for the pilot study, we could 
either assume zero value coefficients, small negative or small positive coefficient 
values for the mean coefficient prior values ßk. As discussed in Section 2.4, researchers 
have shown that by specifying non-zero priors at the design stage can yield gains in 
design efficiency compared to assuming zero prior values (Huber & Zwerina 1996, 
Bliemer & Rose 2009). Hence we opted to specify small prior values instead of 
assuming zeros throughout to increase the efficiency of the design compared to the zero 
value benchmark. Following the literature, we applied fundamental economic theory 
and logical reasoning to determine the signs of the coefficients (ChoiceMetrics 2012, 
pp.99-100).  
For example, the price coefficient was allocated a small negative value by 
considering basic economic theory that suggests that increasing the price level will 
decrease utility of consumers holding all else equal. Based on our qualitative research 
the price of a retailer is a key driver of competition in the market. Hence, the price 
attribute was assumed to have the greatest weight on utility compared with the other 
variables. Similarly for the proximity attribute, we assigned a small negative mean 
coefficient value to account for the opportunity cost associated with increased travel 
time to the grocery store. On the other hand, the discount coefficient was assigned a 
small positive coefficient because a discount will increase consumer utility. Following 
the Ngene forum advice, a “small coefficient” can have a value equal or less than 0.01. 
In light of the lack of information on the intensity of the effects of the different 
attributes, we opted for even smaller coefficients of ‘0.0001’ for some of the variables. 
The parameter priors that were assumed to generate the pilot design are displayed under 
Table 2.2.  The negative values for the qualitative variables represent the effects coding 
applied to the design of the survey because the value of the omitted coefficient is 
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actually equal to the negative of the sum of the other coefficient values. We explain this 
further below.  
 
Table 2.2 - Pilot study parameter priors 
Attribute k  Prior Value 𝛽𝛽�𝑗𝑗 
Basket Price   -0.01 
Loyalty Discount  0.0001 
Store Proximity  -0.001 
Product Quality (Medium, High, Very High)  -0.0002, -0.0001, 0.0001 
Product Range (Medium, High, Very High)  -0.0002, -0.0001, 0.0001 
Service Quality (Medium, High, Very High)  -0.0002, -0.0001, 0.0001 
 
Another option during the design process was either to use dummy coding or 
effects coding for the qualitative variables quality, range and service. Both dummy and 
effects coding require the researcher to omit one of the levels e.g. low quality. The main 
difference between the coding schemes is that, unlike dummy coding, effects coding 
has an additional level with the value ‘-1’ assigned to the reference level which offers 
more variation in the data (Bech & Gyrd-Hansen 2005). When there are a lot of 
qualitative variables with several levels within the experimental design, the design 
matrix will contain a lot of ‘0’ and ‘1’ values that represent the base level for a given 
variable. This aspect of SC data can complicate the maximisation procedures at the 
estimation stage due to insufficient variation and equally can cause difficulty in finding 
an efficient design (ChoiceMetrics 2012, p. 124). Therefore, compared with dummy 
coded variables, effects coding can overcome the problems of non-convergence when 
using maximum likelihood estimation.  
While dummy coding is more widely used, effects coding has its benefits in 
discrete choice modelling (Bech & Gyrd-Hansen 2005). Unlike for dummy coded 
variables, when using effects coding, the reference level, i.e. the omitted level, has a 
coefficient equal to the negative of the sum of the other coefficient values. Both 
approaches are functionally equivalent and should produce the same coefficient 
estimates (Bech & Gyrd-Hansen 2005). At the pilot stage of the study we were 
uncertain whether dummy coding would produce sufficient variation in the data to 
achieve convergence via maximum likelihood estimation due to the many “0” and “1” 
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values as a result of the 4 qualitative variables. Therefore to avoid non-convergence, 
we opted to use an effects coding specification for our pilot design. As we discuss 
below, when estimating our data we obtained the exact same coefficient values when 
using either dummy or effects coding. The effects coded qualitative variable in Table 
2.2 omit the ‘Very High’ level for each of the variables. As explained above, the 
coefficient value of the omitted level will be equal to the negative sum of the other 
specified coefficients.  
As well as the main effects, Ngene also allows the option of including 
interaction effects. These can also be specified in the program syntax. Section 2.4, 
briefly mentioned interaction effects. Norton et al. (2012), Ai and Norton (2003) and 
Greene (2010) provide important insights to the testing and interpretation of interaction 
terms in nonlinear models, such as the conditional logit and mixed logit. Only at 
estimation stages can the researcher verify whether interaction terms account for 
variation in preferences by applying the z-statistic to coefficient estimates. This basic 
statistical test can help inform the researcher whether these terms improve the goodness 
of fit of the model and indicate whether a particular interaction term accounts for 
substantial and statistically significant variation in preferences.  
During the design process, particularly at the pilot stage, it is impossible to know 
for certain whether interaction terms capture any meaningful variation in preferences. 
Following advice on best practice in the Ngene forum, we did not include interaction 
terms for demographic variables at the design stage. Instead, we included some 
interactions between the main explanatory variables. Following logical reasoning, the 
variables selected as interaction effects were assumed to account for differences in their 
effects on utility. Our pilot design syntax included 9 interaction effects with small prior 
coefficients which can be found in the appendix. We interacted the price coefficient 
with proximity, discount, quality and service. We had to limit the number of 
interactions because increasing their number also increases the degrees of freedom of 
the design which in turn increases the sample size requirement. 
Following the specification of design requirements and relevant constraints, the 
representative utility function specifications for each alternative were also defined. 
These can be located in the appendix of this paper. For the pilot we specified a ten row 
design so that each respondent would face 10 choice situations in order to keep the 
survey to a minimum length. This number of choice situations was sufficiently large to 
accommodate the degrees of freedom of the model as this was a basic conditional logit 
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specification. The utility functions in the syntax included the attributes and levels 
displayed in Table 2.1 in addition to the parameter prior values displayed under Table 
2.2. The four respective utility specifications that describe alternatives A, B, C and D 
can be outlined as follows: 
(i) 𝑈𝑈(𝐴𝐴) = 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝐴𝐴{56} + 𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐2𝐴𝐴{0,29,58,117} + 𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐3𝐴𝐴{5,8,12,17} + 𝛽𝛽4𝑐𝑐4𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} +
𝛽𝛽5𝑐𝑐5𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} + 𝛽𝛽6𝑐𝑐6𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} 
(ii) 𝑈𝑈(𝐵𝐵) = 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝐴𝐴{61} + 𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐2𝐴𝐴{0,32,63} + 𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐3𝐴𝐴{5,8,12,17} + 𝛽𝛽4𝑐𝑐4𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} +
𝛽𝛽5𝑐𝑐5𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} + 𝛽𝛽6𝑐𝑐6𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} 
(iii) 𝑈𝑈(𝑉𝑉) = 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝐴𝐴{53} + 𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐3𝐴𝐴{5,8,12,17} + 𝛽𝛽4𝑐𝑐4𝐴𝐴{0,1,2} + 𝛽𝛽5𝑐𝑐5𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} +
𝛽𝛽6𝑐𝑐6𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} 
(iv) 𝑈𝑈(𝐷𝐷) = 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝐴𝐴{81} + 𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐3𝐴𝐴{5,8,12,17} + 𝛽𝛽4𝑐𝑐4𝐴𝐴{1,2,3} + 𝛽𝛽5𝑐𝑐5𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} +
𝛽𝛽6𝑐𝑐6𝐴𝐴{0,1,2,3} 
The above utility functions U(-) represent the utility that a consumer will obtain 
by choosing a particular alternative j from a total of J = 4 alternatives. These alternatives 
are labelled as A, B, C and D. The coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 are generic and indicate the 
coefficient (or utility weight) assigned to attribute k. The attributes and respective levels 
are described by xkl i.e. x1 indicates the price attribute, x2 indicates the loyalty discount 
etc. Here the values in the subscript parentheses denoted by A{…}, indicate the different 
levels that a single attribute can take for that particular alternative. The letter “A” simply 
indicates that attributes are generic i.e. they appear in the first utility specification U(A) 
and also for the rest of the alternatives. These functions can be manipulated in the Ngene 
software to impose specific design constraints and assumptions. Namely to define 
which attributes and levels should be combined together to form a single alternative. 
For example, we were able to ensure that certain prices are combined with specific 
levels of quality and loyalty discounts. Therefore the third and fourth utility 
specifications above omit coefficient 𝛽𝛽2 to indicate a loyalty discount equal to zero. 
This ensures that each survey question displays 2 retailer options who do not offer a 
loyalty scheme to reflect the real-world retail offer available on the market. 
The design for our pilot questionnaire generated a Dp-error of 0.007128. As all 
designs are unique, the D-error is not an absolute measure and should therefore be 
compared against other designs generated for the same SC study. While the relative 
differences in D-errors between candidate designs is a fundamental consideration for 
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efficiency designs, we have previously discussed other design features that are also 
important. For example, some of the designs we inspected during this process had 
relatively smaller D-errors than others, but the more “efficient” designs were not always 
exhibiting sufficient variation in attribute levels. Following a thorough inspection of 
the designs and their features, we opted for the design that had a comparably low 
predicted Dp-error and which met other design criteria, namely attribute level balance. 
We chose to conduct our survey via the Qualtrics platform. The software has a 
number of advanced features.  For example, we are able to embed prompts which a 
prospective survey participant has to review including the following: 
• Are you over 18 years old? 
• Are you responsible for carrying out most of the shopping on behalf of your 
household? 
In addition, the software was instructed to automatically block individuals 
attempting to access the survey from outside of the UK.  If the relevant checks are not 
met an automated response by the software blocks the survey and instructs the 
respondents that they are not eligible to be survey participants. We also did not let 
individuals proceed with the survey unless they had ticked a response in each of the 
questions.  We randomized the order of the questions presented to respondents to avoid 
question order bias. For the purposes of the pilot survey, the survey link was emailed 
to a small number of UK grocery shoppers of variable ages, gender and occupations.48 
We were later able to discuss the respondents’ experiences of taking the survey to 
improve on the final survey appearance. This approach represents a “convenience 
sample” which we evaluated in the context of Section 2.6 above.  The Appendix 
contains print screens for sections of both the main and pilot questionnaires. 
2.8 Pilot Survey: Results 
This section considers the results of the pilot survey.  In fitting the pilot data, it 
is common practice to rely on the conditional logit.  We explained above that in the 
context of the final survey design, large designs are typically evaluated by assuming a 
conditional logit specification.  We carried out the pilot survey over the course of a 
month between September and October 2013 and obtained responses from 26 
individuals. Each respondent evaluated 4 alternatives throughout 10 survey questions 
                                                 
48 For both the pilot and main surveys we wanted to avoid the significant costs associated with 
obtaining a completely random sample of UK grocery shoppers, thus we relied on several networks of 
individuals from university students and lecturers, social media platforms and company mailing lists. 
120 
 
which generated 1040 observations in total. After downloading the pilot survey results 
from Qualtrics, the data was cleaned and inputted into Stata.  
The data we obtained from the pilot study provides an observation for each 
choice scenario that was evaluated by an individual respondent. Both the chosen 
alternatives and rejected alternatives are recorded as individual choice moments. These 
observations provide information on the relative effects of utility achieved from 
choosing a particular alternative. For the data to fit McFadden’s conditional logit 
model, the Stata manual49 recommends either the mlogit, clogit or asclogit as suitable 
commands. This explains why practitioners use the terms conditional logit and 
multinomial logit interchangeably. In principle, the Stata commands are identical 
because they produce the same outputs. The main difference between the commands is 
the command coding and the way that the data must be arranged in Stata’s data browser. 
For example, the asclogit is an alternative-specific conditional logit model that requires 
the least amount of data manipulation when dealing with labelled alternatives. We ran 
both clogit and asclogit commands to ensure consistency and robustness of our results, 
and obtained identical results, while the results reported in this section have been 
obtained exclusively using the clogit command. 
Within the Stata software, the qualitative variables for quality, range and service 
were recoded as dummy variables to enable us to measure the effects of these attributes 
at their different respective levels. We note that this approach increases the number of 
degrees of freedom but is far more informative from an empirical perspective. Instead 
of estimating a single “average” value for a qualitative variable, each level of the 
variable (low to very high) has its own corresponding mean coefficient value. Recall 
that we specified effects coding for the pilot design in case of estimation problems that 
arise from the many 0 and 1 values in the covariance matrix. Hence to test whether the 
results were the same for different coding structures, we compared the results for both 
dummy and effects coding. Using our data, we obtained the same estimates under both 
coding schemes. In light of the more prevalent use of dummy coding this is also our 
preferred approach. 
As we explain in the next chapter, the results of a logistic regression produce 
coefficients that are in values of log(odds). These values can be interpreted as the 
relative weights assigned to the corresponding attributes in the underlying utility 
                                                 
49 StataCorp.. Stata 13 Base Reference Manual. College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2013 
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function as set up by the analyst. In the literature, researchers oftentimes refer to the 
coefficient estimates as probabilities, but they are actually logit probabilities and should 
be interpreted accordingly. A basic logistic regression model can be expressed as 
logit(p)=log(p/(1-p)) = ß0x0 +…+ßkxk , where p is the overall probability of choosing a 
given retailer and p/(1-p) is in the form of an odds ratio.50 For ease of interpretation, we 
have thus calculated the exponent of the coefficients using the post-estimation or 
command in Stata 12. The log(odds) can be converted to odds by simply taking the 
exponent of the coefficients produced by Stata for attribute k i.e. calculating 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘. We 
include the exponent that has been calculated for the coefficient values under the 
columns titled O.R. i.e. odds ratios. These results are shown under Table 2.3 in a 
separate column.  The below results cluster standard errors at the individual-level and 
therefore contain robust standard error estimates. Robust standard errors are presented 
below the mean coefficients in parentheses. We note however, given the small sample 
size we do not place emphasis on these results as they are highly unlikely to be 
representative of the UK population. As we explain in the previous section, these are 
merely indicative results. 
                                                 
50 We follow the guidance of UCLA Statistical Consulting Group for interpreting coefficient values and 
corresponding odds ratios in logistic regression models which has been obtained from 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/odds_ratio.htm 
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Table 2.3 - Pilot survey results 
  Model 1   Model 2  
Variable Coef. |z-stat| O.R. Coef. |z-stat| 
Price -0.036*** 
(0.013) 2.75 0.964 
0.012 
(0.110) 0.11 
Discount 0.01*** 
(0.003)     3.23 1.010 
-0.105 
(0.077) 1.36 
Time -0.081***  
(0.025)   3.24 0.922 
-0.234 
(0.312) 0.75 
Medium Quality 2.39*** 
(0.450) 5.3 10.881 
18.313 
(13.716) 1.34 
High Quality 
 
2.73*** 
(0.457) 5.98 15.330 
20.432 
(14.247) 1.34 
Very High Quality 2.938*** 
(0.641) 4.59 18.885 
22.92 
(14.922) 1.54 
Medium Range 0.744*** 
(0.243) 3.06 2.105 
0.56* 
(0.305) 1.84 
High Range 0.814*** 
(0.246) 3.31 2.256 
0.793* 
(0.476) 1.66 
Very High Range 1.101*** 
(0.340) 3.24 3.007 
1.521*** 
(0.318) 4.79 
Medium Service 0.481*** 
(0.244) 1.97 1.619 
0.322 
(2.189) 0.15 
High Service 0.576 
(0.347) 1.66 1.779 
-0.820 
(1.985) 0.41 
Very High Service 0.772* 
(0.411) 1.88 2.165 
3.203 
(3.284) 0.98 
Price*Discount    0.002 
(0.001) 1.45 
Price*Time    0.003 
(0.005) 0.5 
Time*Discount    -0.001 
(0.001) 0.91 
Price*Low Quality 
   
   0.293 
(0.242) 1.21 
Price*High Quality    0.293 
(0.059) 0.58 
Price*Very High Quality    -0.067 
(0.062) 1.07 
Price*Low Service     -0.0005 
(0.035) 0.01 
Price*High Service    0.014 
(0.042) 0.33 
Price*Very High Service    -0.051 
(0.053) 0.95 
Log-likelihood -270.565   -262.059  
Nr. Respondents 26   26  
Nr. Observations 1040   1040  
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, next to coefficients 
represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Using the pilot data we were able to obtain statistically significant estimates at 
the 1% level for most of the first model’s explanatory variables. The respective absolute 
z-values are indicative of the degree to which the respective attributes account for 
variation in grocery retailer choice. The pilot study estimates show a strong preference 
for higher levels of product quality compared to other retailer attributes. Product quality 
is more important to consumers than the quality of service, while the level of service is 
shown to be more important than the extent of product range and variety. Grocery 
retailer quality accounts for a substantial amount of variation in the data with a z-
statistic of 5.46 attributed to a very high quality level. The results show that by offering 
high quality products in their store, a retailer will have much higher odds of being 
selected by consumers. More precisely, holding all else constant, if the product quality 
improves from low to very high, the odds that the consumer will choose a given retailer 
increase by well over 100% 
This value is likely to be overstated because the calculated odds of 18.89 are 
unusually high for this type of measurement scale. As mentioned previously, the lack 
of observations is likely to have overstated the effect of product quality on store choice. 
On the other hand, the strong preference for quality could also be a reflection of the fact 
that the small sample of respondents could be from higher income households. The 
results show that the variables of price, time and discount are also important to 
consumers. The estimates show that consumers prefer lower shopping costs and value 
a shorter travel distance to the grocery store. In fact, the sample results show that 
consumers value proximity to the store location more highly than the actual basket cost 
of their shopping trip.  This is shown by the negative coefficients for price and store 
proximity and a positive coefficient for the loyalty discount.  
Looking at the results in Table 2.3, the discount variable has an odds ratio of 
1.01. This result indicates that retailers that offer a loyalty scheme improve their odds 
of being selected compared to those who do not offer a loyalty scheme. More exactly, 
keeping all else constant, a £1 increase in the annual loyalty discount improves the odds 
of retailer selection by 1%.While the pilot stage of the choice experiment is essential, 
the pilot results must be approached with a degree of caution because they are restricted 
by relatively few observations compared to the complete study. Based on these results, 
it would be recommended that for Dp-efficient designs researchers should invest in a 
large enough pilot study to obtain more accurate prior values to enter the final design. 
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Recall that during the design stages we included interaction effects between 
some of the explanatory variables. We ran the model with and without interaction terms 
and evaluated the respective coefficient z-statistics and the results are presented in 
Table 2.3 above. The coefficient values were found not to be statistically significant. It 
is likely that our sample size was insufficient to capture these additional effects and the 
model produced some nonsensical results like a positive coefficient for price. In Section 
2.4 we discussed how additional degrees of freedom can require additional data, 
through a greater sample size or additional survey questions. Having outlined the pilot 
survey results and the main design procedures which apply to both the pilot and main 
survey designs, we now proceed to the methodology underlying the final survey design. 
2.9 Main Survey Design 
The pilot coefficient estimates estimated using Stata and presented in the table 
above enter the final survey design as parameter priors. These priors are outlined in 
Table 2.4 below along with the assumed standard deviations. The population standard 
deviations of the respective attributes included in the design were approximated using 
the values of the standard errors of the coefficient estimates.  We explain this 
approximation in further detail in this section. This section outlines a model averaging 
approach using Bayesian approximation to evaluate available designs subject to 
outlined uncertainties. We previously covered the main advantages of this approach, 
including the ability to account for model uncertainty and the precision of the parameter 
values obtained from a pilot study.  We also apply the advice received from the creators 
of the Ngene software in the online forums and the Ngene manual (ChoiceMetrics 
2012).  They explain that larger designs like ours which also assume the mixed logit 
model should be derived using the conditional logit specification and then evaluated 
against the mixed logit in the final stage.  This section concludes by presenting the 
sociodemographic questions which enter the final design of the survey. 
The main survey design generation process took place over the course of many 
weeks to allow Ngene to evaluate as many potential designs as possible and to locate 
the smallest comparable D-error for the final questionnaire. The utility specifications 
for the final design are identical to those outlined in the previous section. Equally, as 
specified for the pilot design, the main survey syntax also used the Modified Federov 
Algorithm to evaluate different combinations in attributes and levels found in the design 
matrix.   The key differences to the design generation process was the application of 
the model averaging approach and Bayesian approximation methods.  
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As explained throughout the discussion on experimental design generation in 
Section 2.4, Bayesian efficient designs require additional simulation procedures. Using 
the Bayesian approach the parameter priors are assumed to be random instead of fixed. 
The design evaluation process necessitates a predetermined number of draws to be 
taken in a random or systematic sequence from the underlying distribution. These draws 
are taken from each of the parameter distributions as specified by the researcher, where 
each distribution is defined by the mean coefficient value and its corresponding 
standard deviation. Following the Ngene Manual (p. 100), “[a] Bayesian efficient 
design optimizes the expected efficiency of the design over a range of prior parameter 
values, thereby making it more robust to misspecifying the priors. Priors with a higher 
uncertainty should see this uncertainty reflected into a larger standard deviation or 
spread of its probability distribution.”  
 In our model, each parameter prior 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗� is assumed to follow a normal 
distribution with mean µk and standard deviation σk. The population standard deviation 
values in Table 2.5 have been approximated using the standard errors of the mean 
coefficient estimates obtained via the pilot study using Stata presented in Table 2.3. 
When considering point estimation of parameters, “[t]he standard error of the estimate 
is the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of the statistic” (Greene 2008, p. 
1027). Recall that the standard error is concerned with the precision of parameter 
estimates (i.e. accuracy with respect to the true population mean) and decreases with 
increasing sample size. Whereas the standard deviation measures the dispersion of data 
in the population around the population mean and has no relationship with sample size. 
In order to obtain a rough approximation of the population standard deviation σ 
we use the well-known relationship between sample size, the standard error of the 
parameter estimate and the population standard deviation: S. E.𝑋𝑋� = 𝜎𝜎√𝑛𝑛.51 We follow this 
approach instead of randomly assigning values to the standard deviations. At this stage, 
the exact value of the standard deviation (and equally the value of the prior mean 
coefficient) will not be known with certainty and as noted above, the researcher can 
assign larger standard deviation prior values if there is uncertainty over the mean 
coefficient value. It follows that for the design generation process the standard deviation 
                                                 
51 This approach has not been used to obtain a precise and unbiased estimate of the population standard 
deviation. We use this approach to avoid assigning random values to the distribution and acknowledge 
that our sample size of 26 is probably not sufficiently large for the formula to accurately predict the 
population standard deviation.  
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need not be a precise estimate of the true population standard deviation but rather 
should be used as a tool to indicate the degree of uncertainty of mean coefficient 
parameter priors. The table below specifies the values assigned to each of the 
distributions of parameter priors for every corresponding attribute.  
 
Table 2.4 – Main survey parameter priors 
Attribute   Assumed Prior:  
𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗� ~ N (µk, σk) 
Basket price   N (-0.04, 0.05) 
Loyalty discount   N (0.01, 0.02) 
Proximity   N (-0.08, 0.1) 
Product Quality   Medium 
High 
Very High 
 
N (2.39, 2.8) 
N (2.73, 2.7) 
N (2.94, 2.8) 
Product Range  Medium 
High 
Very High 
 
N (0.74, 1.38) 
N (0.81, 1.57) 
N (1.1, 1.71) 
Service Quality  Medium 
High 
Very High 
 
N (0.48, 1.34) 
N (0.58, 1.81) 
N (0.77, 1.48) 
 
The Db-error is calculated by Ngene firstly by drawing, R values from the 
random distribution of the prior parameter values as defined in the table above. Then, 
for each of these parameter values, the D-error is evaluated and an average D-error is 
computed over these values. Recall that different parameter values will produce an 
AVC matrix with its own D-error. However over a large number of draws, Bayesian 
approximation achieves convergence to the true D-efficiency of the experimental 
design. For the main survey syntax, the draws were specified to follow the Halton 
Sequence. Compared to its counterparts, the Halton sequence performs well because it 
generally requires fewer draws to converge to the true efficiency of a given design, as 
compared to PMC methods (Bliemer et al. 2008). Before deciding to use the Halton 
sequence, we also performed trials by specifying the Sobol sequence. Throughout the 
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trial runs, both of the procedures produced relatively similar results. In the final syntax 
we specified a relatively large number of draws (40000) to be taken from the 
distribution. This was done because over a large number of draws the approximation 
converges to the true D-efficiency value of the experimental design irrespective of the 
sequence used (Bliemer et al. 2008). 
In addition to prior value specification, we accounted for other uncertainties by 
using the model averaging approach. Following this approach, the researcher can 
specify several design specifications, i.e. models, with their respective assumptions. 
Then the researcher specifies weights for the models to indicate the degree of model 
preference/importance. The average D-error of the models is calculated using these 
weights. The main survey design syntax found in the appendix contains the three model 
types (M1, M2, and M3) that were assumed for the model averaging approach. All three 
models were assumed to be CL with Bayesian priors as outlined in Table 2.5. We 
assigned different properties to these models to account for lack of information at 
design stages.  
The differences between the models were the inclusion/exclusion of interaction 
terms and effects versus dummy coding. For example, the first model, M1, assumed 
dummy coding and main effects only. The second model, M2, included interaction 
terms (same as the ones used in the pilot design) and also used dummy coding. The 
interaction term priors were assigned small negative or positive values instead of using 
the pilot survey results.52 The third and final model M3 properties were assumed to be 
main-effects only with effects coded variables instead of dummy coded. Recall that 
effects coding may be important at data analysis stages if dummy coding hinders 
convergence via maximum likelihood estimation.  
As before, Ngene calculates the individual AVC matrices for each of the models 
specified and calculates the D-error of each individual model. When using the model 
averaging approach, Ngene also displays the D-error adjusted by the weights assigned 
by the researcher. The weights assigned to the model types were introduced to ensure 
that the preferred model would be given the most weight in calculating the D-error. The 
corresponding weights assigned were 2:1.5:1 for models M1:M2:M3 respectively. 
Model M1 was given the greatest weight because it is our preferred main-effects dummy 
                                                 
52 As a result of the small sample size, the estimation in Stata produced nonsensical values for the 
interaction term coefficients. 
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coded model that would also be used during the evaluation stage for the mixed logit. In 
addition to these considerations, the Ngene syntax required that we also specify the 
econometric model types for these three versions. 
Using the model averaging method, we specified the CL model for all three 
model types. After allowing Ngene to run the syntax, we manually saved designs with 
the lowest Db-errors. These stored designs were later evaluated by assuming the panel 
mixed logit model. The evaluation syntax that was used to instruct Ngene to evaluate 
the pre-saved designs can be found in the Appendix of this paper. We firstly attempted 
to derive a design that would produce ten survey questions i.e. ten rows in the survey 
design matrix. However, given the additional degrees of freedom required to estimate 
the mixed logit model, we needed to include an additional row within the design matrix. 
Therefore our final survey presented respondents with a total of 11 survey questions. 
When we evaluated the designs against the ML (random parameter) specification we 
also had to select the number of hypothetical/simulated respondents (ChoiceMetrics 
2012, p. 112). With random parameters, preferences are represented by individual-level 
coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 that are drawn from a particular distribution.  
Hence to calculate the D-efficiency of a design that assumes a mixed logit model 
with random parameters, the process requires the analyst to take a specified number of 
draws from the distribution for each hypothetical respondent and then to calculate an 
average D-error for the design. Larger numbers of draws and greater numbers of 
hypothetical respondents produce more accurate approximations of the efficiency 
measure at an additional cost of increased computation time. We used a relatively large 
number of N = 1000 respondents with 300, 500 and 1000 Halton draws to evaluate the 
efficiency of the candidate designs. The specific D-error estimates of our chosen design 
can be found under the table below.  
The bottom row in Table 2.6 below indicates the final D-error of our chosen 
design when it was tested against the mixed logit model specification.  The figure in 
the brackets indicates the number of Halton draws.  Recall that the D-error is 
determined by the individual design and assumptions imposed, hence the D-error values 
can only be compared between designs of a given choice experiment. 
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Table 2.5 – D-errors of the main survey design 
Testing the D-error of the chosen experimental design 
Model Db-error (H=40000) 
Dp-error 
(H=300) 
Dp-error 
(H=500) 
Dp-error 
(H=1000) 
M1 0.242081    
M2 0.053306    
M3 0.355818    
Unweighted Total Error 
(M1, M2, M3) 0.651205 
   
Average Weighted Error 
(M1, M2, M3) 0.919939 
   
Panel Mixed Logit 
(N= 1000) 
 0.49089 0.49808 0.49686 
Next we present the sociodemographic questions we propose to ask the survey 
respondents and look at the ways these questions should be formulated in the context 
of a survey.  In preparing these questions we noted that there are a number of known 
issues related to the truthful elicitation of responses, in particular those which concern 
income levels.  Firstly, evidence suggests that it is advisable to ask questions on annual 
disposable income as this approach is associated with the most accuracy in response 
(Stopher 2012, p. 180). In addition, the researcher must consider the fact that questions 
about household income may produce some error because it requires some knowledge 
on the other individual not participating in the survey. We also note that even when 
survey participants know the answer to a question, they may not want to reveal a truthful 
answer (Stopher 2012, p. 182).   
If the survey is a self-administered survey, and the individual has complete 
anonymity, this facilitates the elicitation of truthful responses in the context of all types 
of questions (Stopher 2012, 183). Online surveys offer the perfect environment to 
preserve respondent anonymity.  In presenting our survey to respondents, questions are 
outlined in multiple choice format. Further, these questions present respondents with a 
choice of categories (ranges) from which respondents can self-select.  Compared to 
open ended answers, this method is also associated with elicitation of truthful 
responses, particularly on income levels (Stopher 2012, 186). The data collected on 
respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics is an important part of the empirical 
analysis.  Its accuracy is therefore important.  
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At estimation stages, interaction terms enable the segmentation of preferences 
on the basis of observable characteristics. This allows the researcher to identify 
additional dimensions of differences in preferences between sociodemographic groups. 
This first section of the survey presents respondents with 10 multiple choice questions 
on respondents’ age group, gender, household income, weekly expenditure on groceries 
and basic household items, household size, shopping frequency, car ownership, and rate 
of participation in loyalty schemes. A complete list of the multiple choice questions that 
were included in the questionnaire can be found below in Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6 – List of survey questions presented to respondents on their 
sociodemographic and household characteristics and shopping preferences 
1. How old are you? 
a) 18 – 24 
b) 25 – 44 
c) 45 – 64 
d) 65+ 
2. What is your gender? 
a) Male 
b) Female 
3. How many people live in your household? 
a) 1 
b) 2 
c) 3 
d) 4+ 
4. What is your primary occupation? 
a) Full-time employment 
b) Part-time employment 
c) Homemaker 
d) Unemployed 
e) Student 
5. What is your annual household disposable (after tax) income? 
a) £0 - £13,000 
b) £13,001 - £22,000 
c) £22,001 - £45,000 
d) £45,001 - £65,000 
e) £65,000+ 
6. On average, how often do you order groceries using the Internet? 
a) Every week 
b) At least once a month 
c) A few times a year 
d) Never 
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7. On average, how many times per week does your household go grocery 
shopping? 
a) 1 
b) 2 
c) 3 
d) 4+ 
8. On average how much does your household spend on groceries and basic 
household items (toilet roll, bin liners, etc.) each week (excluding alcohol)? 
a) £10 - £35 
b) £36 - £61 
c) £62 - £87 
d) £88 - £103 
e) £104+ 
9. How many loyalty schemes do you participate in? (Including grocery retailer, 
cosmetics retailer, airlines etc.) 
a) None 
b) 1-2 
c) 3-4 
d) 5+ 
10. Do you usually drive a car to go grocery shopping? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the underlying theory and rationale for using stated 
choice methods and efficient experimental designs. We presented evidence that 
orthogonal designs are not optimised for nonlinear discrete choice models, noting that 
efficiency based designs offer a more compelling alternative. After evaluating the 
methods available to practitioners, we presented the ways to perform surveys of human 
populations, noting the possible biases that we would encounter by carrying out the 
survey online and sampling the population following a convenience sampling approach.  
Then, we outlined a detailed methodology for the design of a discrete choice experiment 
to measure consumer preferences for loyalty schemes in the UK groceries market. In 
doing so we undertook a qualitative assessment of this market and designed an 
experiment which mimics the features of the sector. We performed a small pilot study 
to estimate parameter priors to enter the final design of our survey, which is a 
requirement in D-efficient designs.  We then also controlled for uncertainty of 
parameter priors by relying on the Bayesian version of the D-error.  Chapter III of this 
thesis outlines and evaluates the method used to collect the data and presents the results 
of the DCE.  
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results of a discrete choice experiment 
designed to model heterogeneity in consumer preferences for grocery retailer attributes, 
namely loyalty schemes.  Looking back to the literature review chapter, we found that 
the economic models used to assess repeat purchase discount type strategies, generally 
assume that consumers are homogenous in their artificial costs of switching.  In other 
words, when firms implement loyalty schemes, the strategy unilaterally increases the 
costs of switching for all consumers.  We found that theoretical models can, and do in 
many cases, account for heterogeneity in consumer preferences. Typically this is 
through locational differences in a Hotelling framework.  Additional variation may for 
example, be applied through random variation in preferences across different time 
periods entering the model. However, until recently, the fact that consumers are likely 
to be heterogeneous in their switching costs has not been accounted for in the literature 
(Biglaiser et al. 2016).   
In light of this, this thesis set out to re-examine the assumptions entering 
theoretical models on costs of switching when firms implement loyalty schemes.  By 
using the mixed logit model we are able to test whether the coefficient for the loyalty 
discount varies between consumers or not.  If it does not, then it follows that consumers 
are likely to be homogenous in their artificial costs of switching.  This is consistent with 
the nature of assumptions typically applied in the theory.  On the other hand, if 
consumers’ taste for loyalty schemes varies in the population then consumers are likely 
to be heterogeneous in their artificial costs of switching created by the retailer’s 
strategy.  The empirical findings presented in this chapter suggest that loyalty schemes 
do not affect consumers in the same way and that grocery retailers in the UK are likely 
to compete for consumers across a wide range of price and non-price factors, including 
loyalty schemes.   
Compared to other grocery retailer attributes which exhibit preference 
heterogeneity, the most variation in households’ preferences is for the loyalty scheme 
discount attribute.  Based on our sample of data, around 97% of consumers prefer 
grocery retailers who offer high levels of customer service in store.  However, only 
around 68% of consumers choose a grocery retailer on the basis of being able to achieve 
a loyalty discount.  This indicates that in the population of grocery shoppers in the UK, 
only some consumers’ behaviour is affected by a loyalty scheme when choosing a 
grocery retailer. This supports the hypothesis we set out in the first chapter which 
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proposes that consumers are likely to incur artificial switching costs heterogeneously.  
This has implications for the theoretical models used to study endogenous switching 
costs related to loyalty scheme type discounts.  For example, our finding implies that 
loyalty discounts do not unilaterally increase switching costs for all consumers.  We 
also argue that even if a consumer repeatedly buys groceries from the same retailer who 
offers a loyalty scheme, this will not necessarily mean the individual will then redeem 
their lump sum coupon.  This may be due to personal preferences and consumer seeking 
to protect their personal data for example.  As such, the loyalty scheme may not cost as 
much to the retailer as implied by some of the models used to study repeat purchase 
discounts. We also argue that the scheme is unlikely to affect market outcomes in the 
way suggested by theoretical models. We discuss these aspects of the results at greater 
length in the discussion section.   
The overall structure of this chapter can be summarized as follows.  Section 3.2 
discusses the benefits and limitations associated with online surveys and the resultant 
sources of bias we need to consider when undertaking the empirical work.  This sub-
section also sets out how we propose to test the quality of data collected to assess 
whether the empirical results are likely to be meaningful.  Section 3.3 compares survey 
respondent characteristics against the UK population statistics along a range of different 
factors such as location and disposable household income.  For example, we find that 
certain income and age groups as well as UK regions are under or overrepresented in 
the data.   The sampled respondents are proportionality younger, richer and generally 
more likely to be from more prosperous regions where household incomes sit above the 
national average.  The comparison of sociodemographic characteristics of survey 
respondents against actual population figures provides the necessary information to 
determine the relevant frequency weights to be applied to specific groups of consumers 
found to be underrepresented within our sample.  The frequency weights applied to the 
data are set out at the start of the empirical results section.   
Throughout Section 3.4 we present our empirical results obtained by running 
different model specifications, namely the conditional and mixed logit specifications, 
with and without interaction terms. The complete list of all the model specifications 
that are referenced in this chapter can be found in the appendix under table A3.1.  
Section 3.5 presents additional results to assist in the interpretation of the data, namely, 
willingness-to-pay estimates for grocery retailer attributes and graphical 
representations of individual-level parameter estimates.  WTP is a useful and alternative 
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way to interpret results by examining ordered preferences in the form of WTP 
estimates.  Individual-level parameter estimates on the other hand, allow the researcher 
to graphically map how widely (or narrowly) preferences are likely to be dispersed 
around the mean.  Section 3.6 concludes this chapter with a discussion of the relevant 
insights offered by our findings in the context of the academic literature, implications 
for competition policy and possible directions for future research.   
3.2 Data Collection & Data Quality 
This sub-section outlines the process undertaken for the collection of data. In 
doing so, we set out how we propose to test and control for sources of bias that may 
impact the quality of our results.  In the context of the methodological chapter, we 
outlined the trade-offs inherent to the different methods available to researchers aiming 
to collect a representative sample of the population through a survey.  We noted in 
particular the potential sources of bias inherent to data collected via survey methods.  
These issues, including sources of bias attributed to online surveys, are discussed in 
greater detail in the methodological chapter Section 2.7.   In addition, we also note that 
Section 2.9 considers how to mitigate bias and elicit truthful responses to sensitive 
questions such as household income.   
The survey outlined in the second chapter of this thesis was uploaded to the 
online platform Qualtrics and preserved respondent anonymity.   The survey itself was 
made up of two parts, (i) sociodemographic and household characteristics questions; 
and (ii) the D-efficient survey containing 11 hypothetical shopping scenarios.  All 
survey data was collected from the 17th March 2014 up to the 18th July 2017.   The 
purpose of launching the survey online was threefold: (a) elicit truthful responses; (b) 
adopt a cost and resource efficient method; and (c) facilitate the collection of as large 
as possible set of survey responses.  As the survey was conducted online we benefited 
from the ability to reach a wide audience.  For example, the survey was shared via 
multiple internal company and university mailing lists as well as social media channels 
(e.g. Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn).  The survey platform also varied the sequence 
of questions presented to each respondent to remove sources of bias arising from the 
ordering of questions.  Further, by conducting the survey using Qualtrics enabled us to 
purchase supplemental responses at very short notice.   
Whilst beneficial, our adopted approach was also subject to certain limitations.  
Firstly, there are specific biases associated with online surveys.  Online surveys limit 
researchers’ ability to reach certain respondent groups due internet penetration rates not 
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being 100%.  In addition, online surveys require the respondent to have minimum 
threshold of technological skills.   For example, individuals in the older age category 
are less likely to be savvy internet users are would therefore be less likely to participate 
in online surveys.  On the other hand, certain respondent groups may be 
overrepresented, for example students and higher income households. 
Considering the above, by collecting the data online we were inadvertently 
either over-including or excluding certain households from participating in the survey.   
This is consistent with what we observe in the context of the analysis of 
sociodemographic characteristics of survey respondents presented in the section below. 
These results show that our sample is significantly under-representative of older age 
groups and has a large number of students than otherwise suggested by population-level 
figures. In addition, respondents report very high disposable incomes.  We also noted 
in the methodological chapter the issues associated with asking individuals about 
household versus personal income.  This may increase the scope for reporting errors.  
These issues are also discussed in the next section of the chapter.  
Secondly, we chose to distribute the survey link across as many online channels 
as possible which was by far the most convenient and least resource intensive way to 
collect a sufficiently large sample of data for the purposes of our empirical work.  In 
Section 2.6 of the methodological chapter we outlined a number of methods for the 
collection and sampling of data.  In doing so we explained that we would have adopted 
an alternative approach to the collection of data with access to much bigger resources.  
This is in terms of availability of time to conduct the research and much greater 
finances.  In this situation, we would have sought to for example, purchase a sampling 
frame of a representative sample of the UK population and drawn a random sample 
using one of the random sampling methods available.  Alternatively, we could have 
drawn from a random sample of UK households using random dialling or drawing a 
random sample from online telephone directory.   
We would have then invited individuals for face-to-face interviews by 
contacting them via post or telephone because face-to-face interviews are said to deliver 
the most reliable results.53  Alternatively, on the basis of a random sample of grocery 
stores we could have interviewed a random sample of people leaving/ entering each 
selected grocery store. This would have also required face-to-face interview techniques.   
                                                 
53 These issues are discussed at greater length in Section 2.6 of the methodological chapter. 
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However, as we explained in greater detail in Section 2.6, there are a number of 
difficulties associated in drawing a completely random and representative sample of 
households on the basis of postal addresses in a telephone directory or other comparable 
methods. This approach also represents the most resource (time and money) intensive 
method for collecting the survey data, which was one of the main considerations when 
choosing between different survey methods (Stopher 2012, p. 362).   
Our chosen approach, an anonymous online survey, is now a common method 
used to collect survey data.  Online surveys are known to be more effective in eliciting 
truthful responses by ensuring respondents are able to enjoy complete anonymity when 
submitting their responses.  They also permit the careful design of questions to further 
facilitate the elicitation of truthful responses. This was particularly relevant as our 
survey included more sensitive questions in relation to income.  We note that extracting 
truthful information on income levels from respondents in surveys is a well-known 
issue in survey methods. However, we were able to minimize this risk by conducing 
the survey online and presenting available answer as ranges in multiple choice format. 
As noted above, Section 2.6 discusses this issue in greater detail.   
The collection of responses was carefully monitored throughout the data 
collection process.   In the first instance, the link to the survey was shared via a number 
of online channels in the UK.  Furthermore, additional responses were purchased 
through the Qualtrics panel of respondents.   The initial data gathering exercise enabled 
us to collect 293 responses.  Through the Qualtrics panel we purchased a further 142 
responses which were recorded during the same time frame as the first sample, adding 
up to a total of collected 435 responses.  As explained in the methodological chapter, 
researchers generally aim to achieve a sample size of 200 or 300 to achieve robust 
parameter estimates in the context of discrete choice experiments (Rose and Bliemer 
2013, Stopher 2012, p. 256).   
After downloading the data from Qualtrics in .csv format we performed a 
number of checks on the data for quality assurance purposes.  Of the total 435 recorded 
responses, 8 responses were removed from the total sample for one of three different 
reasons.  Firstly, we removed all respondents who completed the survey in under 5 
minutes.  This was to exclude individuals not actually reading the instructions or 
questions presented to them in the survey.   Secondly, we removed a survey respondent 
who selected the same option during each survey question.  We also determined the 
approximate locations of survey respondents at the time of taking the survey using their 
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GeoIP location.  In doing so we identified and removed the survey responses from 
Northern Ireland where the grocery retail sector is significantly different to England, 
Scotland and Wales.54  This left us with a total of 292 and 135 remaining responses 
from the first and second samples respectively. 
After performing these initial quality controls we sought to verify whether we 
could identify and control for sources of bias in our data which would likely affect the 
quality of our results.  In doing so we noted that a good quality and unbiased sample of 
the population would be representative of UK household characteristics and consistent 
with actual UK household preferences.  This would enable us to estimate the data to 
obtain reasonable empirical results with reliable real-world applications.  Considering 
the above we performed a series of checks to test the quality of the data, specifically: 
(i) compared the implied market shares computed on the basis of survey responses 
to actual grocery retailer market shares in the same time period as when the 
survey was conducted; 
(ii) compared the survey respondents’ household and sociodemographic 
characteristics to publically available statistics on the UK population with a 
particular focus on known drivers of grocery shopping preferences including 
but not limited to their household income, age and household size (see Section 
3.3); 
(iii) compared the first and second group of respondents with reference to their 
household and sociodemographic characteristics to test for material differences 
between these two samples (see Section 3.3); and 
(iv) on the basis of the comparative assessment in (ii) apply population based 
weights to the data to address potential sources of bias (see Section 3.4).  
To address bullet (i) above, we computed market shares by taking the frequency 
of responses attributed to retailers A, B, C and D as a proportion of total responses and 
compared these against actual grocery retailer market shares.   Even though the survey 
was “unlabelled”, in the sense that respondents did not choose between identifiable 
                                                 
54 See for example a recent report by Kantar Worldpanel on the Northern Ireland Retail Landscape 
which sets out the key players in the market and their corresponding market shares.  The market 
structure outlined in this report is very different to the UK grocery retail landscape.  For example, 
Tesco has nearly 35% market share (in the UK <30%) and retailers Morrison’s and Waitrose do not 
appear to operate in Northern Ireland.  
https://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/coracampbellkantarworldpanel.pdf, Accessed 9th October 
2017. 
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retailer names, the experiment was designed on the basis of actual retailer offerings.  In 
this context, retailer profiles A, B, C and D were modelled against actual grocery 
retailer features of Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda and Waitrose respectively.  Considering 
the above, the similarity between the survey and actual market shares is a good indicator 
of the quality and representativeness of the data. The market shares computed on the 
basis of the chosen alternatives are presented below in Table 3.1. We also include a so-
called “group of four market share”. In other words, market shares computed as a 
proportion of the total 67.5% share attributed to these four retailers in the UK groceries 
market.   
Table 3.1 – Implied and Actual Grocery Retailer Market Shares in 2014  
 Tesco Sainsbury's Asda Waitrose Total 
Market Share (sample) 45.1% 17.5% 28.4% 9.0% 100.0% 
2014 Market Share (actual) 28.8% 16.2% 17.4% 5.1% 67.5% 
2014 Group of Four 
Market Share 42.7% 24.0% 25.8% 7.6% 100.0% 
Notes: Survey market share figures were computed by calculating the proportion of times retailers 
labelled as A, B, C or D were selected by respondents during the survey.  Actual market share figures 
are sourced from Kantar. 55 Group of four market shares were computed by assuming the grocery market 
was restricted to only the four retailers listed above taken as a proportion of actual market shares in 2014. 
The market shares in the first row of Table 3.1 above, are consistent with actual 
market shares observed in real world markets both in terms of the overall split and 
relative sizes of retailers.  Firstly, comparing retailers’ relative sizes to each other, in 
terms of market shares, Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s and Waitrose are the first, second, 
third and fourth largest retailers in order of market share magnitudes respectively.  This 
is the case when looking at both the sample and the actual UK market.   In addition, 
there is overall limited variation between the sample market shares and the actual 
market shares.  For example, the actual market shares of Tesco, Asda and Waitrose are 
less than 3% higher compared to the survey based market shares.  On the other hand, 
Sainsbury’s market share is 6.5% lower in the sample than its actual market share.  In 
conclusion, although the implied survey market shares are not strictly identical to what 
we observe in actual markets, they are very similar.  On balance, the results of this 
check are consistent with what would be expected of good quality data that is 
                                                 
55 http://uk.kantar.com/consumer/shoppers/2014/2309-kantar-worldpanel-uk-grocery-share-data-
september/ 
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representative of actual UK household preferences and therefore more likely to deliver 
reasonable empirical results.   
The next section evaluates respondent characteristics against those of the UK 
population.  This data is also disaggregated by respondent group to assess whether any 
significant differences exist between these two sets of respondents.  In doing so, we are 
able to perform quality checks (ii) and (iii) described above.  The results of this 
evaluation indicate that although there is some degree of variation between the two sets 
of respondents, on balance the differences are not substantial.  Instead, more material 
differences arise between certain sociodemographic characteristics of survey 
respondents and those found in UK population.  These aspects of the data and how we 
propose to control for these sources of bias are discussed at greater length below.   
3.3 Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents 
 In section 2.10 above we outlined the sociodemographic questions that were 
included in the final survey design.  The inclusion of these specific questions enabled 
us to collect respondent-level data which can be segmented according to respondents 
household and sociodemographic characteristics.  Ultimately, the segmentation of 
respondents allows us test for the presence of preference heterogeneity between groups 
of consumers/ households through interaction terms contained in the various model 
specifications.56    In addition, this segmentation allows us to evaluate the quality of the 
data by comparing the characteristics of the two groups of survey respondents to each 
other and also to those of the general UK population.   In doing so, we test for sample 
representativeness and sources of likely bias that may be corrected through the 
application of population weights. For example, as noted above the survey was 
conducted online rather than using the traditional methods like telephone interviews or 
via postal delivery. This approach to the collection of data may have led to the 
overrepresentation of younger and more educated individuals and the 
underrepresentation of less technologically sophisticated shoppers and also older 
individuals.  We address this type of issue further below through the comparative 
assessment. 
A key assumption we make in interpreting our results is that the choices made 
by individual respondents also account for the preferences of the household they live 
in.   We note that individuals in the population are likely to either: 
                                                 
56 Please see the appendix for a full list of model specifications and interaction term descriptions. 
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• be the main person responsible for their household’s shopping; or  
• may share grocery shopping responsibilities with others in the household; or  
• may generally shop as a household; or 
• may not go grocery shopping at all.  
Being mindful of the above, as part of the preliminary survey questions, survey 
respondents were asked whether they were responsible for performing the main shop 
on behalf of their household.  The survey instructions also clearly set out that the 
questionnaire related to household behaviour.  Additionally, the remaining questions in 
the survey were also formulated to ensure the respondent would consider their overall 
household spending and shopping habits. Thus we interpret the estimated coefficients 
as representing the preferences of individual shoppers (consumers) as well as the 
households they live in.  We also note that some individuals live by themselves in which 
case this point is not pertinent. However as we show below, a majority of survey 
participants do not live by themselves. 
Tables 3.2-3.6 below contain a number of statistics on respondent 
sociodemographic characteristics and shopping behaviour.  We compare these figures 
to UK population statistics which have been sourced from a number of organisations 
such as the Office for National Statistics, HM Revenue & Customs, The Institute of 
Grocery Distribution (“IGD”) and Kantar Worldpanel (“Kantar”). 57   Most statistics, 
unless otherwise stated, are representative of the year 2014 which corresponds to the 
year the survey was conducted.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 A complete list of data sources can be found in the bibliography.  
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Let us first consider the distribution of respondents across the various age 
categories.  Both respondent groups are similar to each other, however, there are 
important differences between the distributions of age groups in the sample groups 
compared to the UK population. In particular the 65+ age category is much smaller than 
other age categories in our sample and also in terms of what is observed within the UK 
population.  Instead, our sample contains nearly twice as many individuals in the 25-44 
age category than suggested by population-level data.   Furthermore, our sample 
contains relatively more female respondent than male respondents.  This may be due to 
the fact that the survey was intended to be completed by the primary shopper of that 
household and women are more likely to carry out this role.  For example, consider the 
Table 3.2 – Survey Summary Statistics: General Household Characteristics 
Demographic 
Variable 
Description 
Respondent 
Group 1 
(%) 
Respondent 
Group 2 
(%) 
All 
Respondents 
(%) 
UK 
Population 
(%) 
 Age 18 – 24 16.44 8.89 14.05 11.54 
 25 – 44 61.30 58.52 60.42 33.63 
 45 – 64 19.18 25.93 21.31 32.37 
 65+ 3.08 6.67 4.22 22.47 
Gender Male 41.78 36.30 40.05 49.22 
 Female 58.22 63.70 59.95 50.78 
Household  1 17.12 11.85 15.46 27 
Size 2 39.04 24.44 34.43 36 
 3 19.86 31.11 23.42 17 
 4+ 23.97 32.59 26.70 20.00 
Primary  Full-time employed 68.84 47.41 62.06 60.01 
Occupation Part-time employed 8.22 23.70 13.11 22.04 
 Homemaker 1.71 14.81 5.85 6.27 
 Unemployed 1.37 10.37 4.22 5.16 
 Student 19.86 3.70 14.75 6.52 
Disposable   £0 - £13,000 11.64 14.07 12.41 17 
Household £13,001 - £22,000 14.73 23.70 17.56 40 
Income £22,001 - £45,000 40.75 45.19 42.15 35 
 £45,001 - £65,000 15.41 10.37 13.82 4 
 £65,000+ 17.47 6.67 14.05 4 
Notes: These figures are based on 427 survey responses.  Respondent groups 1 and 2 have 292 and 135 
survey responses respectively.  Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding.  Data for age, gender, 
household size and occupation was sourced from the ONS.  Data on disposable household income was 
sourced from HM Revenue & Customers. All data relates to 2014. 
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findings of a large study conducted by the Food Standards Agency published in 2007.  
“Consistently throughout the period of the study, more women (77% in 2006) took 
all/most of the responsibility for household food shopping compared to men (29% in 
2006).” 58  
The population statistics for both age and gender were obtained using the ONS’s 
Population Analysis Tool 2014.  Employment statistics were derived from the 2013 
Labour Force Survey (“LFS”) published by the ONS. This data set contains information 
on different types of labour market activity/ inactivity for individuals aged 16-64.  We 
chose the LFS dataset as it provided a breakdown of labour market activity by type.  
However, the LFS dataset allowed for multiple occupations.  So for example, certain 
individuals were classified both as part-time employed and as students. On the other 
hand, our questionnaire did not allow for respondents to select more than one answer 
per question.  Furthermore this data set contained statistics for individuals aged 16-64, 
while our survey was completed by individuals aged 18 to 65+.  Considering the above, 
we are unable to make a like for like comparison to for this specific category and we 
therefore do not place significant weight on the underlying reasons differences observed 
between our sample and the population level statistics.  
Let us first consider the differences between the two samples of respondents in 
the occupation category.  The primary occupations of survey respondents are visibly 
different between the two groups 1 and 2.    A number of the differences in primary 
occupation between the two sets of respondents, could be driven by the different ways 
the two samples were collected.  The first sample was collected by sharing the survey 
via mailing lists and social media.  On the other hand, the second set of responses were 
collected via a paid service which required paying a panel of respondents to complete 
the survey.  For example, the second sample contained around twice as many 
unemployed individuals compared to what we observe in the national statistics.  This 
is consistent with the fact that someone who is employed in a full-time job would be 
less likely to participate in unconventional side-jobs like being a part-time panellist for 
online surveys.  Furthermore, there are a large number of student respondents in the 
first respondent group which is consistent with the channels that were used to distribute 
                                                 
58 We note that this study is ten years old and that more men are likely to be performing the household 
shopping in 2017. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20111206144033/http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/
cas07uk.pdf 
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the survey, namely a number of university mailing lists. When taking the respondent 
groups together, on balance the combined figures are representative overall in the 
context of full-time employment and unemployment.  These figures are very similar to 
the UK population statistics in the fourth column. 
In terms of household sizes, the data we collected is under representative of 
single person households.  However, it is worth noting that 37% of respondents who 
participated in the survey were located in London where living costs are higher than the 
rest of the country.  As a consequence of higher living expenses and well-known supply 
side shortages, more individuals are likely to live in shared accommodation (i.e. as part 
of a larger household) in London which could be driving the above statistic.  The 
locations of survey respondents may also be driving the way household income 
categories are distributed in the sample, in particular the first sample group.   
Over 17% of respondents in the first group stated their household earnings after 
tax were over £65k whereas this figure was 7% and 4% for the second group and UK 
population respectively.  Table 3.5 further below presents the gross disposable income 
by UK region showing that London and the East of England have the highest average 
disposable household incomes compared to other regions.  In addition, Table 3.4 
contains locations of respondents at the time of completing the survey indicating that 
the majority of our respondents were also from these higher income regions. The 
reported household incomes are higher than the national average and there are at least 
two biases driving this result.  The first is the risk that respondents will be uncertain 
about their household income as this information is about another individual. Secondly, 
another source of bias is the fact that the survey was carried out online which restricts 
the sampling to more affluent individuals as discussed in more detail in the 
methodological chapter.  
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Table 3.3 above presents the summary statistics for grocery shopping related 
questions, such as loyalty scheme participation and shopping frequency.   There are a 
number of differences between the two groups of respondents throughout these 
different categories.  Let us consider them in turn.  Firstly, the second group of 
respondents are more avid loyalty scheme participants than the first group.  There are 
in fact, 17% of respondents in the first group who stated they did not participate in any 
loyalty scheme at all.  The corresponding figure for the second group was 5%.  In 
addition, there are significantly more individuals in the second group of respondents 
who stated that they typically drive a car to go grocery shopping compared to those in 
the first group.  The combined figures however, are in line with the population level 
statistics.   
 Looking at the distribution of responses in relation to preferences for online 
shopping, the sampled respondents appear to purchase groceries online more frequently 
Table 3.3 – Survey Summary Statistics: Household Shopping Behaviour 
Grocery Shopping 
Variable Description 
Respondent 
Group 1  
(%) 
Respondent 
Group 2  
(%) 
All 
Respondents 
(%) 
UK  
Population  
(%) 
Shopping Frequency 
(weekly) 
1 37.33 31.85 35.60 - 
2 29.79 41.48 33.49 - 
3 18.49 14.81 17.33 - 
4+ 14.38 11.85 13.58 - 
Online Shopping every week 7.53 15.56 10.07 2.43 
Frequency few times a 
month 13.36 31.85 19.20 11.93 
 a few times a year 29.79 22.96 27.63 7.74 
 Never 49.32 29.63 43.09 77.9 
Weekly Expenditure 
(food & non-food  
nondurable  
household items) 
£10 - £35 17.81 14.81 16.86 - 
£36 - £61 28.08 28.15 28.10 - 
£62 - £87 25.00 25.93 25.29 - 
£88 - £103 15.75 20.74 17.33 - 
£104+ 13.36 10.37 12.41 - 
Loyalty Scheme 0 17.12 5.19 13.35 - 
Participation 1 – 2 49.66 46.67 48.71 - 
(all types) 3 – 4 22.26 33.33 25.76 - 
 5+ 10.96 14.81 12.18 - 
Drives a Car Yes 54.45 67.41 58.55 61 
to Buy Groceries No 45.55 32.59 41.45 39 
Notes: These figures are based on 427 survey responses.  Respondent groups 1 and 2 have 292 and 135 
survey responses respectively.  Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding.  Sources for the 
population-level figures can be found in the data sources section of the bibliography.  
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than the national average.  This holds in particular for the second group of respondents. 
If we compare the overall statistics for online shopping preferences to figures published 
by Kantar, proportionately twice as many of our sampled respondents regularly 
purchase groceries online. This could be due to individuals in our sample working 
demanding jobs with less time to shop or simply they may prefer alternative shopping 
channels.  This could also be attributed to the fact that the sample contains a larger 
number of younger individuals than the national average and the survey itself was 
conducted online which, as noted above, may attract a specific type of respondent. 
On the basis of the table above, once-stop-shopping remains the preferred shopping 
method among roughly a third of survey respondents.  Another third of respondents 
state that they go grocery shopping at least twice per week. The remaining 30% go 
grocery shopping at least 3 times per week.  Although we could not find like-for-like 
data on grocery shopping frequency, we refer to an IGD report which looks at 
developments in grocery shopping frequency over time for some insights.  The IGD 
shopper insight report focuses on the growth in ‘top-up shopping’ through the analysis 
of survey data on consumer shopping behaviour.59 In the report, top-up shopping is 
defined as a smaller shopping trip in terms of basket size, which is carried out by 
customers wishing to top-up their main grocery shop.  According to IGD, 46% of 
respondents in the survey claimed that they were top-up shopping more often that 2-3 
years ago.  The report highlights that consumers used to be more likely to carry out one 
major shop per week and preferred grocery retailers offering a so-called one-stop-shop 
for all major items they needed for that week. In turn, the groceries sector experienced 
growth of big out of town supermarkets. More recently, the sector has seen growth of 
convenience stores in line with consumers favouring more frequent shopping trips over 
a one-stop-shop.  This is consistent with what we observe in our data.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 IGD ShopperVista Report, ‘Top Up Shopping’, June 2015 
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Table 3.4 – Locations of survey respondents 
Location Respondent Group 1 
(%) 
Respondent Group 2 
(%) 
All Respondents 
(%) 
UK Population 
(%) 
East of England 39.38 2.22 27.63 9.59 
East Midlands 1.03 3.70 1.87 7.39 
London 40.75 27.41 36.53 13.61 
North East 1.03 4.44 2.11 4.17 
North West 5.48 13.33 7.96 11.37 
Scotland 1.71 6.67 3.28 8.52 
South East 5.14 9.63 6.56 14.14 
South West 1.71 10.37 4.45 8.64 
Wales 0.34 5.19 1.87 4.93 
West Midlands 1.71 11.11 4.68 9.10 
Yorkshire & the Humber 1.71 5.93 3.04 8.54 
Notes: Locations of 427 survey respondents were recorded at the time of survey completion.  Respondent groups 
1 and 2 have 292 and 135 survey responses respectively.  Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding.  
Population-level figures exclude N. Ireland and have been sourced from the ONS. 
 
 
Using the ONS’s population analysis tool, we calculated the proportion of 
individuals living in different UK regions.  This data is presented in Table 3.4 above.  
The figures which represent the second group of respondents are significantly more 
representative of the UK population statistics than those attributed to the first group.   
In the first group, there are more individuals located in London and the East of England 
compared to the UK average.  In fact there are more than twice as many individuals 
from London and the East of England in our sample compared to the UK demographic.  
We noted above, that this figure is also related to the high income levels reported by 
survey respondents considering that regional differences are an important determinant 
of income of households.  Table 3.4 below presents the respective regional gross 
disposable household incomes (“GDHI”) by region as well as respondent income group 
by respondent location.  The GDHI regional averages presented in the above table 
represent average incomes after taxation and other social contributions have been 
deducted at the individual-level not the average of household incomes in different 
regions.   
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We had initially suspected that the high incomes reported by respondents were 
likely driven by regional differences.   Considering the statistics presented in the table 
above, over half of respondents who reported household incomes of £65k+ were located 
in London.  On the other hand, 40% of individuals in the lowest income category were 
also located in London.  The second largest group of individuals in the highest income 
category were located in the East of England.  This is among the more prosperous 
regions on the basis of the GDHI figures.  Considering another example, the North East 
is reported as having the lowest average household incomes in the UK.  None of these 
survey respondents located in the North East reported as being in the highest household 
income category.  The collected data therefore captures both the income inequalities 
prevalent in the capital as well as regional household income disparities across UK 
regions captured in the first column above.  This finding is consistent with good quality 
of data which is likely to be more representative of preferences within the UK 
population.    
 
Table 3.5 –Gross disposable household income (“GDHI”) by UK region and survey 
respondent income group by respondents’ location 
Region G.D.H.I. 
(£) 
£0 -£13000 
(%) 
£13,001-
£22,000 
(%) 
£22,001-
£45,000 
(%) 
£45,001-
£65,000 
(%) 
£65,000+ 
(%) 
United Kingdom 17,965 - - - - - 
East of England 18,897 28.30 28.00 30.00 30.51 16.67 
East Midlands 16,217 1.89 2.67 1.67 1.69 1.67 
London 23,607 39.62 29.33 33.89 32.20 55.00 
North East 15,189 3.77 2.67 2.22 1.69 0.00 
North West 15,776 7.55 13.33 6.11 11.86 3.33 
Scotland 17,095 0.00 1.33 3.89 6.78 3.33 
South East 20,434 3.77 5.33 7.78 5.08 8.33 
South West 18,144 3.77 5.33 3.89 6.78 3.33 
Wales 15,302 1.89 4.00 1.11 1.69 1.67 
West Midlands 15,611 1.89 6.67 6.11 0.00 5.00 
Yorkshire & the 
Humber 15,498 7.55 1.33 3.33 1.69 1.67 
Total - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: figures are for 2014 and have been sourced from the ONS.  Locations of 427 survey respondents were 
recorded at the time of survey completion. 
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Table 3.6 above presents the average weekly household expenditure on food 
and non-alcoholic drinks by region.  The table also includes average weekly household 
expenditure reported by survey respondents by respondent location.  As above for the 
comparison of regional incomes, the levels of spending on groceries and non-alcoholic 
drink reported in the survey are consistent with the levels of expenditure on these items 
in different regions.  This is also consistent with average household expenditure on 
groceries varying between households enjoying different levels of disposable income.  
The next section considers the empirical results we obtained when fitting the data to a 
number of discrete choice model specifications.  In doing so, we also explain the 
weights applied to the data on the basis of population statistics presented in the various 
tables above.  
3.4 Fitting the Data to the Conditional and Mixed Logit Models 
Logistic regression models are frequently used by researchers to estimate data 
obtained through discrete choice experiments.  As outlined in Section 2.3 of the 
methodological chapter, this family of models allows the researcher to assess consumer 
decision-making and preferences in a target population. Developed over 30 years ago, 
Table 3.6 –Average weekly household expenditure on food and non-alcoholic drink by 
UK region and survey respondent average spending by respondents’ location 
Region 
Household 
average weekly 
spending (£) 
£10 - £35 
(%) 
£36 - £61 
(%) 
£62 - 87 
(%) 
£88 - 103 
(%) 
£104+ 
(%) 
United Kingdom 58.20 - - - - - 
East of England 61.70 26.39% 28.33% 27.78% 25.68% 30.19% 
East Midlands 57.80 1.39% 0.83% 1.85% 1.35% 5.66% 
London 62.60 45.83% 34.17% 35.19% 32.43% 37.74% 
North East 49.60 1.39% 0.83% 2.78% 4.05% 1.89% 
North West 54.80 6.94% 8.33% 8.33% 8.11% 7.55% 
Scotland 56.10 2.78% 0.83% 3.70% 5.41% 5.66% 
South East 64.20 1.39% 7.50% 8.33% 10.81% 1.89% 
South West 60.40 2.78% 6.67% 3.70% 4.05% 3.77% 
Wales 53.20 1.39% 4.17% 0.00% 1.35% 1.89% 
West Midlands 55.80 6.94% 3.33% 6.48% 2.70% 3.77% 
Yorkshire & the 
Humber 51.40 2.78% 5.00% 1.85% 4.05% 0.00% 
Total - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: figures are for 2014 and have been sourced from the ONS. Locations of 427 survey respondents were 
recorded at the time of survey completion. 
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McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model has been the most widely used across 
disciplines. The extension of conditional logit model to the mixed logit specification 
represents a more recent development in discrete choice modelling.60    The results 
presented in this section were estimated by fitting the survey data to the conditional and 
mixed logit models in Stata using the commands clogit and mixlogit respectively.   
The main difference between the two model forms is that the conditional logit 
assumes individuals in the population share the same preferences.  In other words, this 
implies that the computed mean coefficients for model attributes are fixed regardless of 
the individual.  However, when estimating the data with the conditional logit 
specification, researchers can include interactions (i.e. covariates) between explanatory 
variables and sociodemographic variables to test for preference heterogeneity (Hole 
2008). We chose to test 39 interactions terms in total in the context of the empirical 
work for both the conditional and mixed logit models.  These results are presented 
further below.   
The interaction terms were chosen on the basis that there may be some variation 
in preferences between certain sociodemographic groups. Specifically, we are 
interested in understanding whether differences in gender, household composition, 
occupation, age, shopping frequency, loyalty card ownership and household income 
account for variation in preferences for grocery retailer attributes.  In addition to being 
able to capture preference heterogeneity, we also rely on the analysis with interaction 
terms to assess whether our results are reasonable and reliable in the sense that they are 
consistent with general underpinnings of microeconomic theory and general common 
sense. For example, on this basis, we anticipate that the interactions will capture 
differences in household income and/ or household size which are typically important 
drivers of spending habits. 
Compared to the structure of the survey questions, for the purposes of the 
empirical work we have redefined new categories of sociodemographic groups in order 
to preserve degrees of freedom.  For example, in the context of the survey, respondents 
were asked whether their ages corresponded to a set range in one of four age categories.  
Whereas, for the purposes of the empirical analysis, we restrict age to two categories 
only: individuals aged 18-45 (“younger”) and individuals aged 45 and above (“older”).  
                                                 
60 Refer to Section 2.3 of the methodological chapter for more details on McFadden’s conditional logit 
model and extension to the mixed logit model specification.   
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Similar reconfigurations have been performed to design the other interaction terms and 
a complete list of these interactions and their corresponding descriptions are all outlined 
in the Appendix under Table A.3.2.   
 The main benefit of the mixed logit model in this specific context, is that 
preference heterogeneity can be captured not only through sociodemographic 
covariates but also through the magnitudes of the estimated standard deviations of the 
random coefficients themselves. The magnitudes of the standard deviations computed 
by running a mixed logit specification, indicate how preferences are distributed among 
individuals in the population of interest. For example, further below in the next section 
of this chapter we include individual-level parameter kernel density graphs depicting 
the likely distribution of preferences (wide vs narrow) around the mean coefficient 
computed through a simulation of responses on the basis of individual-level 
preferences.  
Ahead of fitting our data to the conditional and mixed logit model, we sought 
to control for likely sources of bias through the application of weights. We impose 
weights on the age, income and location categories computed on the basis of 
population-level statistics outlined in Table 3.7 below.61 For the purposes of our 
empirical analysis we sought to collect a representative dataset of UK households 
across the various sociodemographic categories. In particular, to obtain meaningful 
results, we wanted to ensure that the data would be representative of the population in 
terms of known drivers of preferences and spending habits in the population.  In 
addition, given the UK dimension of our study, it was also important for regional 
differences in the sample to be consistent with what is observed in population-level 
data.  In the previous section we compared the sociodemographic characteristics of 
survey respondents to those characteristics found in the general population. In doing 
so, we found that certain categories of households and regions were over or 
underrepresented in our sample.  We note that this may not necessarily be an issue for 
certain types of studies.  However, when studying preferences which exist within the 
general population, or which can be attributed to a specific type of consumer, the quality 
                                                 
61 Both Stata commands clogit and mixlogit accommodate weights through the sub-command fweight. 
See the Stata manual for more details for the description of the different types of weights 
accommodated by the software, https://www.stata.com/manuals13/u11.pdf#u11.1.6weight, (accessed 
24/10/2017) 
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of the study depends on whether the sample is representative of the population of 
interest.   
When population-level characteristics are known, it is possible to compute 
frequency weights to be applied to specific sociodemographic variables in the sample 
of data.62 In other words, frequency weights replicate choices made by individual 
respondents associated with those characteristics which need to be adjusted through 
weighting. The researcher must compute the ratio of the survey to population values to 
determine the appropriate weights to be applied (Stopher 2012, p. 426).  The previous 
section presented the population level statistics which have been used to compute the 
relevant population weights to be applied to the data.  We also note that the Stata 
commands clogit and mixlogit both accommodate frequency weights through the 
fweight sub-command.   Table 3.7 below presents the frequency weights determined on 
the basis of the ratio between the survey and population statistics.   
Table 3.7 – Population Based Frequency Weights 
Demographic Variable Survey (%) Population (%) Frequency Weight 
Age group: Aged 65+ 4.22 22.47 5 
Income group: £13,001-£22,000 17.56 40 2 
Location: North East  2.11 4.17 2 
Location: East Midlands 1.87 7.39 4 
Location: Scotland 3.28 8.52 2 
Location: South East 6.56 14.14 2 
 Location: South West 4.45 8.64 2 
Location: Wales 1.87 4.93 2 
Location: West Midlands 4.68 9.10 2 
Location: Yorkshire & the Humber 3.04 8.54 3 
 
The results presented in this section were derived in Stata after applying the 
weights outlined in the table above.   However, for comparative purposes, we include 
some specifications in the Appendix which do not apply population weights namely 
models CL1 (b) and ML2 (b). A list of all the model specifications and descriptions 
                                                 
62 Stopher, P., Collecting, Managing, and Assessing Data Using Sample Surveys, Chapter 19 “Data 
expansion and weighting”, Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
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discussed in this section can be found in the Appendix under table A.3.1.  In addition 
to the application of weights, when running the various specifications in Stata we 
instruct the software to cluster standard errors at the individual-level.63  In other words, 
this restriction imposes the assumption that a single individual’s preferences do not 
vary between choice situations, however, they can vary between individuals.  This 
restriction ensures that coefficient estimates produce robust standard errors.  We note 
that this does not affect the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients.   
The survey data was set-up to contain an individual respondent identifier code 
captured by variable pid.  Therefore when running the conditional logit model we are 
able to apply the sub-command vce(cluster pid) to cluster standard errors at the 
individual-level.   Similarly for the mixlogit command we use the sub-command 
cluster(pid) to cluster standard errors at the individual-level.  Without clustering, the 
corresponding standard errors and z-statistics are artificially too low and too high 
respectively compared to their true values.64  As above, for comparative purposes some 
of the results presented in the Appendix do not control for robust standard errors.  
However, we note that all the results presented in the main body of this chapter contain 
both robust standard errors and apply population weights. 
This sub-section is structured as follows.  We begin by presenting the results 
obtained when fitting the data to the conditional logit model specification, with and 
without interaction terms.  We then build on the complexity of these models by fitting 
the data to a number of different mixed logit specifications.  For example, we test the 
impact of imposing different distributional assumptions on certain variables, including 
the log-normal and standard normal distributions.  In evaluating the results, we compare 
the goodness of fit of the different models by performing the likelihood ratio test using 
the χ2 distribution.   
Among the results presented in this section, we place the most emphasis on the 
estimates obtained when fitting the data to two mixed logit model specifications ML2 
and ML4.  The first is the mixed logit model without interaction terms and the second 
includes statistically significant interaction terms.  However, as noted above, we begin 
                                                 
63 See guidance on clustering standard errors in Stata in different contexts contained in the following 
presentation “Clustered Errors in Stata” https://www.stata.com/meeting/13uk/nichols_crse.pdf, 
(accessed 24/10/2017) 
64 See for example the differences in estimated standard errors between CL and CL (a) where model 
CL clusters standard errors at the individual-level and model CL (a) does not.  Standard errors are 
higher for model CL than CL (a).     
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this section by considering the less complex model specifications.  As such, we first 
consider the results in Table 3.8 for conditional logit models CL1 without interactions 
and CL2 with interactions between the explanatory variables and respondent 
sociodemographic characteristics.  
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Table 3.8 – Conditional logit models CL1 & CL2 
 CL1 CL2 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| O.R. Coef. |z-stat| O.R. 
Price -0.054*** (0.006) 
9.34 0.947 -0.046*** 
(0.015) 
3.05 0.955 
Discount 0.009*** (0.001) 
6.17 1.009 0.017*** 
(0.005) 
3.73 1.017 
Time -0.061*** (0.009) 
6.91 0.941 -0.111*** 
(0.023) 
4.79 0.895 
Medium Quality 0.558*** (0.122) 
4.58 1.746 0.562*** 
(0.128) 
4.39 1.754 
High Quality 0.555*** (0.138) 
4.02 1.741 0.558*** 
(0.148) 
3.77 1.747 
Very High Quality 0.830*** (0.150) 
5.54 2.292 1.015*** 
(0.202) 
5.04 2.760 
Medium Range 0.707*** (0.105) 
6.72 2.027 0.898*** 
(0.115) 
7.78 1.978 
High Range 0.924*** (0.127) 
7.28 2.519 0.833*** 
(0.145) 
5.75 2.454 
Very High Range 1.047*** (0.112) 
9.38 2.850 1.199*** 
(0.154) 
7.8 2.588 
Medium Service 0.845*** (0.107) 
7.90 2.327 0.682*** 
(0.106) 
6.45 2.455 
High Service 0.988*** (0.122) 
8.11 2.687 0.898*** 
(0.129) 
6.97 2.300 
Very High Service 1.152*** (0.144) 
7.99 3.165 0.951*** 
(0.209) 
4.55 3.316 
Female*Price       -0.012 (0.011) 
1.11 0.988 
Female*Discount    0.002 (0.003) 
0.68 1.002 
Female*Time    -0.024 (0.019) 
1.27 0.976 
Female*VH Quality    -0.474** (0.192) 
2.46 0.623 
Female*VH Range    0.013 (0.168) 
0.08 1.013 
Female*High Service     0.077 (0.166) 
0.47 1.080 
Large Household*Price        0.017 (0.011) 
1.52 1.017 
Large Household*Discount         0.005* (0.003) 
1.89 1.005 
Large Household*VH Range    -0.129 (0.169) 
0.76 0.879 
Unemployed*Price       -0.019 (0.014) 
1.31 0.981 
Student*Price     0.013 (0.012) 
1.15 1.013 
Unemployed*Discount      0.002 (0.005) 
0.31 1.002 
Student*Discount        0.0004 (0.004) 
0.1 1.000 
Unemployed*Time      0.0158 (0.035) 
0.45 1.016 
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Student*Time     -0.038 (0.025) 
1.49 0.963 
No Car*Time    -0.0055 (0.017) 
0.31 0.995 
No Car*VH Range    0.281 (0.181) 
1.55 1.324 
18 – 44 Age Group*Price       -0.026** (0.013) 
2.04 0.974 
18 – 44 Age Group*Discount       -0.001 (0.003) 
0.48 0.999 
< £22,000 HI*Price       -0.016 (0.011) 
1.41 0.984 
> £45,000 HI*Price       0.021 (0.016) 
1.33 1.021 
> £45,000 HI*Discount    -0.004 (0.004) 
0.94 0.996 
> £45,000 HI*VH Quality       0.356 (0.234) 
1.52 1.427 
> £45,000 HI*High Service      0.542 (0.176) 
3.07 1.719 
< £22,000 HI*Discount       -0.003 (0.003) 
1.08 0.997 
> £45,000 HI*Time        0.036 (0.023) 
1.58 1.037 
Frequent Online Shop*Price       0.044*** (0.011) 
4.08 1.045 
Frequent Online Shop*Discount       -0.001 (0.003) 
0.22 0.999 
Frequent Online Shop*Time       0.070*** (0.018) 
4.00 1.073 
Infrequent Online Shop*Price       -0.010 (0.011) 
0.89 0.990 
Infrequent Online 
Shop*Discount       
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.99 0.997 
Infrequent  Online Shop*Time        0.026 (0.019) 
1.41 1.027 
Infrequent Online Shop*VH 
Range       
-0.014 
(0.180) 
0.08 0.986 
No Loyalty Cards*Price        0.008 (0.013) 
0.66 1.008 
No Loyalty Cards*Discount    -0.014*** (0.004) 
3.52 0.987 
No Loyalty Cards*Time     0.040* (0.023) 
1.71 1.040 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Time     0.020 (0.019) 
1.05 1.020 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Discount       -0.005 (0.003) 
1.64 0.995 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Price      -0.003 (0.012) 
0.21 0.997 
Log-likelihood -5204.184     -4942.885   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18,832   18,832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, next to coefficients represents statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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The above table shows that the estimates for model CL1 are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  The estimates show that prices are an important determinant 
of grocery retailer choice, however the non-price store characteristics also impact the 
odds of a consumer choosing a given retailer.  Let take a closer look at these results.  
The above table contains the mean coefficients of the explanatory variables with the 
robust standard errors presented below these values in parentheses.  The table also 
includes columns for z-statistics and the mean coefficient values transformed to odds 
ratios.  The z-values which correspond to the mean coefficients indicate the relative 
explanatory power of the various attributes in respondents’ choice of grocery retailer.  
The attributes with the largest z-values are the grocery basket price, very high level of 
product range, high level of service, loyalty scheme discount and time travelling to the 
store. The relative magnitudes of the z-statistics in model CL1 indicate that presence of 
a very high range of products in a grocery store and the average basket price account 
for the most variation in choice of grocery retailer.   
The mean coefficient estimates themselves for models CL1 and CL2 in Table 3.8 
are in the form of log of odds ratios. These values can be interpreted as relative weights 
that are assigned to the attributes in the underlying utility function set up by the analyst.  
At times researchers refer to the coefficient estimates as probabilities but these are in 
fact logit probabilities and should be interpreted accordingly. A basic logistic regression 
model can be expressed as logit(p)=log(p/(1-p)) = ß0x0 +…+ßkxk , where p is the overall 
probability of choosing a given retailer and p/(1-p) expresses this probability in the 
form of an odds ratio.65 To facilitate the interpretation the estimated coefficients we 
have calculated the odds ratios by computing the exponent of the mean coefficient 
values using the post-estimation “or” command in Stata 12.  The log(odds) is converted 
to odds by taking the exponent of the coefficients produced by Stata for attribute k, in 
other words calculating 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘. We include these values under the columns titled O.R. i.e. 
odds ratios. 
Looking at the value  of the odds ratio for price, our results show that keeping 
everything else constant, a unit increase in the average weekly basket price leads to a 
5% reduction, on average, in the odds of choosing a particular grocery retailer. On the 
other hand, for every unit increase in the annual loyalty discount, the odds of choosing 
                                                 
65 We follow the guidance of UCLA Statistical Consulting Group for interpreting coefficient values and 
corresponding odds ratios in logistic regression models which has been obtained from 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/odds_ratio.htm 
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a given retailer go up by 1%. The effect of increasing drive time to the grocery store is 
quite large in comparison to these two variables. For every additional minute of drive 
time the odds of store visit go down by 6%.   The estimated coefficient and odds ratio 
values for the qualitative dummy coded variables can be interpreted as a marginal 
movement from the base level ‘low’ to either ‘medium’, ‘high’ or to the ‘very high’ 
level.  The likelihood of the consumer selecting a particular retailer goes up 
significantly as the available product range in the store increases across these levels.  A 
similar relationship is observed for the other qualitative variables. The estimates reveal 
a strong preference for very high levels of service whereby the odds of choosing a 
retailer go up 3 times when we move from low level of service to very high.  
In addition to testing the statistical significance of individual parameters, we use 
the χ2 likelihood ratio test as a measure for the goodness of fit of each respective model.  
This is computed automatically by Stata.  The likelihood ratio test (“LR”) is an 
important tool to assess the overall goodness of fit of a model that is based on using 
maximum likelihood estimation procedures (Louviere et al. 2000, pp. 53-55). This test 
is also useful when fitting the data to several model specifications because it allows the 
analyst to measure and compare the goodness of fit different model forms. We use the 
log-likelihood values obtained from the Stata output to manually compare structurally 
similar models to each other.  
For an individual model, the test statistic is automatically calculated by Stata 
using the formula 2*(‘log-likelihood of constrained model’ – ‘log-likelihood at 
convergence’) or alternatively as 2*(‘log-likelihood at convergence of less restrictive 
model’ – ‘log-likelihood at convergence more restrictive model’), with degree of 
freedom equal to the number of explanatory variables included in the model. The 
calculated test statistic is then compared to a critical value of the chi-square distribution 
with respect to the degrees of freedom. Stata automatically performs this statistical test 
when producing the output containing the estimated results.  In the context of model 
CL1 we have very low p-value and reject the null hypothesis that the predictors 
included in the model have no explanatory power (χ2(12)=245.24). 
Let us now consider model CL2 results, where we have included the 39 
interaction terms we wanted to test for statistical significance.  Out of these 39 
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interactions 7 were found to be significant.66 These terms were: “Female x very high 
quality”, “living in a household with 4 or more individuals x loyalty discount”, “aged 
18-44 x price”, “purchases groceries at least 1/ month x price”, “purchases groceries at 
least 1/ month x travel time to store”, “does not own loyalty cards x loyalty discount”, 
“does not own loyalty cards x travel time to store”.  We re-ran a new specification of 
the conditional logit and included these significant interaction terms.  Following this 
process we eliminated a further three interaction terms.  The model containing only 
significant interaction terms is titled model CL3 and includes the interaction terms: 
“Female x very high quality”, “purchases groceries at least 1/ month x price”, 
“purchases groceries at least 1/ month x travel time to store” and “does not own loyalty 
cards x loyalty discount”.  In interpreting the results, it should be noted that each of the 
interaction terms’ corresponding coefficient values enter the model in an additive way. 
For example, the mean effect of a unit increase in the average basket price for 
individuals who shop online at least once a month, will be equal to the mean coefficient 
for price plus the mean coefficient of the interaction term “purchases groceries at least 
1/ month x price”. The results for this specification are presented in Table 3.9 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 We note that by clustering standard errors at the individual level the estimated standard errors are 
higher and thus there are fewer of significant interaction terms than without clustering.  Nonetheless, 
by clustering standard errors in this way have obtained more reliable results. 
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Let us first compare the log-likelihoods at convergence for CL1 and CL3.  There 
is an improvement in the overall significance of the model following the inclusion of 
covariates. The LR test outlined above can also be used to directly compare the 
goodness of fit between two models by testing the significance of the omitted 
predictors, 4 covariates in this case. The test statistic can be calculated as 2*(-
5083.8893+5204.1841) = 120.295 at 4 degrees of freedom (χ2(4)= 120.295). This figure 
implies a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level that the addition of the 
covariates does not improve the goodness of fit of the model. 
 
Table 3.9 – Conditional logit model CL3 
Variable             Coef. |z-stat| O.R. 
Price -0.068*** (0.008) 
-8.82 0.934 
Discount 0.011*** (0.002) 
6.78 1.011 
Time -0.085*** (0.011) 
-7.84 0.919 
Medium Quality 0.551*** (0.124) 
4.44 1.734 
High Quality 0.554*** (0.142) 
3.91 1.740 
Very High Quality 1.152*** (0.209) 
5.51 3.164 
Medium Range 0.699*** (0.106) 
6.63 2.013 
High Range 0.917*** (0.128) 
7.16 2.502 
Very High Range 1.032*** (0.111) 
9.29 2.807 
Medium Service 0.862*** (0.110) 
7.82 2.368 
High Service 0.983*** (0.125) 
7.83 2.673 
Very High Service 1.169*** (0.147) 
7.96 3.218 
Female*VH Quality -0.563*** (0.202) 
-2.79 0.570 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Price 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
3.43 1.039 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Time    
0.069*** 
(0.016) 
4.42 1.072 
No Loyalty 
Cards*Discount 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-3.25 0.989 
Log-likelihood -5083.889  
 
Nr. of Resp. 427   
Nr. of Obs. 18832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, next to 
coefficients represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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In interpreting the interaction between the price variable and online shopping 
frequency, we note that preferences for basket price can to some degree be interpreted 
as a proxy for relative price sensitivity between groups of consumers.67 In other words, 
a more negative coefficient for a given average basket price interaction term indicates 
greater price sensitivity relative to other groups.  In this context, our results show that 
individuals who are frequent online shoppers of groceries products (i.e. shop online for 
groceries at least once a month) are relatively less price sensitive than those who never 
shop online or shop online only a few times a year.  In addition those who prefer to 
shop online also care less about the travel time to the store.   Furthermore, the results 
show that there are gender differences in preferences for very high quality products in 
store.  We find that female shoppers care less about this attribute than male grocery 
shoppers when choosing between retailers.  The results also show that households that 
tend not to participate in any loyalty schemes, care less about receiving a loyalty 
discount when choosing between grocery retailers.  This is compared to those 
individuals who do participate in loyalty schemes and would prefer to have a loyalty 
discount offered by the grocery retailer.  All the main explanatory variables and 
interaction terms in the results table are significant at the 1% level. 
Having discussed the main results of the conditional logit model, we continue this 
section by presenting and discussing the main results obtained by running the mixed 
logit specifications.  One of the considerations when fitting the data to the mixed logit 
model is to decide which coefficients should be fixed and which will be allowed to vary 
between individuals (Greene & Hensher 2003, Hole 2007a). The coefficients assumed 
to be random will capture preference heterogeneity in the data.  This effect is contained 
in the estimated standard deviations of their respective mean coefficients.  Statistically 
significant standard deviations suggest that the preferences exhibit heterogeneity for 
that attribute (i.e. variable).  The analyst must also decide which type of distribution to 
impose on the respective attribute coefficients which are allowed to vary between 
respondents. The most commonly known, and widely used approach, applies the 
normal distribution to obtain the parameter values through maximum simulated log-
likelihood estimation (“MSLE”).  
A key feature of the mixed logit model is that it relies on simulation methods.  
This is discussed at greater length in the methodological chapter when the choice of 
                                                 
67 This interpretation of the price variable should be considered with caution as this is merely a proxy.   
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econometric model is discussed.  One of the assumptions that the researcher must 
consider when running the mixed logit specification, is the number of draws to assume. 
The main trade-off between using low versus a high number of draws is that as the 
number of draws goes up, the accuracy of estimates increases at the expense of 
increased computational time (Hole 2007). Following Hole (2007), when trialling 
different model specifications we began the process by using only 50 Halton draws, 
which is the lowest recommended number.  For comparative purposes, some of these 
results are presented in the Appendix, for example model ML2 (c).  It is worth noting 
that the literature suggests that at 500 draws, coefficients converge to their true value 
(Hole 2007, Greene & Hensher 2003).   The mixed logit specification results presented 
below have all be estimated using 500 Halton draws. 
Let us first consider mixed logit models ML1 and ML2 where we have applied 
the normal distribution to the coefficients assumed to be random when running the 
specifications in Stata.  These results are presented in Table 3.10 below.  To test all 
attributes for presence of preference heterogeneity, model ML1 assumes that all the 
variable coefficients are distributed randomly following a normal distribution.  In this 
specification, not all of the estimated standard deviations were found to be significant 
and alternative specifications were run in Stata.  Model ML2 presents the results of the 
model with only significant standard deviations. Preferences were found to vary among 
households for the average basket price, loyalty discount, travel time, very high quality, 
very high range and high levels of service.  The p-values for these standard deviations 
are small suggesting we can reject the null hypothesis of all standard deviations being 
equal to zero (Hole 2007).    
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Table 3.10 – Mixed logit models ML1 & ML2 
 ML1 ML2 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. 
Price -0.091*** 
(0.009) 
10.5 -0.068*** 
(0.008) 
-0.090*** 
(0.009) 
9.62 0.067*** 
(0.009) 
Discount 0.013*** 
(0.002) 
5.34 -0.027*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
4.91 0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Time -0.110*** 
(0.015) 
7.47 0.118*** 
(0.015) 
-0.102*** 
(0.014) 
7.25 0.106*** 
(0.015) 
Medium Quality 0.516*** 
(0.163) 
3.17 -0.500*** 
(0.180) 
0.475*** 
(0.158) 
3.00 
- 
High Quality 0.603*** 
(0.199) 
3.03 0.423*** 
(0.202) 
0.573*** 
(0.193) 
2.98 
- 
Very High 
Quality 
0.864*** 
(0.195) 
4.44 0.750*** 
(0.192) 
0.840*** 
(0.183) 
4.58 0.696*** 
(0.187) 
Medium Range 0.758*** 
(0.143) 
5.31 -0.020 
(0.113) 
0.740*** 
(0.135) 
5.49 
- 
High Range 1.008*** 
(0.170) 
5.92 -0.002 
(0.116) 
0.984*** 
(0.164) 
6.02 
- 
Very High Range 1.206*** 
(0.161) 
7.49 0.947*** 
(0.139) 
1.201*** 
(0.157) 
7.65 0.882*** 
(0.142) 
Medium Service 1.156*** 
(0.161) 
7.2 -0.342 
(0.226) 
1.127*** 
(0.154) 
7.31 
- 
High Service 1.364*** 
(0.166) 
8.22 0.752*** 
(0.180) 
1.340*** 
(0.161) 
8.33 0.721*** 
(0.162) 
Very High 
Service 
1.484*** 
(0.212) 
7.00 0.369 
(0.225) 
1.403*** 
(0.203) 
6.91 
- 
Log-likelihood -4627.524   -4647.902   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18,832   18,832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
In the analysis of results we refer to ML2 estimates where estimated coefficient 
and standard deviation values were found to be significant at the 1% level.   Following 
Train (2009, pp. 149) we interpret the mean coefficient estimates using the cumulative 
standard normal distribution given by Φ(-bk/sk) with mean bk and standard deviation sk.  
By applying this approach, we find that individuals have preferences for lower prices. 
Using the above formula and with reference to a z-table, we determine that 9% of the 
distribution in preferences for the average basket price is above zero and 91% is below 
zero. This means that lower average basket prices are an attractive grocery retailer 
feature for 92% of consumers while 8% of consumers choose to shop at more expensive 
retailers and/ or are not insensitive to the higher price. On the other hand, 68% of 
consumers prefer choosing a grocery retailer that offers a loyalty rewarding scheme and 
corresponding discount, while 32% of consumers do not care about the discount aspect 
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of the grocery retailer’s offering.  In terms of travel time to the store, 83% of consumers 
have a preference for a grocery retailer at a closer proximity, while just 17% are willing 
and/ or indifferent about travel further distances to a grocery store. Almost all 
consumers would prefer to frequent stores that offer a high level of service and very 
high quality products. 97% of households are attracted to stores with high service levels.  
In terms of service levels, 91% of households prefer stores with very high levels of 
product range and 89% households are attracted to stores with products that are of very 
high quality.   
We re-ran the above mixed logit model by including the 39 interaction terms that 
were tested as part of the conditional logit model specification.  Of these 39 interactions, 
8 were found to be statistically significant.  We then ran another specification including 
only these significant interaction terms.  Results for both of these models, which have 
been labelled ML3 and ML4 respectively, are presented in Table 3.11 below. 
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Table 3.11 – Mixed logit models ML3 & ML4 
 ML3 ML4 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. 
Price -0.059*** (0.023) -2.61 
0.051*** 
(0.009) 
-0.081*** 
(0.014) 6.01 
0.058*** 
(0.008) 
Discount 0.023*** (0.007) 3.32 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 4.83 
0.025*** 
(0.003) 
Time -0.150*** (0.035) -4.25 
0.096*** 
(0.017) 
-0.129*** 
(0.016) 8.3 
0.103*** 
(0.014) 
Medium Quality 0.502*** (0.158) 3.18 - 
0.489*** 
(0.159) 3.07  
High Quality 0.602*** (0.196) 3.08 - 
0.588*** 
(0.196) 3.01  
Very High Quality 1.101*** (0.245) 4.5 
0.652*** 
(0.174) 
1.161*** 
(0.243) 4.78 
0.675*** 
(0.187) 
Medium Range 0.738*** (0.132) 5.57 - 
0.737*** 
(0.134) 5.51  
High Range 0.978*** (0.161) 6.08 - 
0.982*** 
(0.163) 6.01  
Very High Range 1.110*** (0.274) 4.06 
0.923*** 
(0.131) 
1.029*** 
(0.171) 6.00 
0.897*** 
(0.134) 
Medium Service 1.137*** (0.156) 7.31 - 
1.136*** 
(0.156) 7.29  
High Service 1.110*** (0.177) 6.27 
0.719*** 
(0.143) 
1.260*** 
(0.169) 7.47 
0.701*** 
(0.147) 
Very High Service 1.426*** (0.206) 6.91 - 
1.418*** 
(0.206) 6.87 - 
Female*Price     -0.017 (0.017) -1.05  - - - 
Female*Discount 0.002 (0.005) 0.55  - - - 
Female*Time -0.033 (0.028) -1.16  - - - 
Female*VH Quality -0.579** (0.238) -2.44  
-0.571** 
(0.237) -2.41  
Female*VH Range 0.027 (0.226) 0.12  - - - 
Female*High Service  0.202 (0.200) 1.01  - - - 
Large Household*Price     0.024 (0.015) 1.61  - - - 
Large 
Household*Discount      
0.008* 
(0.005) 1.72  
0.009* 
(0.005) 1.86  
Large Household*VH 
Range 
-0.182 
(0.224) -0.81  - - - 
Unemployed*Price    -0.019 (0.018) -1.08  - - - 
Student*Price  0.016 (0.014) 1.14  - - - 
Unemployed*Discount   -0.002 (0.009) -0.18  - - - 
Student*Discount     -0.002 (0.005) -0.31  - - - 
Unemployed*Time   0.021 (0.042) 0.5  - - - 
Student*Time  -0.038 -1.1  - - - 
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(0.035) 
No Car*Time -0.003 (0.026) -0.11  - - - 
No Car*VH Range 0.463** (0.230) 2.01  
0.421* 
(0.250) 1.68 - 
18 – 44 Age Group*Price    -0.027 (0.019) -1.45  - - - 
18 – 44 Age 
Group*Discount    
-0.002 
(0.005) -0.39  - - - 
< £22,000 HI*Price    -0.025* (0.015) -1.65  
-0.038*** 
(0.014) -2.79 - 
> £45,000 HI*Price    0.006 (0.031) 0.2  - - - 
> £45,000 HI*Discount -0.006 (0.006) -0.87  - - - 
> £45,000 HI*VH Quality    0.377 (0.293) 1.29  - - - 
> £45,000 HI*High 
Service   
0.530** 
(0.235) 2.26  
0.374* 
(0.228) 1.64 - 
< £22,000 HI*Discount    -0.008 (0.005) -1.61    - 
> £45,000 HI*Time     0.043 (0.043) 1.01  - - - 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Price    
0.050*** 
(0.013) 3.82  
0.044*** 
(0.014) 3.14  
Frequent Online 
Shop*Discount    
0.000 
(0.005) -0.05  - - - 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Time    
0.090*** 
(0.023) 3.89  
0.088*** 
(0.023) 3.89  
Infrequent Online 
Shop*Price    
-0.012 
(0.014) -0.83  - - - 
Infrequent Online 
Shop*Discount    
-0.004 
(0.005) -0.81  - - - 
Infrequent  Online 
Shop*Time     
0.034 
(0.024) 1.41  - - - 
Infrequent Online 
Shop*VH Range    
-0.061 
(0.239) -0.25  - - - 
No Loyalty Cards*Price     0.009 (0.016) 0.57  - - - 
No Loyalty 
Cards*Discount 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) -2.86  
-0.017*** 
(0.004) -3.96  
No Loyalty Cards*Time  0.051 (0.032) 1.59  - - - 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Time  0.016 (0.026) 0.59  - - - 
1-2 Loyalty 
Cards*Discount    
-0.006 
(0.005) -1.34  - - - 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Price   -0.010 (0.018) -0.58  - - - 
Log-likelihood -4527.994   -4574.406   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18832   18832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, next to coefficients represents 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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The four interaction terms found to be significant in the conditional logit model 
specification, are also significant when fitting the data to the mixed logit model. In 
addition, the mixed logit model represents an improvement over the conditional logit 
specification as it picked up additional, statistically significant variation in the data.  In 
addition to producing larger estimated coefficient values for the attributes, the above 
results contain a further 4 significant interactions compared to CL3.  The statistical 
significance of these terms varies between 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.  The 
additional covariates found to be significant by running the mixed logit model are: 
“living in a household of 4 or more individuals x discount”, “not driving a car to go 
grocery shopping x very high range”, “household income under £22,000 x price” and 
“household income above £45,000 x high level of service”.   
The two latter interactions capture differences in preferences between higher and 
lower income groups.  Shoppers who have lower disposable household incomes, prefer 
lower prices and are likely to be more sensitive to price when choosing between 
retailers. On the other hand individuals who enjoy higher disposable household incomes 
care less about price and prefer having a high level of service in store when choosing 
between retailers.  In addition, large households prefer a grocery retailer who offers a 
loyalty discount and those who do not drive a car to go grocery shopping prefer 
choosing a grocery retailer who offers a very high range of products in store.  
The distribution of preferences implied by the estimated standard deviations are 
similar to what we observe in model ML2.  92% of respondents prefer a grocery retailer 
who charges lower average basket prices while 69% of respondents prefer to shop at a 
store where they can obtain a loyalty discount.  In terms of store proximity, 89% of 
respondents prefer to travel shorter distances to the grocery store.  While 96% of 
individuals prefer grocery retailers who offer very high quality of products, 87% prefer 
very high range of products in store and 96% prefer high levels of service at the grocery 
store.  Considering the above, the loyalty scheme attribute exhibits the most variation 
in preferences between individuals in the sample.   
We refer to the LR test to compare the goodness-of-fit between models ML2 
(without interactions) and ML4 (with significant interactions). At 8 degrees of freedom 
we have χ2(8)= 73.496.  This figure is greater than the critical value at 8 d.f. and 
therefore implies a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level that the addition of 
the covariates does not improve the goodness of fit of the model. We now consider 
alternative distributional assumptions accommodated by the mixed logit model which 
168 
 
may be imposed on the variables assumed to be random instead of the normal 
distribution.    
The mixed logit models discussed above assumed the normal distribution for the 
coefficients.  However, there are other distributions which can also be applied to the 
modelling. Other less well known distributions, also more rarely discussed in the 
literature, are the uniform, triangular and lognormal (Greene & Hensher 2003). The 
uniform and triangular distributions will generally report the same or similar values for 
parameter estimates as when assuming the normal (Greene & Hensher 2003). In 
contrast, the imposition of a lognormal distribution can lead to different estimates and 
create additional challenges as compared to assuming simply normally distributed 
coefficients. Namely, problems relating to non-convergence and complexities 
associated with the calculation of willingness-to-pay estimates (Greene & Hensher 
2003). However, the main benefit of the lognormal distribution is that it restricts 
coefficient values to be either positive or negative for all individuals which may 
improve the results of the model in some cases. This may be desirable for variables 
such as price, which is likely to always have a negative coefficient value for individuals. 
This type of distributional assumption may be desirable if the researcher knows 
for certain whether a change in the value of the attribute, will either increase or decrease 
total utility for that absolute vast majority of consumers within the population. For 
example, the researcher can say for certain that the costs incurred of choosing a given 
alternative will always have a negative impact on utility (Train 2009, pp. 149-150). The 
evidence overall is mixed with regards to the benefits of the lognormal because in some 
cases it will improve or reduce the goodness of fit of the data (Hole 2008). In this 
context, the researcher must decide which assumptions are appropriate for their 
particular data by comparing the results of different model specifications. The mixlogit 
command in Stata 12 allows the analyst to either impose a normal or lognormal 
distribution by adjusting the underlying command syntax and adjusting the variable 
assumed to be log-normally distributed (Hole 2007).  
When fitting the data to the mixed logit model we wanted to compare if restricting 
the sign of some of the coefficient values, either being positive or negative, would 
improve the quality and explanatory power of our results. In doing so, we impose an 
assumption in the modelling that both the average weekly basket price and travel time 
to the store represent a direct cost to the consumer and subtract from gained utility. 
With respect to the other variables in the data, it was not obvious whether they would 
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result either only positive or negative coefficient values for all respondents and were 
therefore assumed to follow a normal distribution as in the other mixed logit 
specifications.  Table 3.12 below presents the results of two mixed logit specifications 
which assume that price and time are randomly distributed following a log-normal 
distribution.  Model ML5 contains only the main explanatory variables while model 
ML6 contains 11 significant interaction terms.  The results for the model which restricts 
time and price to be log-normally distributed and contains the 39 candidate interactions 
terms is labelled model ML6 (a) and can be found in the Appendix under Table A.3.7. 
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Table 3.12 – Mixed logit models ML5 & ML6 
 ML5 ML6 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. 
Price -0.120*** (0.020) 
5.87 0.180*** 
(0.063) 
-0.127*** 
(0.021) 
10.79 0.135*** 
(0.062) 
Discount 0.014*** (0.003) 
5.55 0.024*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
6.04 0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Time -0.178*** (0.041) 
4.32 
- 
-0.124*** 
(0.026) 
8.78 0.194*** 
(0.064) 
Medium Quality 0.441*** (0.160) 
2.76 
- 
0.439*** 
(0.166) 
2.64 
- 
High Quality 0.537*** (0.191) 
2.81 
- 
0.534*** 
(0.199) 
2.68 
- 
Very High Quality 0.878*** (0.187) 
4.7 0.607** 
(0.244) 
1.194*** 
(0.256) 
4.67 0.598*** 
(0.193) 
Medium Range 0.710*** (0.134) 
5.3 
- 
0.685*** 
(0.134) 
5.1 
- 
High Range 0.945*** (0.160) 
5.91 
- 
0.921*** 
(0.164) 
5.63 
- 
Very High Range 1.145*** (0.156) 
7.36 0.901*** 
(0.131) 
0.947*** 
(0.175) 
5.4 0.874*** 
(0.135) 
Medium Service 1.090*** (0.154) 
7.09 
- 
1.124*** 
(0.155) 
7.26 
- 
High Service 1.298*** (0.156) 
8.31 0.720*** 
(0.153) 
1.194*** 
(0.173) 
6.89 0.683 
(0.145) 
Very High Service 1.416*** (0.204) 
6.93 
- 
1.405*** 
(0.208) 
6.77 
- 
Female*Time    
-0.047** 
(0.024) 
1.96 
- 
Female*VH Quality    
-0.595** 
(0.244) 
2.44 
- 
Large Household*Price        
0.025** 
(0.012) 
2.02 
- 
Unemployed*Price       
-0.028** 
(0.014) 
2.04 
- 
No Car*VH Range    0.443* (0.247) 
1.79 - 
< £22,000 HI*Price       -0.025* (0.014) 
1.83 - 
> £45,000 HI*Price       0.040** (0.019) 
2.09 - 
> £45,000 HI*High Service      0.464** (0.233) 
1.99 - 
Frequent Online Shop*Price       0.039*** (0.014) 
2.9 - 
Frequent Online Shop*Time       0.090*** (0.019) 
4.77 - 
No Loyalty Cards*Discount    -0.018*** (0.005) 
3.65 - 
Log-likelihood -4656.764   -4538.897   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18832   18832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, next to coefficients represents 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.    
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The results table shows that all variables in ML5 are significant at the 1% level.  
Compared to model ML2, where all coefficients followed a normal distribution, 
coefficients for time and price are restricted to being only negative in the population for 
model ML5.  This assumption has had an impact on the magnitudes of the mean 
coefficients for price and time which are now visibly more negative in model ML5 than 
ML2.  In addition, the variable representing the loyalty scheme discount has a relatively 
larger coefficient value than in specification ML2.  However, if we compare the log-
likelihood values at convergence between ML2 and ML6, the normal distribution 
assumption for all the coefficients results in a slightly better fitting model. This result 
is only indicative, however, the fact that the normal distribution results in a slightly 
better fitting model is consistent with the evidence from the literature (Greene & 
Hensher 2003, Hole 2008). 
 Considering model ML6 results, the addition of interactions results in more 
negative coefficient values for price and time and a bigger positive coefficient value for 
the discount variable.  In addition, the interaction terms found to be significant are not 
strictly that same as in the previous specification ML4 and these also vary in their 
statistical significance levels.  When running model ML6, the results pick up gender 
differences in preferences for travel time to the store.  In other words, we find that the 
effect of being female leads to a more negative coefficient for the time attribute 
indicating that women shoppers are more sensitive to the location of the store than their 
male counterparts.  In these results, the covariate “household income is greater than 
£45,000 x price” is statistically significant at the 5% level, further evidencing the 
differences in price sensitivity between households earning meaningfully different 
disposable incomes.  The interaction between the lowest income category and price is 
also significant but only at the 10% level.    
We also find that respondents who indicated they were unemployed prefer 
grocery retailers who offer lower average basket prices indicating these individuals are 
likely to be more price sensitive than individuals in other occupations.  In this model, 
the interaction between large household size and discount is no longer significant.  
Instead, the interaction between large household size (i.e. 4 or more people) and price 
is significant indicating that large households have a preference for lower average 
basket prices when choosing between grocery retailers and are likely to be more price 
sensitive.    Applying the LR test to compare models ML5 and ML6, we can reject the 
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null hypothesis that the addition of 11 interaction terms does not constitute an 
improvement over the more restricted model (χ2(11)= 117.867).  
As noted at the beginning of this section, we place the most weight on models 
ML2 and ML4 with 8 interaction terms in the context of the discussion of results.  These 
models represent an improvement over the conditional logit specifications by 
accommodating unobservable (i.e. not tied to covariates) preference heterogeneity 
between individuals captured in the standard deviations of coefficients.  We note that 
these models assume the normal distribution, which according to the literature is the 
least restrictive assumption to impose on the coefficients assumed to be random.  
Further, the preferred specifications apply 500 Halton draws, include population 
weights and cluster standard errors at the individual level.   Before proceeding to the 
discussion section, we present additional results obtained using the post-estimation 
commands for the mixlogit in Stata 12, including willingness-to-pay and individual-
level parameter estimates. 
3.5    Willingness-to-Pay & Individual-Level Parameter Estimation 
In this section we present willingness-to-pay estimates for different grocery 
retailer attributes.  Further below we include some graphical representations of the 
distributions of preferences using individual-level mean coefficients estimates. The 
purpose of computing willingness-to-pay estimates is to provide a sense of ordered 
preferences for the attributes included in this DCE.  The WTP estimates were calculated 
using estimates obtained by using the estimates from the conditional logit models CL1 
and CL3 and by running additional mixed logit model specifications with fixed price 
coefficients. The analysis of WTP estimates, offers an additional means to interpret the 
results by identifying the relative importance of attributes in an ordered and simple way 
(Hole & Kolstad 2012).   
In the context of the below results, we highlight that our experiment was not 
designed to produce precise WTP estimates. This task would have required very 
specific considerations in the survey design in terms of carefully designed variation in 
price levels displayed to respondents between choice situations.  As such, the estimates 
of the WTP for various attributes should be interpreted with caution.  The results in this 
section have been derived by applying a commonly used approach that requires running 
a model specification using a fixed cost coefficient (Hole & Kolstad 2012). While it 
may be unreasonable to assume that the effect of price is the same for all individuals, 
using a fixed monetary cost coefficient is convenient as it overcomes many modelling 
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issues in random parameter models such as ours (Bliemer & Rose 2013, Hole & Kolstad 
2012).  In current literature there are other, newer and more advanced approaches for 
modelling WTP.  However, these approaches are beyond the focus and scope of this 
paper.   
Following the approach outlined above, we assume that attribute k has a fixed 
coefficient equal to 𝜷𝜷𝒌𝒌.  In the case of our data, we assume a fixed cost coefficient 𝜷𝜷𝒄𝒄, 
which is the average basket price. We can then express willingness-to-pay as: 𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾𝒌𝒌 =
−𝜷𝜷𝒌𝒌/𝜷𝜷𝒄𝒄.  The below Table 3.13 presents the WTP estimates computed on the basis of 
model CL1 and CL3 coefficient estimates.  
Table 3.13 – Models CL1 & CL3 Willingness-to-Pay Estimates (95% Confidence 
Intervals) 
 CL1 CL3 
Grocery Retailer 
Attribute 
Average 
WTP 
(£) 
Lower 
bound 
(£) 
Upper 
bound 
(£) 
Average 
WTP 
(£) 
Lower 
bound 
(£) 
Upper 
bound 
(£) 
Grocery Basket Price - - - - - - 
Loyalty Scheme Discount 0.17 0.11 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.22 
Travel Time to Store (mins) -1.13 -1.43 -0.82 -1.24 -1.55 -0.93 
Medium Quality 10.26 5.93 14.58 8.06 4.41 11.71 
High Quality 10.20 5.15 15.25 8.11 3.88 12.34 
Very High Quality 15.26 9.53 20.99 16.86 9.88 23.84 
Medium Range 13.00 8.87 17.13 10.24 6.84 13.63 
High Range 17.00 11.78 22.22 13.42 9.08 17.76 
Very High Range 19.27 14.29 24.25 15.11 10.97 19.24 
Medium Service 15.54 10.72 20.36 12.62 8.54 16.69 
High Service 18.18 11.93 24.44 14.39 9.16 19.62 
Very High Service 21.19 14.87 27.51 17.11 11.58 22.63 
 
We must note that many of the above WTP estimates, particularly for the 
qualitative attributes in models Cl1 and CL2, appear quite inflated, however, we 
interpret their magnitudes relative to each other.  This allows us to get a sense of ordered 
preferences individuals may have for these attributes when choosing between retailers.  
Looking at the estimates for CL1, in terms of ordered preferences, when choosing 
between retailers, receiving very high levels of service is the most valuable attribute to 
shoppers.  Based on the above results, consumers are willing to pay £0.17 more for their 
weekly average basket price in return for an additional unit increase in the average 
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annual loyalty discount they receive. The negative willingness-to-pay estimates for the 
store proximity variable are the result of this variable’s negative coefficient estimates 
which indicate that increasing the value of this variable (i.e. increasing drive time) 
decreases consumer utility. In this context, consumers are willing to pay £1.13 more for 
their average weekly basket price if they must travel one minute less to the store by car.  
Let us now consider the mixed logit specifications we ran to compute additional 
WTP estimates.  In the case of the mixed logit model, the distribution for WTP is equal 
to the variable’s assumed distribution, scaled with respect to the monetary fixed cost 
coefficient.  Using the wtp post-estimation command on Stata 12, we specified the 
default ‘delta method’ to determine the confidence intervals for the mean WTP 
values.68 This approach assumes that WTP is normally distributed and Stata 
automatically calculates the relevant confidence intervals for the estimated values. This 
implies that WTP will also likely be normally distributed. Furthermore, the assumption 
that WTP is normally distributed is said to hold when the sample size is large the cost 
coefficient is a precise estimate (Hole 2007b).   
We re-ran a number of different mixed logit specifications and in each of these, 
assumed a fixed coefficient value for the average basket price coefficient. In total, we 
ran a further 4 specifications for the purposes of WTP estimates: ML7 (a), ML7 (c), 
ML8 (a) and ML8 (b).  The results for these models are presented under Tables 3.14 
and 3.16 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Please refer to Hole (2007b) and Bliemer & Rose (2013) for an appraisal of the different methods 
available for calculating confidence intervals for willingness-to-pay measures 
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Table 3.14 – Mixed logit models ML7 (a) & ML8 (a) 
 ML7 (a) ML8 (a) 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. 
Price -0.061*** 
(0.006) -9.40 - 
-0.060*** 
(0.006) -9.32 - 
Discount 0.010*** 
(0.002) 4.41 
0.025*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 4.64 
0.025*** 
(0.003) 
Time -0.095*** 
(0.013) -7.52 
0.109*** 
(0.013) 
-0.133*** 
(0.023) -5.9 
0.301** 
(0.124) 
Medium Quality 0.534*** 
(0.141) 3.79 - 
0.533*** 
(0.140) 3.79 
- 
High Quality 0.615*** 
(0.175) 3.52 - 
0.605*** 
(0.174) 3.48 
- 
Very High 
Quality 
0.838*** 
(0.177) 4.74 
-0.684*** 
(0.210) 
0.826*** 
(0.176) 4.69 
0.646*** 
(0.210) 
Medium Range 0.772*** 
(0.132) 5.83 - 
0.732*** 
(0.131) 5.58 
- 
High Range 1.007*** 
(0.156) 6.47 - 
0.962*** 
(0.154) 6.27 
- 
Very High Range 1.295*** 
(0.151) 8.60 
1.016*** 
(0.116) 
1.275*** 
(0.149) 8.57 
1.004** 
(0.110) 
Medium Service 1.061*** 
(0.147) 7.20 - 
1.023*** 
(0.147) 6.97 
- 
High Service 1.382*** 
(0.159) 8.70 
0.726*** 
(0.131) 
1.342*** 
(0.157) 8.55 
0.739*** 
(0.127) 
Very High 
Service 
1.420*** 
(0.198) 7.17 - 
1.396*** 
(0.196) 7.13 
- 
Log-likelihood -4780.929   -4780.832   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18,832   18,832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Model ML7 (a) is a mixed logit model without interactions, which assumes that 
the attributes assumed to be random follow a normal distribution.  On the other hand, 
Model ML8 (a) is also a mixed logit, however the time attribute is assumed to follow a 
random log-normal distribution.  The estimated values are similar between these two 
models, bar the coefficient for time travelling to the store. Below, in Table 3.15 we 
present the WTP estimates derived from the above results.   The WTP values we obtain 
below are very similar to those based on estimates from the conditional logit model 
specifications.  However, the attribute representing travel time to the store represents a 
greater value.  Based on the WTP estimates below individuals are willing to pay an 
additional £2.23 for their basket price to travel one minute less to the store.  On the 
basis of the relative WTP values presented below, both the level of product range and 
levels of service are very important to shoppers choosing between grocery stores. 
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Table 3.15 – Models ML7 (a) & ML8 (a) Willingness-to-Pay Estimates (95% 
Confidence Intervals) 
 ML7 (a) ML8 (a) 
eGrocery Retailer 
Attribute 
Average 
WTP 
(£) 
Lower 
bound 
(£) 
Upper 
bound 
(£) 
Average 
WTP 
(£) 
Lower 
bound 
(£) 
Upper 
bound 
(£) 
Grocery Basket Price - - - - - - 
Loyalty Scheme Discount 0.17 0.09 0.25 0.18 0.09 0.26 
Travel Time to Store (mins) -1.57 -1.98 -1.15 -2.23 -2.45 -1.49 
Medium Quality 8.77 4.32 13.21 8.92 4.38 13.46 
High Quality 10.11 4.53 15.69 10.13 4.44 15.83 
Very High Quality 13.77 8.13 19.42 13.84 8.09 19.59 
Medium Range 12.68 8.30 17.07 12.25 7.81 16.69 
High Range 16.54 11.26 21.81 16.12 10.77 21.46 
Very High Range 21.26 16.00 26.53 21.35 15.98 26.71 
Medium Service 17.43 11.91 22.96 17.13 11.60 22.66 
High Service 22.69 15.94 29.45 22.47 15.71 29.24 
Very High Service 23.32 16.15 30.48 23.39 16.14 30.63 
 
Table 3.16 below presents the results for models ML7 (c) and ML8 (b) which 
assume a fixed coefficient for the average basket price.  ML7 (c) is an extension of 
model ML7 (a) as it contains interaction terms with the remaining assumptions 
remaining constant.  Similarly, model ML8 (b) represents an extension of model ML 
(a), as it follows the same assumptions albeit it contains interaction terms.  Table 3.17 
further below presents the WTP estimates computed on the basis of the results of the 
above models.   
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Table 3.16 – Mixed logit models ML7 (c) & ML8 (b) 
 ML7 (c) ML8 (b) 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. 
Price -0.058*** (0.010) -5.78 - 
-0.057*** 
(0.010) -5.71 - 
Discount 0.013*** (0.003) 5.03 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 5.09 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Time -0.122*** (0.015) -8.35 
0.102*** 
(0.014) 
-0.126*** 
(0.033) -3.78 
0.316* 
(0.239) 
Medium Quality 0.534*** (0.145) 3.67 - 
0.533*** 
(0.145) 3.68 - 
High Quality 0.623*** (0.181) 3.44 - 
0.612*** 
(0.180) 3.39 - 
Very High Quality 1.231*** (0.243) 5.06 
0.616*** 
(0.184) 
1.207*** 
(0.240) 5.02 
0.567*** 
(0.198) 
Medium Range 0.753*** (0.131) 5.75 - 
0.715*** 
(0.129) 5.52 - 
High Range 0.987*** (0.155) 6.35 - 
0.948*** 
(0.154) 6.15 - 
Very High Range 1.276*** (0.150) 8.51 
0.992*** 
(0.121) 
1.248*** 
(0.149) 8.35 
0.984*** 
(0.112) 
Medium Service 1.077*** (0.149) 7.23 - 
1.049*** 
(0.148) 7.07 - 
High Service 1.291*** (0.166) 7.8 
0.709*** 
(0.129) 
1.265*** 
(0.168) 7.54 
0.693 
(0.138) 
Very High Service 1.421*** (0.199) 7.13 - 
1.396*** 
(0.198) 7.04 - 
Female*Time - - - 
-0.048* 
(0.024) -2.02 - 
Female*VH Quality -0.672*** (0.243) -2.76 - 
-0.661*** 
(0.241) -2.75 - 
< £22,000 HI*Price    -0.035*** (0.011) -3.28 - 
-0.035*** 
(0.011) -3.26 - 
> £45,000 HI*High 
Service   
0.358* 
(0.209) 1.71 - 
0.370* 
(0.208) 1.78 - 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Price    
0.035*** 
(0.011) 3.13 - 
0.035*** 
(0.011) 3.14 - 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Time    
0.085*** 
(0.022) 3.89 - 
0.076*** 
(0.017) 4.43 - 
No Loyalty 
Cards*Discount 
-0.018*** 
(0.005) -3.65 - 
-0.018*** 
(0.005) -3.61 - 
Log-likelihood -4672.343   -4661.221   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18,832   18,832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, next to coefficients represents 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.17 – Models ML7 (c) & ML8 (c) Willingness-to-Pay Estimates (95% 
Confidence Intervals) 
 ML7 (c) ML8 (b) 
Grocery Retailer 
Attribute 
Average 
WTP 
(£) 
Lower 
bound 
(£) 
Upper 
bound 
(£) 
Average 
WTP 
(£) 
Lower 
bound 
(£) 
Upper 
bound 
(£) 
Grocery Basket Price - - - - - - 
Loyalty Scheme Discount 0.22 0.11 0.34 0.23 0.12 0.35 
Travel Time to Store (mins) -2.11 -2.85 -1.37 -2.22 -2.51 -1.62 
Medium Quality 9.21 3.74 14.67 9.36 3.79 14.94 
High Quality 10.74 4.19 17.29 10.75 4.06 17.45 
Very High Quality 21.24 11.05 31.43 21.19 10.82 31.56 
Medium Range 12.99 7.36 18.63 12.56 6.90 18.22 
High Range 17.03 9.97 24.09 16.64 9.51 23.77 
Very High Range 22.01 14.19 29.84 21.92 14.00 29.84 
Medium Service 18.58 10.68 26.48 18.42 10.51 26.33 
High Service 22.27 12.97 31.57 22.22 12.73 31.71 
Very High Service 24.51 13.93 35.09 24.52 13.83 35.20 
 
The above WTP estimates are similar to the results when running the other model 
specifications.  Service levels at the grocery store and both product quality and range 
are valuable retailer attributes to grocery shoppers, with high levels of service being the 
most valuable on the basis of ordered preferences.  We note that the time attributes in 
the above models follow two different distributions: normal and log-normal 
respectively.  Nonetheless, these specifications have produced relatively similar WTP 
estimates for the time attribute.  In the above table, the loyalty discount has a larger 
magnitude relative to the previous models ML7 (a) and ML8 (a) as a result of the 
inclusion of interaction terms.  We continue this section by considering the individual-
level parameter estimates we derived using results from mixed logit models ML2 and 
ML4.  
This additional feature of the mixed logit model allows the researcher to 
graphically map the distributions of preferences for the attributes using individual-level 
parameter estimates via simulation. In performing this procedure, the researcher must 
obtain mean parameter estimates for each sampled observation. In other words, perform 
simulations of the data on the basis of the sequence of choices made by respondent n 
and compute the individual-level coefficient estimate for each respondent. These 
179 
 
individual-level parameter estimates can then be mapped using kernel density plots 
(Greene. & Hensher 2003). This exercise can further assist in the interpretation of 
results through a graphical representation of the distribution of preferences as they 
appear in the data (Train 2009 pp. 259-281). Let us consider the details underlying this 
post-estimation technique.   
The values for the individual-level coefficients 𝜷𝜷 correspond to the sequences of 
choices made by individual respondents. The mixlbeta command enables the analyst to 
approximate the individual-level mean coefficients of the estimated variables with 
simulation procedures that use Halton draws. Thus instead of estimating a mean 
coefficient value 𝜷𝜷𝒌𝒌 which applies across respondents as done previously, we are 
computing 𝜷𝜷𝒏𝒏 which represents the individual-level parameter estimates.  Following 
Hole (2013), the expected value of 𝜷𝜷 is conditional on the pattern of choices yn and the 
set of alternatives defined by their respective attributes in xn: 
𝑬𝑬[𝜷𝜷|𝒚𝒚𝒏𝒏,𝒙𝒙𝒏𝒏] = ∫𝜷𝜷∏ ∏ � 𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝑐𝑐
′
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽)
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒(𝑐𝑐′𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽)𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛=1 �𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛=1 𝑓𝑓(𝜷𝜷|𝜽𝜽)𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛=1
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Then 𝑬𝑬[𝜷𝜷|𝒚𝒚𝒏𝒏,𝒙𝒙𝒏𝒏] can be approximated for individual n by taking R number of 
draws for each respondent using the distribution of 𝜷𝜷 as follows: 
𝜷𝜷𝒏𝒏� = 1𝑅𝑅 ∑ 𝜷𝜷𝒏𝒏[𝒓𝒓] ∏ ∏ �
exp �𝑐𝑐′𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛[𝑟𝑟]�
∑ exp �𝑐𝑐′𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛[𝑟𝑟]�𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛=1 �
𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝐽𝐽
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑹𝑹
𝒓𝒓=𝟏𝟏
1
𝑅𝑅∑ ∏ ∏ �
exp �𝑐𝑐′𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛[𝑟𝑟]�
∑ exp �𝑐𝑐′𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛[𝑟𝑟]�𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛=1 �
𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝐽𝐽
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑇𝑇
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑅𝑅
𝑟𝑟=1
 
 
We obtained individual-level mean coefficient distributions by relying on the 
post-estimation procedures for mixlogit in Stata 12 as set out in Hole (2007). Using the 
command mixlbeta we computed simulated individual-level coefficient estimates and 
applied the kdenisty command to generate the graphs. The approach we adopt follows 
the steps set out by Hole (2013) to estimate individual-level coefficients in Stata 12 
using the mixlbeta command. The process firstly requires estimation of a model 
specification. Then the values of individual-level coefficients and graphs are 
180 
 
approximated by considering the sequence of choices made by an individual respondent 
and drawing from this distribution using the above commands. Only the variables 
assumed to be random can be used for this post-estimation procedure.  The results are 
presented below in Figures 3.1 – 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Individual-level parameter estimate for grocery basket price  
ML2 – Grocery Basket Price ML4 – Grocery Basket Price 
  
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Individual-level parameter estimate for loyalty scheme discount 
ML2 – Loyalty Scheme Discount ML4 – Loyalty Scheme Discount 
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Figure 3.3 – Individual-level parameter estimate for travel time to store 
ML2 – Travel Time to Store ML4 – Travel Time to Store 
  
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Individual-level parameter estimate for very high quality 
ML2 – Very High Quality ML4 – Very High Quality 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Individual-level parameter estimate for very high range 
 
ML2 – Very High Range ML4 – Very High Range 
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Figure 3.6 – Individual-level parameter estimate for high level of service 
ML2 – High Level of Service ML4 – High Level of Service 
  
 
 The above kernel density graphs representing the distributions of individual-
level coefficient estimates are slightly different for the two model types.  In Figure 3.6 
above, model ML4 with interactions produces a distribution which is centred more 
closely around the mean value than in the case of ML2. However this is not consistent 
across the above figures.  The distribution of preferences for travel time to the store 
appears to be more widely spread compared to the other distributions. Conversely, the 
distributions for very high quality are centred more closely around the mean, indicating 
the general preference for higher levels of product quality in store.  However, these 
curves are uneven with some bumps due to unobservable variation in preferences.  The 
loyalty scheme discount distribution follows a relatively smooth normal distribution in 
the context of model ML2 and is spread more widely after including the 8 interaction 
terms.  The next section evaluates the results of the empirical work presented above in 
the context of the literature review chapter where we considered whether loyalty 
schemes could induce perceived switching costs in consumers choosing between 
retailers. 
3.6 Discussion 
 In this section we evaluate our results in the context of evidence from real-world 
markets as well as the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in the first chapter.  
We explain how our results may affect the assumptions on consumer preferences which 
enter theoretical models used to study markets for non-durable goods. We also outline 
potential competition policy implications of loyalty inducing strategies in retail markets 
on the basis of these results.  In doing so we consider whether the trends we observe in 
our data substantiate the evidence on actual consumer behaviour in retail markets, in 
particular grocery retail.  We briefly look at recent developments in the way that firms 
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use loyalty rewarding schemes in practice and suggest directions for future research.  
We begin the discussion by presenting a summary of the empirical results of the discrete 
choice experiment with the most emphasis placed on parameter estimates obtained 
through models ML2 and ML4.   
Individuals took part in our discrete choice experiment by completing a survey 
with 11 choice situations (survey questions) as well as sociodemographic questions.  In 
each choice situation participants were presented with 4 alternative grocery retailer 
profiles and had to select only one as their preferred alternative.  Each choice situation 
presented respondents with different trade-off between various combinations of retailer 
features, including different sizes of loyalty scheme discount, different average basket 
prices,  alternative travel time to the store and 4 levels of product quality, product range 
and customer service respectively. The choice of what values to present to respondents 
to ensure visible trade-offs between alternatives is explained at length in the 
methodological chapter where we discuss survey design.  The choice situations 
presented to respondents assumed that two of the four grocery retailers offered a loyalty 
scheme, while the others did not. Through the sequence of choices made by each 
individual respondent we were able to measure the relative importance of grocery 
retailer attributes to consumers when choosing between retailers through discrete 
choice modelling. 
As noted further above in Section 3.3, we interpret the coefficient estimates as 
representing preferences of both individual shoppers and the households in which they 
live. In the data, the three variables price, discount and time, account for significant 
variation in choice of grocery retailer among all the variables entering the model with 
no interactions.  We find that the price variable accounts for the most variation in the 
data and this variable corresponds to the average basket price a consumer can expect to 
pay when visiting the grocery store.  The variable capturing travel time to the grocery 
store, accounts for the second most variation in the data out of these three variables, 
followed by the loyalty scheme discount.  All three variables exhibited preference 
heterogeneity i.e. preferences were not constant for these three variables.  When looking 
at the distribution in tastes (i.e. unobservable variation in preferences) among grocery 
shoppers, the discount variable displays the most variation with 68% of grocery 
shoppers favouring a loyalty scheme when choosing between grocery retailers.  While 
the remaining 32% of shoppers prefer not to participate in any loyalty scheme.   
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Our results show that households have a strong preference for grocery retailers who 
offer high to very high levels of customer service, product range and product quality.  
The data revealed that respondents exhibited preference heterogeneity for high levels 
of product quality, very high levels or product range and very high level of customer 
service.   The remaining qualitative attributes were found to have fixed mean coefficient 
values among respondents.  In assessing the qualitative variables in terms of how they 
impact consumers’ choice of grocery retailer, we note that this data was collected via 
survey.  When answering hypothetical questions, it is likely that some individuals may 
believe that in a real world context they would actually choose the retailer offering the 
highest levels of customer service, highest quality of products and a massive range to 
choose from. In reality however, the majority of consumers are likely to be driven by 
price and the location of the shop. We are not suggesting that these non-price aspects 
of the grocery shopping experience, do not matter to consumers.  We do however note, 
that the estimates may be slightly inflated as a result of this effect. As we discussed in 
the methodological chapter, stated preference analysis has its limitations because in the 
context of experiments, individuals do not always respond in the same way as they 
would in a real-world situation.  
When analysing our data, we also looked at whether there was any variation in 
preferences within identifiable groups of consumers (i.e. observable taste variation).  
The 8 interaction terms found to be significant in model ML4 were:  
• Female*VH Range”: the effect of gender on preferences for very high range of 
products at the grocery store; 
• “Large Household*VH Range”: the effect of living in a large household of four 
or more individuals, on preferences for very high range of products at the 
grocery store; 
• “No Car*VH Range”: the effect of not driving a car to go grocery shopping on 
preferences for very high product range;  
• “< £22,000 HI*Price”: the effect of being in the lower household income group 
earning less than £22,000 annually (after tax) on preferences for grocery basket 
price;  
• “> £45,000 HI*High Service”: the effect of being in a higher household income 
group earning more than £45,000 annually (after tax) on preference for very 
high levels of service in store; 
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• “Frequent Online Shop*Price”: the effect of regularly purchasing groceries 
online (i.e. at least once a month) on preferences for the grocery basket price; 
• “Frequent Online Shop*Time”: the effect of regularly purchasing groceries 
online (i.e. at least once a month) on preferences for grocery store proximity; 
and 
• “No Loyalty Cards*Discount”: the effect of not participating in any loyalty 
schemes on preferences for the loyalty scheme discount. 
In our data, female respondents displayed a lower preference for very high 
levels of product quality than male respondents.  Participants who indicated they lived 
in a large household displayed a greater preference for very high product range 
availability than those who indicated they lived in smaller sized households.  We also 
find that those individuals who typically do not drive a car to go grocery shopping, 
prefer a grocery retailer who offers a bigger product range. Unsurprisingly, we find that 
households in the lowest income category have a stronger preference for lower average 
basket prices than households in higher income groups.  While those grocery shoppers 
who live in households in the highest income category, prefer a grocery retailer with 
high levels of customer service than those who live in households earning lower 
disposable incomes.  
 There are also differences in the preferences of individuals who are frequent 
online shoppers.  We find that these individuals are less sensitive to the basket price 
and the travelling time when choosing their preferred grocery retailer compared to those 
who are either infrequent online shoppers, or those who never shop online at all.  The 
final interaction we consider, is between loyalty card ownership and the loyalty scheme 
discount.  The results show that while the loyalty scheme coefficient is positive for most 
individuals, this is not constant for everyone. On the basis of our estimates, respondents 
who indicated that they do not participate in any loyalty schemes at all, prefer to not 
have a loyalty scheme at all when choosing between retailers. This further emphasises 
differences between customer groups in terms of their tastes for loyalty schemes.  We 
keep the above findings in mind throughout the discussion which proceeds below.  
Next, we consider specific aspects of our results and how they compare to real-world 
markets.  
In Section 3.2, we considered the data collection method we adopted and 
whether we could expect meaningful results on the basis of this data.  In assessing 
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whether our results would be reasonable, we computed implied market shares of the 
four retailers labelled A, B, C and D, as chosen by the survey respondents.  Although 
they were labelled as A, B, C and D, these four retailer profiles were designed by 
gathering information on actual retailer characteristics, including prices, namely, 
Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda and Waitrose.  The market shares we computed were very 
similar to the actual real world market shares of the four major UK retailers during the 
same year that the survey responses were collected.  This suggests that variation in our 
data closely follows type of variation in retailer preferences observed in the UK 
population.  In addition we applied population weights to avoid sources of bias affecting 
the robustness of results as we found a divergence between some of the sample-level 
statistics versus population-level sociodemographic statistics. The standard errors of 
estimates have also been clustered at the level of the individual to improve the 
robustness of results.  In consideration of these points, we proceed with the confidence 
that the empirical results presented in this chapter offer meaningful insights into 
behaviour of consumers in actual markets. 
When designing the attributes to include in the discrete choice experiment, we 
relied on some of the findings of the Competition Commission’s market investigation 
into the UK groceries market.  The CC’s Final Report published following the 
completion of the investigation in 2008, noted that grocery retailers mainly compete for 
customers through price, quality, product range and service, also known as “PQRS”.   
However, the CC’s assessment did not factor in loyalty schemes.  Below we consider 
how our findings sit in the context of the demand estimation procedures performed by 
the CC using an extensive time-series household dataset.  The main findings of the 
demand estimation were published in the Final Report. 
The CC found that preferences for retailers could only be explained by 
sociodemographic variables to an extent. Instead, using a mixed logit model with 
random parameters allowed the CC to capture additional aspects of taste heterogeneity.  
Overall our results are comparable with the CC’s findings when considering the effect 
of store proximity, consumers’ preferences for product range and the level of service. 
The CC’s demand model produced a statistically significant and negative effect 
associated with distance from the store, a positive effects for product availability and 
levels of service. The CC’s report also found evidence of differences in preferences for 
store proximity and product availability as a result of differences in car ownership and 
household size. Specifically, the CC’s analysis of results found that larger households, 
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and those who own a car, are more likely to travel greater distances to a given grocery 
store (Competition Commission 2008, Annex 4 p.18). This corresponds to a similar 
effect we discussed as part of our results where we found a significant relationship 
between differences in household size and availability of products in the store.  
As mentioned above, the CC investigation identified that an important aspect of 
consumer satisfaction was the presence of a grocery store at close proximity, 
irrespective of the retailer brand itself. During its investigation, the CC identified that 
there was substantial gain in consumer satisfaction from having a grocery store within 
5 minutes of driving distance. This is also interesting form an exogenous switching cost 
perspective.  This suggests that consumers in the UK groceries sector suffer less from 
brand related exogenous switching costs than other markets. Our results also show that 
consumers have a strong preference for having a store at close proximity confirming 
that proximity remains a key determinant of grocery retailer choice.    
 In the UK groceries sector, discount stores are also popular which is consistent with 
the importance consumers place on price.  The CC’s market investigation concluded in 
2008 and since then, discounters Lidl and Aldi experienced growth in market share in 
the UK. This has been partially at the expense of other leading grocery retailers. The 
increase in popularity of the discount retailers is consistent with consumers caring a 
significant amount about the prices they pay.  On the other hand, the increase in market 
shares of Aldi and Lidl, also shows that a lot of consumers do not really care about the 
shopping experience itself where the shopping experience is captured through quality, 
range and service attributes.  As noted above, we also found that average basket price 
accounted for the most variation in consumers’ choice of grocery retailer. In addition, 
although our data also shows that consumers are likely to care about the quality of 
products, customer service and product range, these effects are likely overstated for the 
reasons previously outlined above.  
 The evolution in the market shares in the UK’s groceries market is presented in 
Figure 3.7 below.  The top bar represents August 2015 market shares and the lower bar 
represents August 2013 market share data respectively.  The figure shows a visible 
growth of market shares of the discounters and a contraction in the market share of the 
leading retailer Tesco. 
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Figure 3.7 – UK Grocery Retailer Market Shares (top bar shows August 2015 
market share figures, lower bar shows August 2013 market share figures)69 
 
 
The importance of price is consistent with findings of a recent IGD report on 
drivers of grocery shopper loyalty.70 Based on the results of IGD’s shopper insight 
survey, convenience (i.e. proximity) and price are by far the biggest drivers of store 
loyalty. 71  In addition, the IGD report finds that loyalty schemes are also valuable to 
some shoppers.  In the report, 33% of surveyed shoppers stated that a store loyalty card 
is the main reason for their loyalty to a given grocery retailer while 44% of respondents 
stated that a loyalty card was either an “extremely important” or “very important” driver 
of store choice.  Thus while loyalty schemes may be very important to some grocery 
shoppers, this certainly is not the case for all. This also corresponds to our empirical 
results.   
We now apply our empirical findings to the literature reviewed in the first 
chapter.  We focus mainly on the assumptions on consumer preferences and how 
consumers react when firms adopt repeat purchase discount strategies.  In doing so we 
comment on the likely implications of our findings for the firm strategies and market 
outcomes suggested by the theoretical models.  On the basis of our empirical results, 
we argue that unlike the typical assumptions entering theoretical models, loyalty 
schemes do not unilaterally increases costs of switching for consumers.  The coefficient 
estimates we obtained indicate that around a third of consumers and/ or households 
prefer not to receive a repeat purchase discount and would not want to participate in a 
                                                 
69 Market share data sourced from Kantar Worldpanel, http://www.kantarworldpanel.com/en/grocery-
market-share/great-britain. 
70 IGD ShopperVista Report ‘Shopper loyalty in 2015’, April 2015. 
71 The report is based on a survey of 943 UK grocery shoppers. 
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loyalty program.  For this sub-set of the population, the choice of retailer is independent 
of the availability of a repeat purchase discount.  In fact, our results indicate that a 
loyalty scheme may actually reduce utility for some individuals.  For example, these 
individuals may not like the idea of their data being collected, stored and analysed by 
companies. We apply this result to the some of the main papers we discussed in the first 
chapter on loyalty scheme strategies.  
 In the literature review chapter we illustrated and solved Lal and Bell’s (2003) 
model of loyalty discounts and exogenously set product promotions.  This model is set 
up differently to the models of loyalty rewarding schemes in the industrial organisation 
literature.  It assumes that some consumers are simply loyal due their proximity to a 
grocery store following a Hotelling framework. There are promotions which are 
determined exogenously and the authors consider a scenario when one of the two 
retailers offers a loyalty scheme on top of the promotional product prices. Consumers 
who are located in the middle segment of the unit line are cherry-pickers who look for 
the best deals.  Loyalty schemes are shown to not affect the behaviour of consumers 
who are loyal to either one of the two retailers located at the ends of the linear city.  
These consumers do however, redeem the repeat purchase discount which reduces the 
retailer’s profit.  In addition, the model is set up so that only the behaviour of those 
consumers who cherry pick between stores is affected by the loyalty scheme. This result 
holds so long as the opportunity cost of shopping around for a better deal is sufficiently 
compensated by the loyalty discount. 
 The empirical results presented above are consistent with Lal and Bell’s 
assumption that not all consumers will base their purchasing decisions on loyalty 
schemes.   Of course, the model is relatively simplistic in its form and does not account 
for the fact that firm’s may respond to the consumers’ behaviour in future periods.  The 
model does not consider the wider features of a retail market which may also affect 
consumers’ choice of retailer. In addition, our empirical results suggest that not all the 
consumers would redeem their repeat purchase discount even if they had earned one by 
shopping at the same retailer. If fewer consumers redeem repeat purchase discounts and 
they continue to choose that retailer, the firm would achieve greater profits than 
suggested by Lal and Bell’s model.  The same applies to the Caminal and Claici model 
which we consider below.  
Caminal and Claici’s (2007) model assumes that consumers vary in their 
preferences for variety and are heterogeneous in respect of the brands available.  
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Caminal and Claici’s model also captures the profit incentive driving firms to invest in 
loyalty schemes when there are few firms in the market.  The endogenously created 
switching costs lock in a segment of consumers enabling the firm to charge higher 
prices in future.  The investment however, reduces profits of the firm and the firm will 
only offer a repeat purchase discount if the additional profits exceed the cost of the 
strategy.  In the model, consumers are also uncertain about their future preferences and 
firms are able to discriminate between consumers. A number of model variations are 
considered, including an extension to multiple periods of competition and where firms 
discriminate between generations of consumers.  This offers a more sophisticated 
interpretation of consumer preferences than the Lal and Bell model.    
In the model, when a firm implements a loyalty scheme, consumers’ transport 
costs increase due the endogenously created switching costs and in certain cases this 
reduces overall welfare.  On the basis of our results we would argue that this increase 
in transport costs would affect fewer consumers than suggested by the model. This 
implies that a loyalty scheme would have an impact on future strategies of firms.  In 
this context, with the knowledge that not all consumers redeem repeat purchase 
discounts, the forward looking firm may for example, decide to offer larger or smaller 
repeat purchase discounts when maximising pay offs.  Further, if firms are able to 
effectively discriminate between consumers with different switching cost types via the 
loyalty scheme, this would have further implications for firm strategies and market 
outcomes.  
Caminal (2012) also argues that discount strategies may not achieve the most 
efficient outcome because in practice, a future price commitment achieves the most 
efficient outcome in terms of welfare.  Without a commitment in place, a firm can raise 
prices unilaterally to compensate for the reduction in profit from offering customers a 
repeat purchase discount.  In this context, some consumers will find themselves in a 
prisoner’s dilemma, where they are equally better off not participating in the scheme as 
they end up facing higher prices in future periods. More generally, Caminal (2012) 
notes that the models of endogenous switching costs, namely the models above as well 
as the model of Caminal and Matutes (1990), are set up in a way that “LRs allow firms 
to retain previous customers, even when rival firms offer goods or services that better 
match their current preferences. As a result, LRs are welfare reducing because they 
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cause a mismatch in the allocation of consumers. […] it is unclear whether LRs tend to 
relax or exacerbate price competition”72  
 In light of our empirical results, we argue that the reduction in welfare suggested 
by a broad range of models of endogenous switching costs would be less pronounced.   
As noted above, the results suggest that when choosing between retailers, a third of 
consumers prefer not to have and/ or participate in a loyalty scheme. This suggests that 
some consumers may even be deterred by the scheme. Instead, choose the retailer 
corresponding to their current preferences, even if it is the retailer who offers the loyalty 
scheme.  In real world markets, consumers are not forced into redeeming loyalty points 
in the form of lump sum coupons or other rewards. It is therefore unrealistic to assume 
that when a firm implements a loyalty rewarding scheme, this unilaterally increases 
artificial switching costs in consumers.  We note that variation in the way consumers 
incur endogenous switching costs, may have ambiguous welfare effects depending on 
the model design, namely whether the firms can observe this aspect of behaviour and 
how they would react in response.  Considering the above, we argue that the strategy is 
likely to have a weaker effect on price competition than suggested by the literature. 
While the extent that consumers are heterogeneous in their switching costs is only one 
of many assumptions entering a model, it would be of interest to understand how this 
assumption would affect the outcomes suggested in the theory. 
We now consider the implications of our findings for competition policy.  Let 
us first consider the UK groceries market.  In this sector, firms compete over various 
aspects of the retail offer to attract consumers to their stores and invest heavily in 
branding and advertising.  This is supported by our DCE results.  Since the CC’s market 
investigation which concluded in 2008, the main players, in particular Tesco who 
previously dominated the market, experienced fluctuating performances as a result of 
changing market conditions, poor investments and accountancy related scandals.  More 
generally, we noted above that retailers face competitive pressures from shifting 
shopping patterns towards convenience and pressures from newer expanding entrants 
such as discount retailers Aldi and Lidl.    
Considering these wider aspects of the UK groceries market, no one retailer is 
likely to enjoy significant market power. Therefore on the basis of our results, loyalty 
                                                 
72 Caminal, R., ‘The Design and Efficiency of Loyalty Rewards’, Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, Vol. 21, Nr. 2, 2012, p. 340 
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schemes are unlikely to be an anticompetitive device in this market.  Instead, loyalty 
schemes in this market represent one of many aspects of the competitive process in a 
mature market.  In reality, a loyalty scheme, in this particular market, may have a 
locking-in effect on certain groups of consumers. For example those indicating they 
participate in no loyalty schemes at all are found to prefer not receiving a loyalty 
scheme discount. This is consistent with Section 1.5 of the first chapter. In the context 
of the retail energy and retail banking market investigations, the surveys commissioned 
by the CMA suggested that some groups of consumers were likely to face different 
costs of switching and were switching at different frequency, with some consumers not 
switching at all.  These findings also suggest that consumers are heterogeneous in their 
costs of switching in markets with exogenous switching costs.  For example in the 
context of retail banking, younger consumers are more tech savvy and can be expected 
to be more engaged and willing to switch (Banking MI, para 5.165).  On balance, 
loyalty schemes are unlikely to be problematic from a competition policy perspective 
in dynamic markets for nondurables assuming that consumers face minimal exogenous 
switching costs and firms continually invest in maintaining market share, for example, 
through lower prices and/ or better quality. 
Given the significant weight placed on consumer outcomes by EU competition 
authorities, understanding consumer behaviour is an important first step in a 
competition related investigation.  The favourable statistical properties and insights 
offered by the discrete choice experiment outlined in this thesis, could also be of value 
to competition authorities or researchers in industrial organization.  DCE can help 
investigate the effects of a business strategy on consumer behaviour or identify how 
preferences are distributed in the population of interest.  In addition, the approach 
outlined in this thesis can help assist in policy design.  For example, if the competition 
authority is seeking to have a better understanding of consumer preferences in a market 
associated with consumer switching costs.  The approach may help support a broader 
analysis to identify the relevant policies to reduce switching costs and increase 
switching by consumers for example. 
Compared to a discrete choice experiment, theoretical models may not capture 
the wider aspects of the retail offer.  In particular, such models are less able to 
accommodate diverse consumer preferences and the differentiated characteristics of 
sellers which prevail in real-world markets.  However, in evaluating our approach we 
also note that in the context of DCEs, consumers may not respond in the same way as 
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they do in real world markets.  In addition, experiments more generally are imperfect 
due to the complex nature of competitive interactions in markets namely, changes to 
strategies in response to changes in others’ strategies.  Thus both approaches suffer 
from drawbacks. We therefore argue that when analysing the effects of business 
strategies which rely heavily on assumptions on consumer choices, a combination of 
theoretical and experimental evidence may be optimal. 
An advantage of performing a DCE compared to the above model, is that we 
were able to ass loyalty schemes in the context of price and non-price factors which 
matter to consumers.  On balance, DCEs enable the researcher to address very specific 
questions on drivers of consumer choice by mimicking real-world markets through a 
series of survey questions or controlled lab experiments. Importantly, the approach 
accommodates all types of behavioural patterns, including non-utility maximising 
behaviour.  Thus, empirical evidence can help determine realistic assumptions to enter 
a theoretical model which can then be applied to achieve broader analysis of business 
strategies and its implications for policy which consider both the demand and supply 
side of the market.  
 In this context, theoretical modelling is essential in explaining broader 
dynamics of markets to help us understand the underlying rationale and incentives for 
the pricing and discounting strategies adopted by firms, including loyalty schemes.  
However, this approach focuses on the firm rather than the consumer. It is therefore of 
essence to accurately introduce consumer behaviour into such models and their 
responses to various firm strategies.  Thus, in the assessment of strategic behaviour of 
firms which prevail in real-world markets, we favour the approach which combines 
insights from theoretical and empirical modelling. This is more likely to overcome 
some of the trade-offs associated with theoretical and experimental approaches and is 
therefore more likely to offer the greatest insights on different aspects of a market.   For 
example, looking back at Shi’s (2012) model of exogenous and endogenous switching 
costs. Our modelling exercise did not include brand names as we deliberately designed 
an unlabelled choice experiment which is discussed at length in the methodological 
chapter. However, we note that it would be of interest to empirically assess whether the 
brand attachment effect, or other exogenous switching costs would be greater than that 
of a loyalty scheme when considering actual consumer behaviour. Let us look at some 
further areas for future research.    
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Loyalty cards typically enable firms to collect vast amounts of data to improve 
their knowledge of customers’ behaviour and preferences. In the United States and 
United Kingdom, loyalty schemes have achieved popularity among both firms and their 
customers. In the US, the second largest chemist CVS has a loyalty scheme with 69 
million subscribers.73 The loyalty scheme strategy aims to maintain existing customers 
using regular price discounts and targeted coupons based on purchase history.74 
Similarly to the US experience, a report by YouGov (2013) on British shoppers, 
identified that 76% typically carry one to five loyalty cards in their wallets. The report 
also finds that 32% of shoppers are willing to exchange further personal information in 
return for extra loyalty points. In this context, loyalty schemes offer perceived benefits 
to both firms and consumers.   
On the basis of our findings, we argue that loyalty schemes are likely to continue 
to play a role as a differentiation mechanism for firms. For example, Tesco have 
developed novel mobile payments via a new app. This allows customers to quickly pay 
for their shopping and collect points all in one go as their payment details are linked to 
the app.  The payment facility could easily be expanded to a digital wallet loyalty 
scheme allowing customers to collect and spend points across different channels.  This 
is already a possibility with some credit cards.75  In this context, in future, firms will 
still likely be able to rely on loyalty schemes as mechanisms for differentiation.  Thus 
future research should consider the competitive implications of loyalty schemes which 
affect multiple markets instead of only focusing on one market or one type of product. 
In addition to the above strategy, firms may also use loyalty schemes to collect 
rich customer data.  Lal and Bell’s model and our empirical results suggest that a loyalty 
scheme’s profitability depends on the firm’s ability to identify and target the consumers 
whose behaviour is affected by the loyalty discount.  Firms actively use loyalty reward 
programs to help them identify consumers using the data that have accumulated.  This 
facilitates targeted marketing and product discounts.  The same can be said about firms 
who operate online and target consumers with adds on the basis of their search history.  
                                                 
73 ‘Retailing: Spies in your Wallet’, The Economist, November 5th 2011 (available online 
http://www.economist.com/node/21536604) 
74 Ibid. 
75 Research by IGD has already identified existence of “smart” loyalty cards that have been introduced 
in the United States. See: IGD, ‘What impact do loyalty schemes have on store choice?’ 15th July 2013, 
http://www.igd.com/Research/Shopper-Insight/shopper-outlook/15151/What-impact-do-loyalty-
schemes-have-on-store-choice/ 
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Therefore firms are likely to have the incentive to invest in scheme effectiveness to 
target consumers whose behaviour can be impacted through strategic behaviour.  This 
also has implications for competition and a firms’ market power. We understand that 
firms can gain a competitive data advantage over rivals where the “data’s competitive 
significance (and value) arise in part from the ability of firms to exclude others from 
access and analysing it as quickly.”76  There is therefore a growing interest in the role 
of big data in competition policy.  This is in the context of the likely implications of 
firms’ access to proprietary customer data used to inform basic internal company 
workings as well as strategic business decisions.77   This is consistent with Tesco’s 
Clubcard loyalty scheme being central to its business which we explained in the first 
chapter in Section 2.2.    
An argument previously outlined in an article in The Economist stated that 
retailers’ investment into loyalty cards is not intended to induce customer loyalty but 
rather to collect their data.78  Tesco was the first retailer to implement a loyalty scheme 
strategy in the UK groceries market and has been collecting and analysing data on 
customers in this way ever since.  The company, Dunnhumby, which helped Tesco 
establish the Clubcard in the early 1990s, is wholly owned by Tesco.  Dunnhumby is 
also a leading firm in customer data science for retailers and brands.79  While this 
highlights Tesco’s data advantage, if, or to what extent, Tesco’s market share can be 
explained by this aspect of its business is another question altogether.  Thus while this 
was not the focus of our thesis, it offers a fruitful direction for future research.  In this 
context, it would be of interest to model and assess the competitive data advantage 
conferred to firms offering loyalty programs.  Additionally, future research should 
consider the impact of companies’ acquisition and analysis of vast customer data on 
their strategic decisions and resultant market power, both in online as well as brick and 
mortar channels respectively. 
3.7 Conclusion 
 This chapter presented the results of the discrete choice experiment on the UK 
groceries market developed as part of the methodological chapter.  In Section 3.2 we 
                                                 
76 Stucke, M., Allen Grunes, A., Big Data and Competition Policy, Oxford University Press, paragraph 
4.26, 2016. 
77 Ibid. Part I, Section 4, The Competitive Significance of Big Data. 
78 ‘Retailing: Spies in your Wallet’, The Economist, November 5th 2011 (available online 
http://www.economist.com/node/21536604) 
79 https://www.tescoplc.com/about-us/our-businesses/dunnhumby/about-the-business/ 
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explained the processes undertaken to evaluate the quality of the survey data and we 
also tested the data for sources of bias through a comparative assessment on the basis 
of population-level statistics in Section 3.3.  We were then able to control for sources 
of sample bias through the application of frequency weights.  In sections 3.4 and 3.5 
we presented a number of model outputs based on different specifications of the 
conditional logit and mixed logit models.  Section 3.6 applied the empirical results to 
the theoretical literature presented in the first chapter and discussed the implications of 
our results to competition policy.  We critically assessed our approach with respect to 
theoretical modelling and concluded with a discussion on directions for further research 
on loyalty scheme strategies. 
As part our results, we found that individuals have a strong preference for non-
price aspects of the grocery store offering, namely the product quality, range and level 
of customer service.  For example, 97% were found to prefer high levels of product 
quality. We explained the possibility that these effects may be overstated because the 
results were obtained using stated preference instead of revealed preference data.  As 
such, we concluded that on balance, the majority of households prefer lower prices over 
and above other retailer features. Further, we found that households are heterogeneous 
in their preference for a number of price and nonprice grocery retailer attributes.  
Notably, of all the variables entering the specification, preferences were the most varied 
for the loyalty reward scheme with a third of consumers preferring not to have a loyalty 
scheme when choosing between retailers.   
In considering the outcomes suggested in the theory, we recalled that firms have 
the profit incentive to offer strategic discounts as this increases artificial switching costs 
in consumers. On that basis, firms can increase prices in future periods if no 
commitments are in place. In this type of set up, loyalty rewarding schemes can be 
shown to impact competition in different ways, either having a softening or intensifying 
effect. Outcomes tend to depend on the market structure, the type of price commitment 
in place and number of periods entering the theoretical model. Our results indicate that 
because consumers are heterogeneous in their switching costs, the effects of repeat 
purchase discounts do not have a consistent effect across the population of grocery 
shoppers in the UK.   
On the basis of our results, we conclude that loyalty schemes do not create 
artificial switching costs for all consumers, at least not to the same degree.  In turn, the 
effects of the strategy are likely to be weaker and produce a milder impact on price 
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competition that suggested in the literature. It is therefore unrealistic to assume that 
when a firm implements a loyalty rewarding scheme that this will unilaterally increase 
artificial switching costs in all consumers. This also suggests that firms may be less 
incentivised to engage in harvesting of consumers and will choose to invest in market 
share instead. The investment incentive will be strong if most consumers are active 
switchers in a non-durable goods market with low brand effect related switching costs. 
While this has not been tested as part of this thesis, lack of brand attachment in grocery 
retail may also explain why competition in this market is strongly driven by price.  We 
also note that in practice, grocery retailers are unable to price discriminate in a material 
way between different groups of consumers with varying sensitivities to loyalty 
rewarding schemes. The evidence and arguments outlined in this chapter suggest that 
retailers are unable to rely on loyalty schemes alone to retain and build their market 
share.  Instead, it is more likely that such firms must rely on other levers of competition 
to attract different types of consumers, namely by choosing lucrative geographic 
locations, offering better service, higher quality products or lower average prices. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.2.1 – Raw basket price data using ONS CPI list of 139 food and household 
items most frequently purchased by UK households. The table shows the prices 
and item descriptions for the cheapest own brand product at Tesco, Sainsbury, 
Asda and Waitrose. The data was collected using the grocery retailer online 
websites during January 2014. 
  Tesco Sainsbury’s Asda Waitrose 
 Total CPI Basket Items Price £216.64 £234.34 £201.32 £305.57 
Item  Item Description  Price   
A Bread and Cereals     
1 Cereal bars (cheapest option 150 gr) 0.92 0.99 0.83 1.92 
2 Chocolate wafers N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3 Corn based snacks (Cheese Puffs 100 gr) 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.66 
4 Cornflakes (500 gr) 1.29 1.29 1.28 1.29 
5 Cream Crackers (300 gr) 0.45 0.36 0.50 0.36 
6 Crusty Bread rolls (4 Fresh from Bakery) 0.65 0.70 0.70 1.40 
7 Flour (Plain 1.5 kg) 0.60 0.60 0.60 1.11 
8 Frozen pizza (Cheese and Tomato 250-300 gr) 0.60 0.60 0.60 1.84 
9 Fruit pies (Fresh Bramley apple pie) 1.00 1.10 1.00 2.50 
10 Garlic bread (twin pack 420 gr) 1.50 1.50 1.20 1.50 
11 Hot oat cereal (porridge 1 kg) 1.20 1.20 0.85 1.10 
12 Jam Doughnuts (5 pcs) 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.69 
13 Large white loaf (Fresh Sandwich Loaf 800 gr) 1.30 1.25 1.30 1.28 
14 Large wholemeal loaf (medium sliced 800 gr) 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.80 
15 Long Grain Rice (1 kg) 0.40 0.44 0.40 1.39 
16 
Pack of individual cakes (Chocolate chip muffins 4 
pk) 1.50 1.50 1.00 1.50 
17 Fresh Pasta (Penne 500 gr) 1.72 1.60 1.43 1.70 
18 Pasta (Dry Spaghetti 500 gr) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.95 
19 Sponge cakes (Victoria Sponge Cake) 2.20 2.30 2.48 2.29 
20 Various selected biscuits (Custard Creams 400gr)   0.40 0.40 0.31 0.90 
B Meat     
 Beef     
21 Beef mince (500gr) 1.56 1.46 1.46 3.19 
22 Braising steak (cheapest available 500 gr) 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
23 Frozen burgers N/A N/A N/A N/A 
24 Rump Steak (500 gr) 5.00 6.32 5.50 8.75 
 Topside (Joint 500 gr) 5.00 5.00 5.39 5.65 
25 Lamb     
26 Leg of Lamb (1 KG) 10.99 10.99 6.00 12.99 
27 Loin chops (500 gr) 4.00 5.13 4.50 8.50 
28 Shoulder (half shoulder joint 1 KG) 7.00 7.00 5.50 7.99 
 Pork     
29 Loin chops (500 gr) 2.43 2.43 2.00 3.73 
30 Bacon (300 gr) 1.64 1.64 1.70 2.85 
31 Gammon (Steaks 500 gr) 2.60 4.69 2.25 5.00 
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 Chicken     
32 Chicken Breasts (500 gr) 6.00 6.50 4.85 6.89 
33 Frozen Chicken Nuggets (300 gr) 1.00 1.64 1.04 3.00 
34 Fresh/chilled whole chicken (1.5 kg) 3.72 3.75 3.72 4.92 
35 Frozen chicken breasts (1kg) 4.75 6.49 3.99 8.80 
36 Rotisserie cooked hot whole chicken N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 Other Meats     
37 Steak Pie (550 gr) 3.50 3.65 3.38 3.59 
38 Pork Sausages (8pcs) 0.61 0.65 0.44 1.39 
39 
Cooked meats – eg ham (roast turkey breasts 200 
gr) 2.70 3.34 4.16 5.58 
40 Fresh turkey steaks (4 pk 500 gr) 4.54 4.50 3.69 5.00 
41 Canned meats (corned beef 300 gr) 2.02 2.01 1.36 3.12 
42 Frozen Chicken Nuggets (300 gr) 0.68 1.17 0.68 3.00 
43 Chicken kievs (2 pk) 1.39 1.98 2.18 2.27 
44 Oven-ready joint (pork belly 1kg) 5.00 5.33 5.30 6.39 
C Fish     
45 Frozen Breaded Cod Fillets (500 gr) 2.20 3.20 2.00 3.00 
46 
Fresh white fish fillets (Pre-Packed Cod Fillets 250 
gr) 2.98 2.98 3.25 3.66 
47 Fresh salmon fillets (pre-packed 300 gr) 2.69 2.69 2.69 4.08 
48 Canned tuna (185 gr) 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.71 
49 Fish fingers (Frozen Cod 300 gr)  1.75 1.91 1.41 1.91 
50 
Frozen prawns (Cooked and peeled King prawns 
250 gr) 3.25 2.99 3.58 3.82 
D Milk, Cheese and Eggs     
51 Cheese spread (Soft cheese 200 gr) 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.80 
52 
Chilled pot dessert (Chocolate Mousse Pack 6 x 
62.5 = 375 gr) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.90 
53 Edam (wedge 310 gr) 2.00 2.16 2.00 2.55 
54 English Medium Cheddar (300gr) 2.26 2.36 2.25 2.49 
55 Fresh cream (Single 300 ml) 1.05 0.95 0.95 0.95 
56 Fromage frais (low fat 500 gr) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.19 
57 Medium Free Range Eggs (12 pcs) 2.65 2.65 1.98 2.92 
58 Milk (6 pints half fat) 1.89 1.89 1.48 1.89 
59 Other regional cheeses (Mozzarella 125 gr) 0.44 0.65 0.44 0.95 
60 Parmesan (200 gr) 3.25 3.29 3.20 3.72 
61 Powdered baby formula N/A N/A N/A N/A 
62 Pro-biotic drink N/A N/A N/A N/A 
63 Soft continental cheese (French Brie 200 gr)  1.09 1.09 1.00 1.67 
64 Yoghurt (Natural Low-Fat 500 gr) 0.49 0.65 0.49 1.00 
E Oils and Fats     
65 Butter Salted (250 gr) 1.19 1.20 0.98 1.20 
66 Margarine/low fat spread (Olive spread 500 gr) 1.39 1.50 1.39 1.50 
67 Olive oil (1 lt) 3.80 3.69 3.48 3.69 
F Fruit     
68  Pineapple (1 pc) 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.69 
69 Avocado (ready to eat twin pack)  2.00 2.00 1.75 1.99 
70 Bananas (Loose 1 kg) 0.79 0.79 0.68 0.79 
71 Cooking apples  (1 kg) 1.95 1.99 1.95 1.99 
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72 Dessert apples (Gala Bag of 6) 1.70 1.99 1.50 1.99 
73 Dried fruit (Dried Mango 100 gr) 1.50 1.75 1.47 1.93 
74 Grapefruit (Red x 3 )  1.50 1.41 1.08 1.44 
75 Green Seedless Grapes Pack (500 gr) 2.25 2.50 2.00 2.75 
76 Kiwi fruit (6 pk)  1.00 1.25 1.00 1.25 
77 Oranges (Loose 5 pcs) 1.50 1.75 1.50 1.50 
78 Organic fruit (Lemons 4pk) 1.33 1.50 1.87 1.99 
79 Peaches/nectarines (Punet of 4) 1.50 2.50 1.75 3.00 
80 Pears (Ripe 4 pk) 1.75 1.80 1.75 2.50 
81 Plums (loose 500 gr)  2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 
82 Salted/roasted peanuts (200 gr) 0.55 0.72 0.48 1.08 
83 Small oranges (bag of 5) 0.59 0.93 0.48 1.99 
84 Strawberries (300 gr) 2.31 1.80 1.32 3.80 
85 Various canned fruits (pineapple pieces 500 gr)  0.30 0.71 0.28 0.92 
G Vegetables      
86             Broccoli (1 unit 335 gr) 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.69 
87  Onions (Red 3 pk) 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.25 
88 Baking Potatoes (Bag 2.5 KG) 2.40 2.60 2.20 2.75 
89 Cabbage (Savoy 1 pc) 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
90 Canned baked beans (4x420 gr) 1.60 1.60 1.27 1.68 
91 Canned sweet corn (325 gr) 0.62 0.69 0.59 0.69 
92 Canned tomatoes (4x400 gr) 2.19 2.49 1.56 2.49 
93 Carrots (loose 1 kg) 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
94 Cauliflower 0.89 1.00 0.50 1.00 
95 Courgettes (loose 1 kg) 1.90 2.00 1.62 2.00 
96 Crisps – single and multi-packs (sea salt 150 gr) 1.39 1.50 1.00 1.50 
97 Cucumbers (1 pc) 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.90 
98 Frozen chips  (1.5 kg) 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.41 
99 Frozen Garden Peas (1kg) 1.60 1.76 1.60 1.77 
100 Lettuce (Round 1 pc) 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.60 
101 Mushrooms (White Closed Cup 400 gr) 0.97 0.97 1.07 1.30 
102 Organic vegetables (Organic Leeks 400 gr) 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
103 Peppers (Mixed Bag 600 gr) 1.34 1.51 1.52 1.75 
104 Pre-packed salad (Leafy Rocket Salad 100 gr) 1.39 1.88 1.11 1.66 
105 Tomatoes (500 gr) 0.95 0.90 0.89 1.69 
106 Vegetable pickle (Onion 440 gr) 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.99 
107 Vegetarian burger/grills N/A N/A N/A N/A 
H Sugar, Jam, Honey, Syrups, Chocolate and Confectionery    
108 Chocolates (Milk chocolate bar 200 gr) 0.60 0.66 0.60 1.62 
109 Gum N/A N/A N/A N/A 
110 Ice cream (Vanilla 2 litres) 1.00 0.89 0.89 1.50 
111 Mints (Assortment 200 gr) 0.89 0.78 0.80 1.00 
112 Sugar N/A N/A N/A N/A 
113 Various jams (Strawberry Jam 454 gr)  0.29 0.29 0.29 0.80 
114 Various selected popular brands of sweets N/A N/A N/A N/A 
I Food Products (not elsewhere classified)     
115 Mayonnaise (500 ml) 0.45 0.50 0.45 1.09 
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116 Ready cooked meals (Fresh Cottage Pie 450 gr) 2.30 2.30 2.25 2.69 
117 Soup (Leek and Potato 600 gr) 1.00 1.70 1.00 1.99 
118 Tomato Sauce (Squeezy Ketchup 500 gr) 0.92 1.03 0.87 1.03 
J Non-alcoholic Beverages     
  Coffee, Tea and Cocoa     
119 Tea Bags (80 bags) 0.27 0.35 0.35 1.50 
120 Instant Coffee (Rich Roast 100 gr) 1.50 1.50 1.84 1.50 
121 Ground Coffee (227 gr) 1.69 1.69 2.28 2.29 
 Mineral Waters, Soft Drinks and Juices     
122 Cola (2 litres) 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.95 
123 Energy drinks  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
124 Fruit drink (Cranberry Juice 1 litre) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.80 
125 Fruit smoothie (Tropical Fruit 1 litre) 1.33 2.00 1.33 2.39 
126 Lemonade (2 litres) 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.69 
127 Mineral water (Sparkling 4x2 litres) 1.50 1.65 1.50 1.65 
128 Squash (Orange Double Strength 1.5 litres) 1.50 1.59 1.49 2.24 
129 Various fizzy drinks (Ginger Ale 1 litre) 0.61 0.51 0.45 0.50 
130 Various pure fruit juices (Orange Fresh 1 litre) 1.20 1.20 1.00 1.20 
K Goods and Services for Household Maintenance     
 Non-Durable Household Goods     
131  Bin liners (Standard Tie Top Refuse 20 Pack) 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.66 
132  Bleach (Thick Citrus 750 ml) 0.79 0.87 1.00 0.87 
133  Washing powder (3 kg Bio Powder) 2.80 2.88 2.52 6.45 
134  Washing-up liquid (500 ml) 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.89 
135 Aluminium foil (20 m) 1.13 0.68 0.72 2.98 
136 Dishwasher tablets (30 pk) 1.60 1.80 1.67 3.70 
137 Fabric conditioner (2 l) 0.90 1.20 0.90 2.20 
138 
Household cleaner cream/liquid (all purpose liquid 
1l) 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.52 
139 Kitchen roll (2 rolls) 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.58 
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A.2.2 – Ngene pilot design syntax 
;alts = T, S, A, W 
;rows = 10 
;eff = (mnl,d) 
;alg = mfederov 
;require: 
T.P= [56.07] and S.P= [60.65] and A.P= [52.60] and W.P= [80.59], 
T.Disc= [0] or T.Disc= [29.16] or T.Disc= [58.31] or T.Disc= [116.62], 
S.Disc= [0] or S.Disc= [31.54] or S.Disc= [63.08] 
;reject: 
W.Qual=0, 
A.Qual=3 
;model: 
U(T) = b1[-.01]*P[52.60, 56.07, 60.65, 80.59] + b2[0.0001]*Disc[0, 
29.16, 58.31, 31.54, 63.08, 116.62]  
+ b3[-.001]*Time[5, 8, 12, 17] + b4.effects[-.0002|-
.0001|.0001]*Qual[0,1,2,3]  
+ b5.effects[-.0002|-.0001|.0001]*Ran[0,1,2,3] + b6.effects[-.0002|-
.0001|.0001]*Serv[0,1,2,3] 
+ i1[.0001]*Disc*Time + i2[-.0001]*P*Time + i3[.0001]*Disc*P + 
i4[.0001]*P*Qual.effects[2]+ i5[.0002]*P*Qual.effects[3] 
+ i6[-.0002]*P*Qual.effects[0] + i7[.0001]*P*Serv.effects[2] + 
i8[.0002]*P*Serv.effects[3] 
+ i9[-.0002]*P*Serv.effects[0] 
/ 
U(S) = b1*P + b2*Disc + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv 
/ 
U(A) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv  
/ 
U(W) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv  
$ 
 
 
 
A.2.3 – Screen shot of pilot survey instructions for participants 
203 
 
A.2.4 – Screenshot of a sample question from the pilot survey  
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A.2.5 - Pilot survey results before clustering standard errors at individual level 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| Coef. |z-stat| 
Price -0.036* 
(0.01) 
3.67 0.012 
(0.111) 
0.11 
Discount 0.01*  
(0.003)     
3.47 -0.105 
(0.065) 
1.63 
Time -0.081*  
(0.022)   
3.62 -0.234 
(0.293) 
0.8 
Medium Quality 2.39* 
(0.549) 
4.35 18.313 
(13.68) 
1.34 
High Quality 
 
2.73* 
(0.52) 
5.25 20.432 
(14.685) 
1.39 
Very High Quality 2.938* 
(0.538) 
5.46 22.92 
(14.229) 
1.61 
Medium Range 0.481* 
(0.262) 
1.84 0.322 
(2.662) 
0.12 
High Range 0.576 
(0.354) 
1.63 -0.820 
(2.6) 
0.32 
Very High Range 0.772* 
(0.285) 
2.71 3.203 
(2.683) 
1.19 
Medium Service 0.744* 
(0.271) 
0.066 0.56 
(0.388) 
1.44 
High Service 0.814* 
(0.308) 
0.103 0.793 
(0.0529) 
1.50 
Very High Service 1.101* 
(0.336) 
0.007 1.521* 
(0.369) 
4.12 
Price*Discount   0.002 
(0.001) 
1.79 
Price*Time   0.003 
(0.293) 
0.52 
Time*Discount   -0.001 
(0.001) 
1 
Price*Low Quality 
   
  0.293 
(0.241) 
1.22 
 
Price*High Quality   0.293 
(0.063) 
0.54 
Price*Very High Quality   -0.067 
(0.062) 
1.07 
Price*Low Service   -0.0005 
(0.044) 
0.01 
Price*High Service   0.014 
(0.458) 
0.31 
Price*Very High Service   -0.051 
(0.052) 
0.97 
Log-likelihood -270.565 -262.059 
Nr. Respondents 26  26  
Nr. Observations 1040  1040  
Notes: Standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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A.2.6 – Ngene main design syntax: model averaging approach with Bayesian 
approximation 
 
Design 
;alts(m1) = T, S, A, W 
;alts(m2) = T, S, A, W 
;alts(m3) = T, S, A, W 
;rows = 11 
;eff = 2*m1(mnl,d,mean) + 1.5*m2(mnl,d,mean) + m3(mnl,d,mean) 
;alg = mfederov 
;bdraws= Halton(40000) 
;require: 
T.P= [56] and S.P= [61] and A.P= [53] and W.P= [81], 
T.Disc= [0] or T.Disc= [29] or T.Disc= [58] or T.Disc= [117], 
S.Disc= [0] or S.Disc= [32] or S.Disc= [63] 
;reject: 
W.Qual=0, 
A.Qual=3 
;model(m1): 
U(T) = b1[(n,-.04, .05)]*P[53, 56, 61, 81] + b2[(n,0.01,.02)]*Disc[0, 
29, 58, 32, 63, 117] + b3[(n,-.08,.01)]*Time[5, 8, 12, 17]  
+ b4.dummy[(n,2.39,2.7)|(n,2.73,2.8)|(n,2.94,2.7)]*Qual[1,2,3,0] + 
b5.dummy[(n,.74,1.38)|(n,.81,1.57)|(n,1.1,1.71)]*Ran[1,2,3,0]  
+ b6.dummy[(n,.48,1.34)|(n,.58,1.81)|(n,.77,1.71)]*Serv[1,2,3,0] 
/ 
U(S) = b1*P + b2*Disc + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv 
/ 
U(A) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv  
/ 
U(W) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv 
 
;model(m2): 
U(T) = b1[(n,-.04, .05)]*P[53, 56, 61, 81] + b2[(n,0.01,.02)]*Disc[0, 
29, 58, 32, 63, 117] + b3[(n,-.08,.01)]*Time[5, 8, 12, 17]  
+ b4.dummy[(n,2.39,2.7)|(n,2.73,2.8)|(n,2.94,2.7)]*Qual[1,2,3,0] + 
b5.dummy[(n,.74,1.38)|(n,.81,1.57)|(n,1.1,1.71)]*Ran[1,2,3,0]  
+ b6.dummy[(n,.48,1.34)|(n,.58,1.81)|(n,.77,1.71)]*Serv[1,2,3,0] 
+ i1[-.001]*Disc*Time + i2[.001]*P*Time + i3[.001]*Disc*P + i4[-
.001]*P*Qual.dummy[2]+ i5[-.001]*P*Qual.dummy[3] + 
i6[.001]*P*Qual.dummy[0] + i7[.001]*P*Serv.dummy[2]  
+ i8[-.001]*P*Serv.dummy[3] + i9[-.001]*P*Serv.dummy[0] 
/ 
U(S) = b1*P + b2*Disc + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv 
/ 
U(A) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv  
/ 
U(W) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv 
 
;model(m3): 
U(T) = b1[(n,-.04, .05)]*P[53, 56, 61, 81] + b2[(n,0.01,.02)]*Disc[0, 
29, 58, 32, 63, 117] + b3[(n,-.08,.01)]*Time[5, 8, 12, 17]  
+ b4.effects[(n,2.39,2.7)|(n,2.73,2.8)|(n,2.94,2.7)]*Qual[1,2,3,0] + 
b5.effects[(n,.74,1.38)|(n,.81,1.57)|(n,1.1,1.71)]*Ran[1,2,3,0]  
+ b6.effects[(n,.48,1.34)|(n,.58,1.81)|(n,.77,1.71)]*Serv[1,2,3,0] 
/ 
U(S) = b1*P + b2*Disc + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv 
/ 
U(A) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv  
/ 
U(W) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv 
$ 
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A.2.7 – Ngene model evaluation syntax for the mixed logit specification 
Design 
;alts(m1) = T, S, A, W 
;rows = 11 
;eff = m1(rppanel,d) 
;rdraws= halton(1000) 
;rep = 1000 
;eval = 6.ngd 
;model(m1): 
U(T) = b1[n,-.04, .05]*P[53, 56, 61, 81] + b2[n,0.01,.02]*Disc[0, 29, 
58, 32, 63, 117] + b3[n,-.08,.01]*Time[5, 8, 12, 17]  
+ b4.dummy[n,2.39,2.7|n,2.73,2.8)|n,2.94,2.7]*Qual[1,2,3,0] + 
b5.dummy[n,.74,1.38|n,.81,1.57|n,1.1,1.71]*Ran[1,2,3,0]  
+ b6.dummy[n,.48,1.34|n,.58,1.81|n,.77,1.71]*Serv[1,2,3,0] 
/ 
U(S) = b1*P + b2*Disc + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv 
/ 
U(A) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv  
/ 
U(W) = b1*P + b3*Time + b4*Qual + b5*Ran + b6*Serv 
$ 
 
 
 
A.2.8 – Instructions for survey participants for the main survey 
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A.2.9 – Screenshot of a sample question from the main survey 
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A.3.1 – List of Model Specifications  
Model Model specification 
CL1 
• Conditional logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
CL1 (a)* 
• Conditional logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Applies population weights 
CL1 (b)* 
• Conditional logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
 CL2 
• Conditional logit 
• Contains the main explanatory variables and all candidate interaction terms 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
CL3 
• Conditional logit 
• Contains the main explanatory variables and statistically significant 
interaction terms 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
ML1 
• Mixed logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• All explanatory variables are assumed to be random 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML1 (a)* 
• Mixed logit interim model to identify which of the explanatory variables has 
significant standard deviations to verify if preferences vary in the population 
for that particular attribute 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are Price, 
Discount, Time, Very High Quality, High and Very High Range, High and 
Very High Service 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML1 (b)* 
• Interim mixed logit to identify which of the explanatory variables has 
significant standard deviations to verify if preferences vary in the population 
for that particular attribute 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are Price, 
Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range, High and Very High 
Service 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML2 
• Mixed logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Price, Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High 
Service 
• Applies population weights 
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• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML2 (a)* 
• Mixed logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Price, Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High 
Service 
• Applies population weights 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML2 (b)* 
• Mixed logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Price, Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High 
Service  
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML2 (c)* 
• Mixed logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Price, Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High 
Service 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 50 Halton draws 
ML3 
• Mixed logit 
• Contains the main explanatory variables and all candidate interaction terms 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Price, Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High 
Service 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML3 (a)* 
• Mixed logit 
• Contains the main explanatory variables and all candidate interaction terms 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Price, Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High 
Service 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 50 Halton draws 
ML4  
• Mixed logit 
• Contains the main explanatory variables and statistically significant 
interaction terms 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Price, Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High 
Service 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML4 (a)* 
• Mixed logit 
• Contains the main explanatory variables and statistically significant 
interaction terms 
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• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Price, Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High 
Service 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 50 Halton draws 
ML5  • Mixed logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Discount, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High Service 
• Variables assumed to be random and log-normally distributed are restricted 
to Price and Time 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML6  • Mixed logit 
• Contains the main explanatory variables and significant interaction terms 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Discount, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High Service 
• Variables assumed to be random and log-normally distributed are restricted 
to Price and Time 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors  
• 500 Halton draws 
ML6 (a)* • Mixed logit 
• Contains the main explanatory variables and all candidate interaction terms 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Discount, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High Service 
• Variables assumed to be random and log-normally distributed are restricted 
to Price and Time 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors  
• 500 Halton draws 
ML7 (a) • Mixed logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High Service 
• Price is assumed to have a fixed coefficient for WTP estimates 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML7 (b)* • Interim mixed logit to find significant interaction terms 
• Contains the main explanatory variables and interaction terms that were 
statistically significant in model ML4 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High Service 
• Price is assumed to have a fixed coefficient for WTP estimates 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML7 (c) • Mixed logit 
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• Contains the main explanatory variables and only statistically significant 
interaction terms 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Discount, Time, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High Service 
• Price is assumed to have a fixed coefficient for WTP estimates 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML8 (a) • Mixed logit 
• Contains only the main explanatory variables (no interaction terms) 
• Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are restricted to 
Discount, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High Service 
• Variables assumed to be random and log-normally distributed are restricted 
to Time 
• Price is assumed to have a fixed coefficient for WTP estimates 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
ML8 (b) • Contains the main explanatory variables and significant interaction terms 
from ML 6 (b) Variables assumed to be random and normally distributed are 
restricted to Discount, Very High Quality, Very High Range and High 
Service 
• Price is assumed to have a fixed coefficient for WTP estimates 
• Variables assumed to be random and log-normally distributed are restricted 
to Time 
• Applies population weights 
• Individual-level clustered standard errors 
• 500 Halton draws 
Notes: * indicates that the table of results for this model specification is presented in the appendix.   
This table does not include the pilot survey model specifications which are outlined in Chapter 2. 
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A.3.2 - Description of interaction terms tested in the conditional and mixed logit 
model specifications 
 
Interaction Interaction description 
Female*Price     The effect of gender on preferences for grocery basket price. 
Female*Discount The effect of gender on preferences for a loyalty scheme discount. 
Female*Time The effect of gender on preferences for grocery store proximity. 
Female*VH Quality The effect of gender on preferences for very high quality of products at the grocery store. 
Female*VH Range The effect of gender on preferences for very high range of products at the grocery store. 
Female*High Service  The effect of gender on preferences for high levels of service at the grocery store 
Large 
Household*Price     
The effect of living in a large household of four or more individuals, on 
preferences for grocery basket price. 
Large 
Household*Discount      
The effect of living in a large household of four or more individuals, on 
preferences for a loyalty scheme discount. 
Large Household*VH 
Range 
The effect of living in a large household of four or more individuals, on 
preferences for very high range of products at the grocery store. 
Unemployed*Price    The effect of being unemployed on preferences for grocery basket price. 
Student*Price  The effect of being a student on preferences for grocery basket price. 
Unemployed*Discount   The effect of being unemployed on preferences for a loyalty scheme discount. 
Student*Discount     The effect of being a student on preferences for a loyalty scheme discount. 
Unemployed*Time   The effect of being unemployed on preferences for grocery store proximity. 
Student*Time  The effect of being a student on preferences for grocery store proximity. 
No Car*Time The effect of not driving a car to go grocery shopping on grocery store proximity. 
No Car*VH Range The effect of not driving a car to go grocery shopping on very high product range. 
18 – 44 Age 
Group*Price    
The effect of being in the 18-44 age group on preferences for the grocery 
basket price. 
18 – 44 Age 
Group*Discount    
The effect of being in the 18-44 age group on preferences for a loyalty 
scheme discount. 
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< £22,000 HI*Price    The effect of being in the lower household income group earning less than £22,000 annually (after tax) on preferences for grocery basket price. 
> £45,000 HI*Price    The effect of being in a higher household income group earning more than £45,000 annually (after tax) on preference for grocery basket price. 
> £45,000 
HI*Discount 
The effect of being in a higher household income group earning more 
than £45,000 annually (after tax) on preference for the loyalty scheme 
discount. 
> £45,000 HI*VH 
Quality    
The effect of being in a higher household income group earning more 
than £45,000 annually (after tax) on preference for very high quality of 
products in store. 
> £45,000 HI*High 
Service   
The effect of being in a higher household income group earning more 
than £45,000 annually (after tax) on preference for very high levels of 
service in store. 
> £45,000 HI*Time     
The effect of being in a higher household income group earning more 
than £45,000 annually (after tax) on preference for grocery store 
proximity. 
< £22,000 
HI*Discount    
The effect of being in a lower household income group earning less than 
£22,000 annually (after tax) on preference for the loyalty scheme 
discount. 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Price    
The effect of regularly purchasing groceries online (i.e. at least once a 
month) on preferences for the grocery basket price. 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Discount    
The effect of regularly purchasing groceries online (i.e. at least once a 
month) on preferences for the loyalty scheme discount. 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Time    
The effect of regularly purchasing groceries online (i.e. at least once a 
month) on preferences for grocery store proximity.  
Infrequent Online 
Shop*Price    
The effect of rarely purchasing groceries online (i.e. few times a year/ 
never) on preferences for the grocery basket price. 
Infrequent Online 
Shop*Discount    
The effect of rarely purchasing groceries online (i.e. few times a year/ 
never) on preferences for the loyalty scheme discount. 
Infrequent  Online 
Shop*Time     
The effect of rarely purchasing groceries online (i.e. few times a year/ 
never) on preferences for grocery store proximity. 
Infrequent Online 
Shop*VH Range    
The effect of rarely purchasing groceries online (i.e. few times a year/ 
never) on preferences for very high product range in store. 
No Loyalty 
Cards*Price     
The effect of not participating in any loyalty schemes on preferences for 
the grocery basket price. 
No Loyalty 
Cards*Discount 
The effect of not participating in any loyalty schemes on preference for 
the loyalty scheme discount. 
No Loyalty 
Cards*Time  
The effect of not participating in any loyalty schemes on preferences for 
grocery store proximity. 
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1-2 Loyalty 
Cards*Time  
The effect of participating in 1-2 loyalty schemes on preferences for 
grocery store proximity. 
1-2 Loyalty 
Cards*Discount    
The effect of participating in 1-2 loyalty schemes on preferences for the 
loyalty scheme discount. 
1-2 Loyalty 
Cards*Price   
The effect of participating in 1-2 loyalty schemes on preferences for the 
grocery basket price. 
 
 
 
 
 
A.3.3 – Conditional Logit Models CL1 (a) & CL1 (b) 
 CL1 (a) CL1 (b) 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| O.R. Coef. |z-stat| O.R. 
Price -0.054*** 
(0.002) -23.94 0.947 
-0.054*** 
(0.003) -15.95 0.947 
Discount 0.009*** 
(0.001) 16.22 1.009 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 9.66 1.009 
Time -0.061*** 
(0.005) -12.84 0.941 
-0.075*** 
(0.006) -12.58 0.928 
Medium Quality 0.558*** 
(0.061) 9.09 1.746 
0.725*** 
(0.071) 10.21 2.065 
High Quality 0.555*** 
(0.065) 8.59 1.741 
0.764*** 
(0.082) 9.31 2.146 
Very High Quality 0.830*** 
(0.075) 11.05 2.292 
1.035*** 
(0.089) 11.62 2.815 
Medium Range 0.707*** 
(0.065) 10.82 2.027 
0.571*** 
(0.062) 9.24 1.769 
High Range 0.924*** 
(0.070) 13.18 2.519 
0.960*** 
(0.072) 13.27 2.613 
Very High Range 1.047*** 
(0.061) 17.12 2.850 
1.006*** 
(0.068) 14.7 2.735 
Medium Service 0.845*** 
(0.059) 14.35 2.327 
0.782*** 
(0.062) 12.6 2.186 
High Service 0.988*** 
(0.058) 17.1 2.687 
0.945*** 
(0.072) 13.11 2.572 
Very High Service 1.152*** 
(0.073) 15.79 3.165 
1.110*** 
(0.081) 13.68 3.034 
Log-likelihood -5204.184   -5109.258   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18832   18788   
Notes: Standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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A.3.4 – Mixed Logit Models ML1 (a) & ML1 (b) 
 ML1 (a) ML1 (b) 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev 
Price -0.094*** 
(0.010) 9.35 
0.067*** 
(0.008) 
-0.091*** 
(0.010) 8.97 
0.067*** 
(0.009) 
Discount 0.012*** 
(0.002) 5.24 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 5.11 
-0.025*** 
(0.003) 
Time -0.107*** 
(0.015) 7.3 
0.110*** 
(0.013) 
-0.104*** 
(0.015) 7.09 
0.111*** 
(0.015) 
Medium Quality 0.473*** 
(0.156) 3.02 
0.392** 
(0.178) 
0.478*** 
(0.161) 2.97 
0.286 
(0.544) 
High Quality 0.563*** 
(0.193) 2.92 
0.284 
(0.283) 
0.574*** 
(0.192) 2.99 - 
Very High Quality 0.875** 
(0.188) 4.64 
0.688*** 
(0.206) 
0.836*** 
(0.197) 4.25 
0.659*** 
(0.235) 
Medium Range 0.741*** 
(0.136) 5.45 - 
0.743*** 
(0.137) 5.43 - 
High Range 0.982*** 
(0.165) 5.94 - 
0.983*** 
(0.164) 5.98 - 
Very High Range 1.196*** 
(0.158) 7.58 
0.863*** 
(0.132) 
1.209*** 
(0.156) 7.77 
0.893*** 
(0.147) 
Medium Service 1.141*** 
(0.161) 7.08 - 
1.122*** 
(0.154) 7.27 - 
High Service 1.320*** 
(0.170) 7.77 
0.679*** 
(0.171) 
1.330*** 
(0.163) 8.15 
0.757*** 
(0.148) 
Very High Service 1.433*** 
(0.211) 6.79 - 
1.416*** 
(0.205) 6.9 - 
Log-likelihood -4640.753   -4646.057   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18832   18832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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A.3.5 – Mixed Logit Models ML2 (a), ML2 (b) & ML2 (c) 
 ML2 (a) ML2 (b) ML2 (c) 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev 
Price -0.090*** 
(0.005) 16.99 
0.067*** 
(0.005) 
-0.089*** 
(0.005) 
16.21 -0.065*** 
(0.006) 
-0.080*** 
(0.011) 
7.18 0.060** 
(0.024) 
Discount 0.011*** 
(0.001) 7.98 
0.024*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
8.96 -0.023*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
4.49 0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Time -0.102*** 
(0.008) 12.63 
0.106*** 
(0.008) 
-0.126*** 
(0.010) 
12.99 0.131*** 
(0.010) 
-0.092*** 
(0.013) 
7.09 0.100*** 
(0.015) 
Medium 
Quality 
0.475*** 
(0.073) 6.49 - 
0.701*** 
(0.091) 
7.72 
- 
0.488*** 
(0.153) 
3.20 - 
High Quality 0.573*** 
(0.079) 7.28 - 
0.843*** 
(0.110) 
7.68 
- 
0.580*** 
(0.184) 
3.15 - 
Very High 
Quality 
0.840*** 
(0.094) 8.94 
0.696*** 
(0.106) 
1.087*** 
(0.109) 
9.98 0.665*** 
(0.106) 
0.809*** 
(0.184) 
4.39 0.527** 
(0.256) 
Medium 
Range 
0.740*** 
(0.076) 9.76 - 
0.513*** 
(0.073) 
7.05 
- 
0.711*** 
(0.129) 
5.53 - 
High Range 0.984*** 
(0.080) 12.3 - 
1.018*** 
(0.088) 
11.51 
- 
0.955*** 
(0.157) 
6.08 - 
Very High 
Range 
1.201*** 
(0.087) 13.87 
0.882*** 
(0.083) 
1.110*** 
(0.088) 
12.54 0.900*** 
(0.087) 
1.151*** 
(0.149) 
7.75 0.709*** 
(0.210) 
Medium 
Service 
1.127*** 
(0.072) 15.57 - 
1.005*** 
(0.084) 
12.00 
- 
1.086*** 
(0.148) 
7.35 - 
High Service 1.340*** 
(0.079) 16.90 
0.721*** 
(0.085) 
1.211*** 
(0.090) 
13.47 -0.692*** 
(0.101) 
1.229*** 
(0.157) 
7.85 0.646*** 
(0.160) 
Very High 
Service 
1.403*** 
(0.087) 16.15 - 
1.321*** 
(0.106) 
12.51 
- 
1.367*** 
(0.200) 
6.83 - 
Log-
likelihood -4647.902   -4600.321  
 -4674.851   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18,832   18,788   18,832   
Notes: Standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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A.3.6 – Mixed logit models ML3 (a) & ML4 (a) 
 ML3 (a) ML4 (a) 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. 
Price -0.076*** (0.019) 4.1 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
-0.076 
(0.016) 4.86 
0.051*** 
(0.010) 
Discount 0.025*** (0.007) 3.78 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.003) 4.15 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Time -0.158*** (0.032) 4.95 
0.091*** 
(0.016) 
-0.121 
(0.014) 8.45 
0.091*** 
(0.013) 
Medium Quality 0.488*** (0.156) 3.13 - 
0.499 
(0.154) 3.23 - 
High Quality 0.588*** (0.195) 3.02 - 
0.602 
(0.190) 3.17 - 
Very High Quality 1.125*** (0.244) 4.61 
0.475** 
(0.213) 
1.137 
(0.238) 4.78 
0.443** 
(0.192) 
Medium Range 0.725*** (0.129) 5.62 - 
0.708 
(0.126) 5.60 - 
High Range 0.947*** (0.156) 6.06 - 
0.948 
(0.156) 6.09 - 
Very High Range 0.990*** (0.261) 3.79 
0.739*** 
(0.161) 
1.000 
(0.162) 6.17 
0.693*** 
(0.170) 
Medium Service 1.122*** (0.158) 7.12 - 
1.088 
(0.153) 7.11 - 
High Service 1.056*** (0.180) 5.86 
0.679*** 
(0.198) 
1.156 
(0.165) 7.00 
0.667*** 
(0.148) 
Very High Service 1.408*** (0.208) 6.76 - 
1.376 
(0.205) 6.71 - 
Female*Price     -0.019* (0.011) 1.76 - - - - 
Female*Discount 0.003 (0.005) 0.54 - - - - 
Female*Time -0.014 (0.025) 0.57 - - - - 
Female*VH Quality -0.540** (0.233) 2.32 - 
-0.565** 
(0.232) 2.43  
Female*VH Range 0.027 (0.221) 0.12 - - - - 
Female*High Service  0.144 
(0.190) 0.75 - - - - 
Large Household*Price     0.027** 
(0.011) 2.56 - - - - 
Large 
Household*Discount      
0.006 
(0.005) 1.16 - 
0.006 
(0.006) 1.12  
Large Household*VH 
Range 
-0.226 
(0.229) 0.99 - - - - 
Unemployed*Price    0.006 
(0.026) 0.23 - - - - 
Student*Price  0.025* 
(0.015) 1.73 - - - - 
Unemployed*Discount   -0.003 
(0.006) 0.48 - - - - 
Student*Discount     -0.005*** 
(0.005) 0.9 - - - - 
Unemployed*Time   0.032 
(0.041) 0.78 - - - - 
Student*Time  -0.037 1.15 - - - - 
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(0.032) 
No Car*Time -0.022 
(0.022) 0.97 - - - - 
No Car*VH Range 0.340 
(0.232) 1.46 - 
0.375 
(0.241) 1.56 - 
18 – 44 Age Group*Price    -0.027** 
(0.012) 2.2 - -  - 
18 – 44 Age 
Group*Discount    
-0.004 
(0.005) 0.84 - - - - 
< £22,000 HI*Price    -0.019 
(0.012) 1.59 - 
-0.033* 
(0.019) 1.72 - 
> £45,000 HI*Price    0.023 
(0.017) 1.36 - - - - 
> £45,000 HI*Discount -0.006 
(0.007) 0.86 - - - - 
> £45,000 HI*VH Quality    0.317 
(0.299) 1.06 - - - - 
> £45,000 HI*High 
Service   
0.562** 
(0.233) 2.41 - 
0.521** 
(0.261) 2.00 - 
< £22,000 HI*Discount    -0.007* 
(0.004) 1.68 - - - - 
> £45,000 HI*Time     0.043 
(0.031) 1.41 - - - - 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Price    
0.059*** 
(0.011) 5.17 - 
0.046** 
(0.021) 2.2 - 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Discount    
0.000 
(0.004) 0.08 - - - - 
Frequent Online 
Shop*Time    
0.101*** 
(0.023) 4.46 - 
0.082*** 
(0.023) 3.59 - 
Infrequent Online 
Shop*Price    
-0.011 
(0.011) 0.98 - - - - 
Infrequent Online 
Shop*Discount    
-0.005 
(0.004) 1.38 - - - - 
Infrequent  Online 
Shop*Time     
0.024 
(0.023) 1.03 - - - - 
Infrequent Online 
Shop*VH Range    
0.088 
(0.244) 0.36 - - - - 
No Loyalty Cards*Price     0.020 
(0.013) 1.56 - - - - 
No Loyalty 
Cards*Discount 
-0.017*** 
(0.007) 2.58 - 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 3.19 - 
No Loyalty Cards*Time  0.060** 
(0.030) 1.98 - - - - 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Time  0.034 
(0.023) 1.43 - - - - 
1-2 Loyalty 
Cards*Discount    
-0.004 
(0.005) 0.72 - - - - 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Price   -0.003 
(0.011) 0.24 - - - - 
Log-likelihood -4537.429   -4592.741   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18832   18832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, next to coefficients represents 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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A.3.7 – Mixed logit models ML6 (a) & ML7 (b)    
 ML6 (a) ML7 (b) 
Variable Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev. Coef. |z-stat| St. Dev 
Price -0.112*** 
(0.021) 5.31 
0.125*** 
(0.032) 
-0.058*** 
(0.010) -5.81 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Discount 0.025*** 
(0.008) 3.29 
0.023*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 4.18 
0.102*** 
(0.014) 
Time -0.155*** 
(0.035) 4.37 
0.174*** 
(0.064) 
-0.122*** 
(0.015) -8.35 - 
Medium Quality 0.457*** 
(0.162) 2.82 - 
0.534*** 
(0.145) 3.68 - 
High Quality 0.551*** 
(0.197) 2.8 - 
0.621*** 
(0.181) 3.43 - 
Very High Quality 1.116*** 
(0.254) 4.39 
0.578*** 
(0.187) 
1.224*** 
(0.242) 5.06 
0.611*** 
(0.187) 
Medium Range 0.700*** 
(0.133) 5.24 - 
0.752*** 
(0.131) 5.74 - 
High Range 0.937*** 
(0.161) 5.8 - 
0.984*** 
(0.155) 6.35 - 
Very High Range 1.020*** 
(0.277) 3.68 
0.879*** 
(0.130) 
1.134*** 
(0.170) 6.69 
0.976*** 
(0.122) 
Medium Service 1.129*** 
(0.157) 7.17 - 
1.077*** 
(0.149) 7.22 - 
High Service 1.091*** 
(0.180) 6.04 
0.683*** 
(0.166) 
1.285*** 
(0.167) 7.7 
0.703*** 
(0.129) 
Very High Service 1.410*** 
(0.210) 6.71 - 
1.421*** 
(0.199) 7.14 - 
Female*Price     -0.006 (0.013) 0.42  
- - - 
Female*Discount 0.002 (0.005) 0.33  
- - - 
Female*Time -0.049** (0.026) 1.87  
- - - 
Female*VH Quality -0.559** (0.240) 2.32  
-0.666*** 
(0.241) 2.76 - 
Female*VH Range 0.028 (0.237) 0.12  
- - - 
Female*High Service  0.183 
(0.205) 0.89  
- - - 
Large Household*Price     0.026** 
(0.011) 2.41  
- - - 
Large Household*Discount      0.007 
(0.005) 1.37  
0.005 
(0.005) 1.07 - 
Large Household*VH Range -0.160 
(0.236) 0.68  
- - - 
Unemployed*Price    -0.035** 
(0.016) 2.15  
- - - 
Student*Price  0.008 
(0.013) 0.59  
- - - 
Unemployed*Discount   0.002 
(0.007) 0.31  
- - - 
Student*Discount     -0.001 
(0.005) 0.22  
- - - 
Unemployed*Time   0.018 
(0.032) 0.58  
- - - 
Student*Time  -0.042 
(0.029) 1.45  
- - - 
No Car*Time -0.007 
(0.021) 0.35  
- - - 
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No Car*VH Range 0.411* 
(0.236) 1.74  
0.369 
(0.253) 1.46 - 
18 – 44 Age Group*Price    -0.019 
(0.013) 1.49  
- - - 
18 – 44 Age Group*Discount    -0.001 
(0.005) 0.33  
- - - 
< £22,000 HI*Price    -0.021* 
(0.012) 1.8  
-0.035*** 
(0.011) 3.23 
- 
> £45,000 HI*Price    0.034* 
(0.019) 1.79  
- - - 
> £45,000 HI*Discount -0.008 
(0.007) 1.23  
- - - 
> £45,000 HI*VH Quality    0.383 
(0.294) 1.3  
- - - 
> £45,000 HI*High Service   0.554** 
(0.233) 2.38  
0.365* 
(0.210) 1.74 
 
< £22,000 HI*Discount    -0.007 
(0.005) 1.62  
- - - 
> £45,000 HI*Time     0.023 
(0.037) 0.62  
- - - 
Frequent Online Shop*Price    0.045*** 
(0.012) 3.73  
0.036*** 
(0.011) 3.15 
 
Frequent Online Shop*Discount    0.001 
(0.005) 0.27  
- - - 
Frequent Online Shop*Time    0.087*** 
(0.021) 4.12  
0.084*** 
(0.022) 3.89 
 
Infrequent Online Shop*Price    -0.005 
(0.013) 0.37  
- - - 
Infrequent Online Shop*Discount    -0.003 
(0.004) 0.66  
- - - 
Infrequent  Online Shop*Time     0.026 
(0.022) 1.15  
- - - 
Infrequent Online Shop*VH Range    0.021 
(0.250) 0.09  
- - - 
No Loyalty Cards*Price     0.010 
(0.013) 0.75  
- - - 
No Loyalty Cards*Discount -0.022*** 
(0.007) 3.15  
-0.018*** 
(0.005) 3.88 
- 
No Loyalty Cards*Time  0.040 
(0.028) 1.44  
- - - 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Time  0.028 
(0.022) 1.25  
- - - 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Discount    -0.008 
(0.005) 1.51  
- - - 
1-2 Loyalty Cards*Price   0.009 
(0.013) 0.72  
- - - 
Log-likelihood -4511.693   -4667.179   
Nr. of Resp. 427   427   
Nr. of Obs. 18,832   18,832   
Notes: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. ***, **, *, represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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